TW: Andrew Bacevich is a very good national security analyst. If you want to read some insightful stuff on the Middle East, call up some of his articles. This piece addresses Afghanistan. Afghanistan is another quagmire in the making. It has received far less publicity than Iraq, one because it has been a lower intensity conflict with relatively poor media coverage (too expensive and dangerous which is not the media's fault, it just is). And most importantly unlike Iraq ,there was and is much stronger support for our being there hence far greater patience and willingness to absorb casualties and cost.
Yet it remains an unresolved, interminable and dangerous conflict. Unlike Iraq there is a consensus that we need to win even at a high cost but like Iraq just what winning means remains nebulous. Most discussion (inc. from the POTUS elect) has centered around deploying more troops, Bacevich argues that deploying more troops will do little solve the problems but merely exacerbate them. He does not propose withdrawal but new tactics focused less on democratization and more on dealing with the actual power players there, e.g. the warlords. I agree.
The neo-cons believe spreading American style democracy will solve all the world's ills, the bleeding heart left just wants everyone to get along and stop killing themselves, they are both wrong. Cold hearted power politics underpinned by as many rule sets as we can apply should drive our policy. It is not pure and pristine but it may be feasible.
From Bacevich and Newsweek:
"In Afghanistan today, the United States and its allies are using the wrong means to pursue the wrong mission. Sending more troops to the region, as incoming president Barack Obama and others have suggested we should, will only turn Operation Enduring Freedom into Operation Enduring Obligation. Afghanistan will be a sinkhole, consuming resources neither the U.S. military nor the U.S. government can afford to waste...
One of history's enduring lessons is that Afghans don't appreciate it when outsiders tell them how to govern their affairs—just ask the British or the Soviets...But we're now discovering that the challenges of pacifying Afghanistan dwarf those posed by Iraq. Afghanistan is a much bigger country—nearly the size of Texas—and has a larger population that's just as fractious. Moreover, unlike Iraq, Afghanistan possesses almost none of the prerequisites of modernity; its literacy rate, for example, is 28 percent, barely a third of Iraq's. In terms of effectiveness and legitimacy, the government in Kabul lags well behind Baghdad—not exactly a lofty standard. Apart from opium (last year's crop totaled about 8,000 metric tons), Afghans produce almost nothing the world wants...
All this means that we need to change course. The war in Afghanistan (like the Iraq War) won't be won militarily. It can be settled—if imperfectly—only through politics. And America's real political objective in Afghanistan is actually quite modest: to ensure that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda can't use the country as a safe haven for launching attacks against the West. Accomplishing that won't require creating a modern, cohesive nation-state...
..real influence in Afghanistan has traditionally rested with tribal leaders and warlords. Offered the right incentives, warlords can accomplish U.S. objectives more effectively and cheaply than Western combat battalions. The basis of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan should therefore become decentralization and outsourcing, offering cash and other emoluments to local leaders who will collaborate with us in keeping terrorists out of their territory...
http://www.newsweek.com/id/171254
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