TW: Barnett looks at Kurdistan (albeit with a bias since his company does much work them). Kurdistan has since the days of the first Gulf War (recall the no fly zone) been a region in the Iraq and the Middle East yearning for more not less U.S. involvement. Their motivation is simple, they want an autonomous state and the U.S. provides the means by which to acquire it (along with much work on their part). This does not mean they are any more or less noble than the southern Iraqis. Their interests are just far better aligned with the presence of American troops and "liberation" from Saddam than the southern Iraqis.
Is an autonomous Kurdistan good for the U.S. I think so assuming the Kurds are legitimately reconciled to forsaking any aspirations for a greater Kurdistan encompassing Kurd populations in Turkey or Iran.
The Kurds very much want a long-term U.S. military presence inside Kurdistan, I believe bases there would be relevant and useful to our national interests. The bases would deter Iranian and non-Kurd Iraqi aggression in the area. Without them one can safely assume Kurd/Iranian/Iraqi conflict will occur in time. Barnett brushes off the issue of Kirkuk (oil rich area), which the Kurds and the southern Iraqi both want (for obvious reasons). Resolution of Kirkuk along with the southern Iraqis agreeing to a level of autonomy for Kurdistan with which the Kurds are comfortable are the big hurdles to a peaceful resolution of the Kurd situation.
From Tom Barnett:
"...America enforced a no-fly zone over northern Iraq soon after Desert Storm's conclusion. Unlike the rest of Iraq that remained under Saddam's iron grip, the Kurdistanis got a lengthy head start on nation-building - an opportunity they vigorously exploited.
That success, in tandem with the K.R.G.'s disciplined militia known as the peshmerga, accounts for the almost complete lack of U.S. military casualties there since the war.
You know that neocon bit about Iraqis "welcoming us with flowers" and helping us overthrow Saddam? Well, it actually happened in Kurdistan. As a result, our military hasn't stationed - or lost - troops inside the K.R.G. since Saddam fell.
So when we talk about U.S. nation-building in Iraq, we must admit there was a "good" (Kurdistan) to go along with the "bad" (Shiite south) and the "ugly" (Sunni triangle).
...The neocons ridiculed then-senator Joe Biden's promotion of Iraq's "soft partition," but the truth is that outcome was preordained, with the majority Shiia ruling the south and Baghdad, Sunni tribal councils once again governing their own, and the K.R.G. in firm control of northern Iraq.
The U.S. military's surge strategy achieved success in pacifying southern Iraq primarily by acquiescing to that emergent reality and co-opting it.
But here's the rub: The Bush administration's meager efforts to create a regional security dialogue yielded little-to-no commitment to Iraq's stability from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey once U.S. troops leave.
Plus, we'll leave behind three armies inside Iraq: the Sunni militias, the K.R.G.'s peshmerga, and the reconstituted Iraq army - overwhelmingly controlled by Shiia.
Thus, as our troops draw down, the Obama administration will become essentially powerless to stop any future Shiite attempts to establish unitary control over the entirety of Iraq, meaning a resumed civil war is entirely possible.
Moreover, if regional kingpins Iran (Shiite) and the House of Saud (Sunni) are intent in re-igniting a proxy war within Iraq's borders, Washington will be reduced to a bystander.
But there is one thing the Obama administration can do to shape this scary pathway for the better: Leave behind enough ground troops inside Kurdistan to effectively take it off the table regarding future civil strife..."
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2009/feb/01/obama-must-not-sell-out-kurdish-iraq/
No comments:
Post a Comment