TW: Others are starting to question exactly how Moussavi would govern. He is an Iranian nationalist with close ties to the Islamic leadership. If he were not he would not be a leading candidate for POTI. Will he continue to pursue nukes, bet on it (pursuing nukes is a logical step for Iran but that is for a different post). Will he be more amenable to reaching a constructive accommodation with the West and even Israel, perhaps. In many ways he would provide a much more challenging POTI than Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad has become a caricature, easily defined as a radical. Moussavi would pursue Iranian interests in a more subtle and less confrontational manner. Moussavi represents liberalization of a very conservative state, but his ascension would validate Iran as a pluralistic society seeking a means to integrate more fully into the world structures. A good thing.
From Economist:
"...There are those who distrust Mr Moussavi. One sceptic writes, "His reserved tone and sudden populism mask a dark history of religious fanaticism, support for terrorism, and perpetuation of authoritarianism." Certainly his years as prime minister, 1981 to 1989, were marked by some controversial policies—support for the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, a place on Hizbullah's leadership council, a defence of the taking of American hostages. Yet, in the FT interview and elsewhere, Mr Moussavi comes off as a very cautious, pragmatic, vague and increasingly shrewd ;politician. During his "20 years of silence", as he worked in Iran's arts community, he seems to have moderated. Should the protests prove successful, "the world could expect a President Mousavi who fits somewhere between the accommodating reformism of Khatami and the strident nationalism of Ahmadinejad," says Mehrzad Boroujerdi, in a less attention-grabbing profile.
Whichever profile fits, most can agree that Mr Moussavi is hardly the perfect representative of the reformist, liberal Iranians who have taken to the streets. And, as happened with Mohammad Khatami, this will likely lead to some disappointment should Mr Moussavi win power. For now, though, this matters little. Matt Steinglass puts it well:
'[H]e’s no radical reformer. But what’s happened is that simply by representing an alternative, Moussavi became a vehicle for the expression of the hopes of people who are far more radical in their reformist attitudes than anyone in the dominant power structure. Even though the players in the Iranian elections were all screened for their personal views, the simple fact of an election became a forum in which radical and unacceptable political views could express themselves and ultimately co-opt one of the candidates.'
The current battle is over power and control of the electoral system—the clerics have it and the people want it. The specifics of governing will be worked out later, should the people succeed. But the ambiguity surrounding Mr Moussavi is yet another reason why Barack Obama should continue to play his cards close to his chest. If Mr Moussavi takes power, he's not going to abandon the nuclear programme, accept the existence of Israel or announce that it is now the Methodist Republic of Iran. When the energy of the protests fades and a sense of normality returns, no matter who has come out on top, America and Iran will still be left with very real differences on very many things. None of which is to say that America shouldn't be rooting for the opposition.
Update: Barack Obama beats me to my point.
Well, I think first of all, it's important to understand that although there is amazing ferment taking place in Iran, that the difference between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi in terms of their actual policies may not be as great as has been advertised. Either way, we were going to be dealing with an Iranian regime that has historically been hostile to the United States, that has caused some problems in the neighborhood and is pursuing nuclear weapons. And so we've got long-term interests in having them not weaponize nuclear power and stop funding organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas. And that would be true whoever came out on top in this election."
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/06/rationing_not_so_scary.cfm
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