TW: This piece provides context on what it means to engage directly in another nation's politics. Do we understand what we are doing initially much less the 2nd, 3rd, 10th order effects of our involvement? Our engagement in Iran ousted a Sunni dictatorship and gave the Shia majority political influence. Iraq is now aligned more closely with Iran than other Middle Eastern nations. As I said yesterday we will likely need to retain a material military presence in Iraq (assuming they will permit us) just to make sure the Iranians do not end up with their own military forces athwart the oil rich southern Shia provinces inside Iraq.
Pondering and evaluating these derivative effects will be crucial to formulating our next steps in an even thornier conundrum...AfPak.
From Tom Ricks at Foreign Policy Mag relating a letter from a U.S. Army officer recently back from an Iraq deployment:
"...Ghaz[the city in which the officer was deployed], as you may know, is mainly Shia in the northern half and Sunni in the southern half. We closed the last JSS [U.S. military outpost] in Ghaz on Sept. 7...and the day after it was closed the Iraqi army battalion in south Ghaz raided the South Ghaz (Sunni) SOI headquarters, confiscating weapons and equipment a US unit had supplied them back in 2007-2008. The JSS, which straddled the Shia-Sunni fault line across the middle of Ghaz, was basically the buffer for the Sunni in the south. SOI and local council leaders were reported to have fled the neighborhood, citing Shia militia threats. Keep in mind, directly to Ghaz's north is the Shia enclave of Shulla, a mini-Sadr City that is basically controlled by JAM[Shia militia] remnant groups (and a heavily complicit Iraqi Army battalion). This Shia influence spills into north Ghaz and has been encroaching upon south Ghaz over the past several months.
... It is unsurprising and confirms a steady and growing Shia influence throughout Baghdad. ...
When I was in Iraq, I read a bunch of books to include Robert Baer's The Devil We Know, which is about Iran's growing influence in the Mideast. Baer's first two sentences in Chapter 2, "How Iran Beat America," are: "Iraq is lost. Iran won it." Given what we've seen in classified reports and in the revolving door of Iraqi army commanders in select Baghdad neighborhoods, his thesis is spot on. Plus, Shia militiamen have melted into the army and police over the past few years making it much easier for them to create Shia havens throughout the city. It'll be interesting to see where Baghdad is in about 5 years.
In your book, The Gamble, you cite Ryan Crocker's comment that the most important events in Iraq have yet to happen. This is quite true and the troubling fact is that these events are going on right now and we don't even know what to do about them. Probably the better question is if can we do anything about them, especially given the constraints of the Security Agreement. It's especially tough to influence our ISF and council member counterparts via cell phone from Camp Liberty.
Anyway, forgive my rambling thoughts. Just thought I'd add to your Iraq "the unraveling" series. I must say, though, I am quite conflicted about our unit's efforts and sacrifices over the past year and the real reality on the ground right now. I mean how much of it is out of our control? How much can Chris Hill really influence Maliki and the Iraqi politicians? Do US interests line up with Iraqi interests? And how much of Iraq's interests are really Iran's? Much to think about ..."
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/30/iraq_the_unraveling_xxv_iran_won_an_army_officer_reports
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