My Gratuitous Opinion On an AfPak Escalation: Part 2

TW: Why and how do I think the U.S. can achieve a successful escalation in AfPak?

1) Everything I read about Gen. McChrystal is that he is the right person to formulate and execute an effective COIN strategy (I know there is some blow back on his involvement in the Pat Tillman fiasco but not anywhere enough to diminish his other credentials and accomplishments) One cannot forget the neglect with which the U.S. treated the AfPak theater after the overthrow of the Taliban. Resources of all kinds were severely restricted partially due to the small footprint strategy (which has been a dismal failure) and partly as special forces, satellite intel and other resources were re-deployed to Iraq.

The U.S. left a huge void in AfPak hoping friendly indigenous forces would assume full control. This strategy failed miserably creating a void into which the Taliban gradually back-filled. For the first time in AfPak we may finally have a strategy and resources to re-build Afghanistan.

2) From Economist: "The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war."

All good points and not at all slam dunks. Credible partner governments have been the bane of COIN throughout history. Any partner government starts out at a severe disadvantage as they at some level are subservient to the outside power involved. Immediately the insurgents can claim a certain legitimacy as the more "true" nationalist representative.

The U.S. made a further mistake in Afghanistan by attempting to impose democracy where none had existed and where centralized government in general has always been weak. We now see many observers twisted in knots about the recent fraudulent election. To me the elections are a distraction. The key will be the U.S. and others working with Afghani to de-centralize governance through various tribal entities regardless of who occupies executive power in Kabul.

3) From Economist: "The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war."

AfPak has been under-resourced from day one. Obama must define the stakes and ask for commitment from Americans, from Europeans and from others. W. Bush said many things as POTUS but one thing he never articulated was how the so-called "war on terror" was existential yet did not require significant sacrifice on the part of average Americans. No extra taxes, no national service, no spending cuts in other areas and no clear delineation of the price Americans must pay in order to address our strategic challenges.

If the U.S. is to have a legitimate chance at success in AfPak. very significant human and financial costs will be necessary. These costs cannot be defined precisely but they will be significant. If Americans are unable or unwilling to absorb these costs, then Americans should be prepared to live in a world where the risk of instability will be much higher with the commensurate risks to American national interests.

4) America is not and should not be alone in AfPak. We tend as always to focus on our ourselves but AfPak impacts nearly everyone throughout the world. The strategic imperatives in AfPak are not American only, they are relevant to any nation seeking to minimize terrorism risks, minimize the negative impacts of radical Islam and minimize the risks of the regional powers in the area (Pakistan, Iran, India, the Stans, China, Russia) coming to blows over instability in the AfPak area.

Unlike Iraq where allied support (for good reason it turns out) but for the Brits was largely either brief (e.g. Spain), motivated by secondary political considerations (e.g. the Georgians, Poles) or extremely limited (about all others); many nations have contributed forces in AfPak. While these forces have been limited and frequently restricted in capability and aggressiveness, they are substantial (roughly 40,000). Few Americans realize for instance that several nations in particular the Brits, the Dutch, the Danes and the Canadians have fought expensive, disproportionate and deadly battles in Afghanistan.

Understand we broke the Taliban (while excluding almost all allied involvement in the actual initial fights, everyone wanted to pitch in post 9/11 but we said no thanks we will kill them ourselves), then we largely left Afgahnistan (we had fewer than 20,000 troops for the first several years). We sold NATO on AfPak being a peacekeeping mission not an actual war. Sending one's soldiers off to serve under someone else's leadership is never an easy task (imagine Americans being asked to send significant troops to serve under say French leadership in Africa). All the while with our strategies in AfPak meandering between "small footprint", counter-terror and partial COIN.

But now with a new American commitment and strategy it is imperative that our allies and near allies commit as well. Otherwise they will be guilty of free-riding. The U.S. as the leader will always bear a disproportionate share that goes with making the decisions and driving policy. We cannot expect others to merely follow lemming like behind us. But we can expect folks to pitch in.

Part of the new strategy will be to work with the nearby regional powers including Iran to engage their help stabilizing the AfPak area. But if the Brazilians, Japanese, South Koreans, Indonesians etc. want to enjoy the benefits of globalization then they need to step up to help ensure global stability is enhanced as well.

To be continued tomorrow with a final piece on why AfPak is not Vietnam, Iraq or any other prior benchmark.