TW: Why is AfPak different than other contemporary U.S. quagmires?
Simply put unlike Vietnam or Iraq, we should be there. In Iraq our engagement was controversial before, during and after its start. Ultimately it was clear within months of the initial invasion that our basis for invading had been dubious at best. In Vietnam our engagement had been incremental from day one and evolved into a classic case of our continuing involvement feeding ever increasing escalation in order to avoid defeat. The further we looked back in either Iraq or Vietnam the less clear it became why we had engaged in the first place.
Why were Iraq and Vietnam the wrong wars at the wrong time? In Iraq it remains unclear what precisely motivated the Bush administration's casus belli. Was it a legitimate intelligence failure? Imperialist overstretch in pursuit of "democracy" and "regional game-changers"? Political opportunism? Whatever it was, in hindsight it was insufficient.
In Vietnam we fundamentally mistook nationalist Vietnamese agitation for a world-wide communist conspiracy. We engaged haphazardly into an war where our national interests paled in comparison to the costs of our engagement.
This dynamic is fatal. War is immensely costly most of all in human terms. It inevitably becomes controversial. If the basis for our involvement is dubious at best and wrong at worst, our collective energies are sapped and moral clarity decisively obscured. These type wars gnaw at the fabric of our nation. They result in our politicians emitting piles of bullshit to justify our involvement. Justifications of sufficient cynicism as to make reasonable citizens questions nearly any use of our armed forces. Political polarization results as partisans take sides based less on the merits of the situation and more on the derivative political impacts.
These type wars should never be started and if started ended ASAP.
But for Afghanistan few, if any, questioned why we initiated the war. More importantly, eight years into this war few question the imperative to seek a stable AfPak region and minimize the risks from radical jihadists. What folks do legitimately debate is how best to prosecute this war. And nearly everyone laments and is chastened by the human and economic costs of a war conducted amidst very challenging circumstances. Or in other words can we succeed?
Questioning how we can succeed is crucially different than questioning why we started or are continuing a war in the first place. One must recall few mainstream leaders (I do not consider Ron Paul or Dennis Kucinich mainstream) are calling for a withdrawal from AfPak. The debate is between a smaller footprint counter-terrorism (CT) or a larger footprint counter-insurgency (COIN) focus. This is not a binary choice as sometimes portrayed in the media between "all-in" or "all-out" or even "largely out". There are degrees and nuance.
It should also be remembered that, unlike say the Viet Cong who were a unitary force more or less as legitimate (or illegitimate) as any other Vietnamese political group, the Taliban are a tribal minority with attributes (misogynism, radical Islamism) inimical to a majority of Afghans (and Pakistanis). There are groups in AfPak very motivated to defeat the Taliban (Shiites, Uzbeks, Tajiks, secularists etc.). While these groups may be weak, dispersed and ill-led; they very much exist and in time can provide the framework for an alternative governance structure. Furthermore, even our frenemies in the region (e.g. Iran, Russia) have interests more aligned with us than the Taliban (unlike say the Iranians in Iraq or Russians in Vietnam).
In my view a clear national security imperative exists in AfPak. Our nation, in conjunction with our allies and frenemies, should exert maximum effort to stabilize the region. There are times when nations must step up militarily and economically to protect their interests, this is one of those times. An integrated military, economic and diplomatic program using the vast resources of the ourselves, allies and frenemies should be sufficient to accomplish the goal.
Obama should not hedge on the human and economic costs of this endeavor, nor should he avoid making the necessary diplomatic moves (Iran, Russia etc.) in order to optimize our chances of success. AfPak is hard and will continue to be so, that does not mean we should not face up to the challenges.
This is the final installment of this particular gratuitous thought stream. Feel free to share any comments.
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