TW: Our POTUS announced his plan last week. I posted my opinions six weeks ago. I put much time into them and thought they would be relevant to review now that a real plan has been defined.
From October 20, 2009
TW: Should the U.S. escalate its troop commitment in the AfPak region. Yes. Certainly I am not privy to the exact force structure options presented to our POTUS but I will assume the 40,000 number bandied about is about the number current military leadership believes necessary to prosecute an effective COIN operation in the AfPak area.
I do not say yes merely because the local commander has made the request. Local commanders are paid to develop contingencies, our political leaders are paid to assess those contingencies within the context of our overall strategic interests. Had local commanders been followed blindly in Korea in 1951 or Cuba in 1962 the U.S. would have entered broad and open-ended conflicts which in retrospect seem wisely avoided.
But escalating our military, economic and humanitarian commitments in AfPak are in our strategic interest and are strategic necessities. Here are the reasons why:
1) U.S. knows how to break places (i.e. shock and awe) but can we fix anyplace ?
"The Afghan conflict, it is often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year wars. NATO comes off worse each time. And so to the fourth and most important reason for persisting in Afghanistan: the coalition can do much better.[Economist]"
We have since 9/11 invaded two sovereign nations overwhelming their limited conventional militaries. Both "re-building" wars have proven far more challenging than the initial battles. We have yet to succeed in either. Should we fail again our legitimacy as a force for long-term good would be called into question. We must get away from we can break things but cannot re-build things. Our nation must also accept that short, sharp engagements based upon our current technological power are not a valid strategic posture. We must accept the aftermath's consequences as well, once we do perhaps we will be less apt to attempt one without the other.
2) "The United States has had one central objective: to deny Al Qaeda the means to reconstitute, train, and plan major terror attacks" (from Zakaria at Newsweek).
This is correct only partially. Al Qaeda is not the end all be all of American national security interests. Al Qaeda suppression is certainly a goal but by no means our only goal. Afghanistan is the armpit of the world and I mean that both metaphorically and literally. It has been fought over for centuries precisely due to its strategic value as a physical and tribal crossroads for the East and West. The Taliban have become a petri dish for extremist Islam and they are firmly implanted in AfPak.
Just as importantly AfPak is the "four corners" of international relations in the 21st century. We have have Iran to its west, Russia and its former Islamic states (the "stans") to the north, India to its east with China just over the hills. Leaving a festering, terrorist supporting Taliban in control of AfPak would be an unacceptable development for our national interest. Such an occurrence could lead to direct and indirect de-stabilization for too many critical allies (India) and frenemies (Pakistan, Russia, China, the "stans").
3) Again from Zakaria-"let's please remember that there is virtually no Qaeda presence there...Al Qaeda is in Pakistan, as is the leadership of the hard-core Afghan Taliban...There's little evidence that Pakistan's generals have truly accepted that they must defeat all the jihadis in their country (as opposed to just those who threaten the Pakistani state). But they have been more cooperative and active in the past year than ever before."
This is where Zakaria is most wrong in his analysis. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been pushed largely into Pakistan. That does not mean they will stay there. Furthermore the more I read about the current Taliban the more I see their radicalism meshing with Al Qaeda, not completely aligned but sufficiently so to be more than a mere nationalist Pashtun entity.
If the U.S. leaves AfPak a void is created. The Taliban and Al Qaeda would stream right back into Afghanistan. Just as importantly, should a void be created Pakistan will release pressure on its side of the border on the Taliban. Pakistan sees the Taliban as a strategic ally relative to India and perhaps Iran. The Pakistanis will only contain the Taliban as long as a strong U.S./NATO presence in Afghanistan provides an alternative strategic reality.
Fundamentally the U.S. must exert pressure in Afghanistan in order to have Pakistanis exert pressure within their own borders. Afghans and Pakistanis and other regional players are looking for a long-term commitment from U.S. To date even post 9/11 the U.S. and NATO have appeared more interested in leaving ASAP which would lead right back to the status quo pre 9-11 (i.e. a Pakistani supported Taliban operating throughout the AfPak area serving as Al Qaeda's host).
The above speaks to why we must continue and enlarge our engagement in AfPak. The next post will speak to why and how I think we can succeed.
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