TW: Here is an anti-escalation case as presented by Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek and someone whose work I greatly respect.
From Zakaria at Newsweek:
"At the heart of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's request for a major surge in troops is the assumption that we are failing in Afghanistan. But are we really? The United States has had one central objective: to deny Al Qaeda the means to reconstitute, train, and plan major terror attacks. This mission has been largely successful for the past eight years. Al Qaeda is dispersed, on the run, and unable to direct attacks of the kind it planned and executed routinely in the 1990s. Fourteen of the top 20 leaders of the group have been killed by drone attacks. Its funding sources are drying up, and its political appeal is at an all-time low. All this is not an accident but rather a product of the U.S. presence in the region and efforts to disrupt terrorists, track funds, gain intelligence, aid development, help allies, and kill enemies.
It's true that the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. While it is nothing like Iraq in 2006—civilian deaths are a 10th as numerous—parts of the country are effectively controlled by the Taliban. Other parts are no man's land. But these areas are sparsely populated tracts of countryside. All the major population centers remain in the hands of the Kabul government. Is it worth the effort to gain control of all 35,000 Afghan villages scattered throughout the country? That goal has eluded most Afghan governments for the last 200 years and is a very high bar to set for the U.S. mission there.
Why has security gotten worse? Largely because Hamid Karzai's government is ineffective and corrupt and has alienated large numbers of Pashtuns, who have migrated to the Taliban. It is not clear that this problem can be solved by force, even using a smart counterinsurgency strategy. In fact, more troops injected into the current climate could provoke an antigovernment or nationalist backlash.
It's important to remember that the crucial, lasting element of the surge in Iraq was not the influx of troops, but getting Sunni tribes to switch sides by offering them security, money, and a place at the table. U.S. troops are now drawing down, and yet—despite some violence—the Sunnis have not resumed fighting because Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is courting their support.
The United States and the Afghan government need to make much greater efforts to wean Pashtun tribes away from the most radical Taliban factions. It is unclear how many Taliban fighters believe in a global jihadist ideology, but most U.S. commanders with whom I've spoken feel that the number is less than 30 percent. The other 70 percent are driven by money, gangland peer pressure, or opposition to Karzai.
And when we think through our strategy in Afghanistan, let's please remember that there is virtually no Qaeda presence there. Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen recently acknowledged what U.S. intelligence and all independent observers have long said: Al Qaeda is in Pakistan, as is the leadership of the hard-core Afghan Taliban. (That's why it's called the Quetta Shura, Quetta being a Pakistani city.) All attacks against Western targets that have emanated from the region in the past eight years have come from Pakistan and not Afghanistan. Even the most recently foiled plot in the United States, which involved the first Afghan that I know of to be implicated in global terrorism, originated in Pakistan. Yet we spend $30 in Afghanistan for every dollar in Pakistan.
There's little evidence that Pakistan's generals have truly accepted that they must defeat all the jihadis in their country (as opposed to just those who threaten the Pakistani state). But they have been more cooperative and active in the past year than ever before. A civilian government, the jihadi takeover of the Swat Valley, a change in public attitudes, and increased American aid have all contributed to a more effective U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Greater energy, attention, and resources will surely yield even more.
What about the argument that Osama bin Laden and his minions will simply shift back across the border if the Taliban is allowed free rein? Well, they haven't done so yet, despite the pockets of turf the insurgents control. And it is easier for us to deny them territory than to insist that we control it all ourselves—we can fight like guerrillas too. Remember that the U.S. and its allies have close to 100,000 troops in Afghanistan now. Keeping them there is the right commitment, one that keeps in mind the stakes, but also the costs and, most important, the other vital interests around the world to which U.S. foreign policy must also be attentive."
http://www.newsweek.com/id/217109
Showing posts with label fareed zakaria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fareed zakaria. Show all posts
Monday, October 19, 2009
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Can We Govern Without the Imperative Of Crisis?
TW: The premise of Zakaria's piece is old: democracies move slowly until a crisis forces their hand. 9/11, Pearl Harbor, GD 1.0, JFK's assassination etc. created environments of real bi-partisanship in which for better or worse our government made big moves. The challenge is not all governmental challenges occur around hot burning crises. Many are slow burns- climate change, fiscal deficits, improving education, investing in infrastructure, addressing poverty and income disparities etc.
Our government reflecting the will of entrenched, powerful interests and a passive, ill-informed populace refuses to make challenging choices. Crisis mitigates the power of those entrenched interests and awakens the passive.
The challenges we face are not insurmountable they merely require trade-offs and some level of sacrifice, a level of sacrifice which would likely surprise many by its relative ease.
American democracy has worked fairly effectively to harness its competing interests as its demographic and material resources were waxing. As these resources wax relatively speaking will the vaunted American democracy be up for the challenge? Our fiscal deficits are causing America great harm. They are sapping our competitive strength in a drip, drip, drip manner punctuated by the occasional belch like last Fall. We can neither tax our way out of them nor wish them away with fantasies like supply side economics. Some cuts are needed but where are the folks pounding the table for that?
From Fareed Zakaria at Newsweek:
"...There is something about America—the system, the government, the people—that allows us to react to a crisis with astonishing speed.
...Now, to see the weakness of the American system, consider the past week or two and the debacle of the health-care debate. It is demonstrably clear that the U.S. health-care system is on an unsustainable path. If current trends continue—and there is no indication that they won't—health care will consume 40 percent of the national economy by 2050. The problem is that this is a slow and steady decline, producing no crisis, no Pearl Harbor, no 9/11. As a result, we seem incapable of grappling with it seriously.
It's not as if the problems aren't apparent to everyone, whatever your political persuasion. Costs are rising so fast that every day, more than 10,000 Americans lose their insurance coverage. In 1993, 61 percent of small businesses provided health insurance for their employees. Now that number is down to 38 percent. Larger firms face greater and greater health-care costs. And yet, Americans do worse on almost every health measure than most advanced industrial countries, which spend about half as much on health care per person and have proportionately more elderly people.
The political debate that is taking place is unreal...The lack of serious discussion is a tragedy,
....Health care is the nation's most serious long-term problem. But think of Social Security, government pension liabilities, state--government deficits, and energy dependence, and you face the same issue. Each one of these problems is getting worse by the day, and yet the political system seems unable to take them on and make major reforms. On these very important issues, America is caught in a downward spiral. It makes you wish for a crisis."
http://www.newsweek.com/id/212163
Our government reflecting the will of entrenched, powerful interests and a passive, ill-informed populace refuses to make challenging choices. Crisis mitigates the power of those entrenched interests and awakens the passive.
The challenges we face are not insurmountable they merely require trade-offs and some level of sacrifice, a level of sacrifice which would likely surprise many by its relative ease.
American democracy has worked fairly effectively to harness its competing interests as its demographic and material resources were waxing. As these resources wax relatively speaking will the vaunted American democracy be up for the challenge? Our fiscal deficits are causing America great harm. They are sapping our competitive strength in a drip, drip, drip manner punctuated by the occasional belch like last Fall. We can neither tax our way out of them nor wish them away with fantasies like supply side economics. Some cuts are needed but where are the folks pounding the table for that?
From Fareed Zakaria at Newsweek:
"...There is something about America—the system, the government, the people—that allows us to react to a crisis with astonishing speed.
...Now, to see the weakness of the American system, consider the past week or two and the debacle of the health-care debate. It is demonstrably clear that the U.S. health-care system is on an unsustainable path. If current trends continue—and there is no indication that they won't—health care will consume 40 percent of the national economy by 2050. The problem is that this is a slow and steady decline, producing no crisis, no Pearl Harbor, no 9/11. As a result, we seem incapable of grappling with it seriously.
It's not as if the problems aren't apparent to everyone, whatever your political persuasion. Costs are rising so fast that every day, more than 10,000 Americans lose their insurance coverage. In 1993, 61 percent of small businesses provided health insurance for their employees. Now that number is down to 38 percent. Larger firms face greater and greater health-care costs. And yet, Americans do worse on almost every health measure than most advanced industrial countries, which spend about half as much on health care per person and have proportionately more elderly people.
The political debate that is taking place is unreal...The lack of serious discussion is a tragedy,
....Health care is the nation's most serious long-term problem. But think of Social Security, government pension liabilities, state--government deficits, and energy dependence, and you face the same issue. Each one of these problems is getting worse by the day, and yet the political system seems unable to take them on and make major reforms. On these very important issues, America is caught in a downward spiral. It makes you wish for a crisis."
http://www.newsweek.com/id/212163
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Are We a Hegemon Or a Superpower?
TW: I read a Robert Kaplan book about the Balkans (Balkan Ghosts) a whileback, the common theme as he traveled from country to country was the populace of each country framing their perspectives relative to the that point in history when their country's power was at its maximum. That period may have been 50 years ago or 500 (and they were all much closer to the latter, we are talking Greeks, Macedonians, Serbs etc.) but that is how they saw themselves and all strived to return to the glory days.
The U.S. suffers from the same problem. I recall living through the stressful 1970's as we fretted about our power diminishing relative to that historically brief period post WW2 when we were a hyperpower without peer. Then the Soviet Union collapsed and suddenly we thought the good old days of unbridled power were back. The 1990's were fun that way. But since about the time W. Bush landed on that aircraft carrier declaring "Mission Accomplished" things have receded back towards a less hegamonic state.
Yet many of our elites in DC still yearn for hegemony. It was bad policy even before 2003, it is certainly bad policy now.
From Fareed Zakaria:
"George W. Bush's term came to a close, he had few defenders left in the world of foreign policy. Mainstream commentators almost unanimously agreed the Bush years had been marked by arrogance and incompetence. "Mr. Bush's characteristic failing was to apply a black-and-white mindset to too many gray areas of national security and foreign affairs," editorialized The Washington Post. Even Richard Perle, the neoconservative guru, acknowledged recently that "Bush mostly failed to implement an effective foreign and defense policy." There was hope that President Obama would abandon some of his predecessor's rigid ideological stances. But, the Post warned, "it won't be easy to undo what Mr. Bush has done."
In fact, though consumed by the economic crisis in its first 50 days, the Obama administration has nevertheless made some striking moves in foreign policy. Obama announced the closure of Guantánamo and the end of any official sanction for torture. He gave his first interview as president to an Arab network and spoke of the importance of respect when dealing with the Muslim world—a gesture that won him rave reviews from normally hostile Arab journalists and politicians.
Hillary Clinton has racked up more miles in a few weeks than many of her predecessors as secretary of state did in months, mixing symbolic gestures of outreach with substantive talks. The administration has signaled a willingness to start engaging with troublesome regimes like Syria and Iran. Clinton publicly affirmed that the United States would work with China on the economic crisis and energy and environmental issues despite differences on human rights. She has also offered the prospect of a more constructive relationship with Russia. Obama said he was open to the prospect of talking to some elements of the Taliban in an effort to isolate its hard-core jihadis.
These are initial, small steps but all in the right direction— deserving of praise, one might think. But no, the Washington establishment is mostly fretting, dismayed in one way or another by most of these moves. The conservative backlash has been almost comical in its fury. Two weeks into Obama's term, Charles Krauthammer lumped together a bunch of Russian declarations and actions—many of them long in the making—and decided that they were all "brazen provocations" that Obama had failed to counter. Obama's "supine diplomacy," Krauthammer thundered, was setting off a chain of catastrophes across the globe. The Pakistani government, for example, had obviously sensed weakness in Washington and "capitulated to the Taliban" in the Swat Valley. Somehow Krauthammer missed the many deals that Pakistan struck over the last three years—during Bush's reign—with the Taliban, deals that were more hastily put together, on worse terms, with poorer results.
Many normally intelligent commentators have joined in the worrying. Leslie Gelb, the author of a smart and lively new book, "Power Rules," says that Hillary's comments about China's human-rights record were correct, but shouldn't have been said publicly. Peter Bergen of CNN says that "doing deals with the Taliban today could further destabilize Afghanistan." "It's change for change's sake," Gelb writes ruefully. Ah, if we just kept in place all those Bush-era policies that were working so well.
Consider the gambit with Russia. The Washington establishment is united in the view that Iran's nuclear program poses the greatest challenge for the new administration. Many were skeptical that Obama would take the problem seriously. But he has done so, maintaining the push for more effective sanctions, seeing if there is anything to be gained by talking to the Iranians, and starting conversations with the Russians. The only outside power that has any significant leverage over Tehran is Russia, which is building Iran's nuclear reactor and supplying it with uranium. Exploring whether Moscow might press the Iranians would be useful, right?
Wrong. The Washington Post reacted by worrying that Obama might be capitulating to Russian power. His sin was to point out in a letter to the Russian president that were Moscow to help in blunting the threat of missile attacks from Tehran, the United States would not feel as pressed to position missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic—since those defenses were meant to protect against Iranian missiles. This is elementary logic. It also strikes me as a very good trade since right now the technology for an effective missile shield against Iran is, in the words of one expert cited by the Financial Times's Gideon Rachman: "a system that won't work, against a threat that doesn't exist, paid for with money that we don't have."
The problem with American foreign policy goes beyond George Bush. It includes a Washington establishment that has gotten comfortable with the exercise of American hegemony and treats compromise as treason and negotiations as appeasement. Other countries can have no legitimate interests of their own—Russian demands are by definition unacceptable. The only way to deal with countries is by issuing a series of maximalist demands. This is not foreign policy; it's imperial policy. And it isn't likely to work in today's world."
http://www.newsweek.com/id/189240
The U.S. suffers from the same problem. I recall living through the stressful 1970's as we fretted about our power diminishing relative to that historically brief period post WW2 when we were a hyperpower without peer. Then the Soviet Union collapsed and suddenly we thought the good old days of unbridled power were back. The 1990's were fun that way. But since about the time W. Bush landed on that aircraft carrier declaring "Mission Accomplished" things have receded back towards a less hegamonic state.
Yet many of our elites in DC still yearn for hegemony. It was bad policy even before 2003, it is certainly bad policy now.
From Fareed Zakaria:
"George W. Bush's term came to a close, he had few defenders left in the world of foreign policy. Mainstream commentators almost unanimously agreed the Bush years had been marked by arrogance and incompetence. "Mr. Bush's characteristic failing was to apply a black-and-white mindset to too many gray areas of national security and foreign affairs," editorialized The Washington Post. Even Richard Perle, the neoconservative guru, acknowledged recently that "Bush mostly failed to implement an effective foreign and defense policy." There was hope that President Obama would abandon some of his predecessor's rigid ideological stances. But, the Post warned, "it won't be easy to undo what Mr. Bush has done."
In fact, though consumed by the economic crisis in its first 50 days, the Obama administration has nevertheless made some striking moves in foreign policy. Obama announced the closure of Guantánamo and the end of any official sanction for torture. He gave his first interview as president to an Arab network and spoke of the importance of respect when dealing with the Muslim world—a gesture that won him rave reviews from normally hostile Arab journalists and politicians.
Hillary Clinton has racked up more miles in a few weeks than many of her predecessors as secretary of state did in months, mixing symbolic gestures of outreach with substantive talks. The administration has signaled a willingness to start engaging with troublesome regimes like Syria and Iran. Clinton publicly affirmed that the United States would work with China on the economic crisis and energy and environmental issues despite differences on human rights. She has also offered the prospect of a more constructive relationship with Russia. Obama said he was open to the prospect of talking to some elements of the Taliban in an effort to isolate its hard-core jihadis.
These are initial, small steps but all in the right direction— deserving of praise, one might think. But no, the Washington establishment is mostly fretting, dismayed in one way or another by most of these moves. The conservative backlash has been almost comical in its fury. Two weeks into Obama's term, Charles Krauthammer lumped together a bunch of Russian declarations and actions—many of them long in the making—and decided that they were all "brazen provocations" that Obama had failed to counter. Obama's "supine diplomacy," Krauthammer thundered, was setting off a chain of catastrophes across the globe. The Pakistani government, for example, had obviously sensed weakness in Washington and "capitulated to the Taliban" in the Swat Valley. Somehow Krauthammer missed the many deals that Pakistan struck over the last three years—during Bush's reign—with the Taliban, deals that were more hastily put together, on worse terms, with poorer results.
Many normally intelligent commentators have joined in the worrying. Leslie Gelb, the author of a smart and lively new book, "Power Rules," says that Hillary's comments about China's human-rights record were correct, but shouldn't have been said publicly. Peter Bergen of CNN says that "doing deals with the Taliban today could further destabilize Afghanistan." "It's change for change's sake," Gelb writes ruefully. Ah, if we just kept in place all those Bush-era policies that were working so well.
Consider the gambit with Russia. The Washington establishment is united in the view that Iran's nuclear program poses the greatest challenge for the new administration. Many were skeptical that Obama would take the problem seriously. But he has done so, maintaining the push for more effective sanctions, seeing if there is anything to be gained by talking to the Iranians, and starting conversations with the Russians. The only outside power that has any significant leverage over Tehran is Russia, which is building Iran's nuclear reactor and supplying it with uranium. Exploring whether Moscow might press the Iranians would be useful, right?
Wrong. The Washington Post reacted by worrying that Obama might be capitulating to Russian power. His sin was to point out in a letter to the Russian president that were Moscow to help in blunting the threat of missile attacks from Tehran, the United States would not feel as pressed to position missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic—since those defenses were meant to protect against Iranian missiles. This is elementary logic. It also strikes me as a very good trade since right now the technology for an effective missile shield against Iran is, in the words of one expert cited by the Financial Times's Gideon Rachman: "a system that won't work, against a threat that doesn't exist, paid for with money that we don't have."
The problem with American foreign policy goes beyond George Bush. It includes a Washington establishment that has gotten comfortable with the exercise of American hegemony and treats compromise as treason and negotiations as appeasement. Other countries can have no legitimate interests of their own—Russian demands are by definition unacceptable. The only way to deal with countries is by issuing a series of maximalist demands. This is not foreign policy; it's imperial policy. And it isn't likely to work in today's world."
http://www.newsweek.com/id/189240
Monday, September 8, 2008
Newsweek Zakaria: The Russians Messed Up
Zakaria may be the best MSM foreign policy writer today. His book "Future of Freedom" written before the Iraq mess explains alot on why Iraq is a mess along with most of the rest of Bush's foreign policy.
Regardless, the point of this column was that contrary to some of the hysterical reactions Russia's move into Georgia may have been a serious strategic blunder on Russia's part.
"The attack on Georgia will go down not as the dawn of a new era of Russian power but as a major strategic blunder. Look at what has happened. Russia has scared its neighboring states witless, driving them firmly into the arms of the West...
Diplomats are now searching for ways to make Moscow pay some price for its actions, to weaken its standing in international bodies, suspend some agreements, break some joint enterprises. These are all worth looking into but it's also worth noting that we only have this leverage with the Russians because we have spent the last two decades building up ties with them. In fact, the real challenge we face in dealing with Moscow is that we have too few such ties and, as a result, too little leverage...The problem is not that Russia has been integrated into a world order that has failed to deter it, but rather that the country remains largely unintegrated—and thus feels it has little to lose by breaking the rules...A strategy that further isolates Moscow would only reduce the levers that we have to affect its behavior.
Imagine if we had kicked Russia out of the G8 and broken most ties with Moscow—as the Republican nominee, John McCain, and many neoconservatives have long wanted to do. Then, when the Russians attacked Georgia, we would have had only two options—appeasement or war.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/156350
Regardless, the point of this column was that contrary to some of the hysterical reactions Russia's move into Georgia may have been a serious strategic blunder on Russia's part.
"The attack on Georgia will go down not as the dawn of a new era of Russian power but as a major strategic blunder. Look at what has happened. Russia has scared its neighboring states witless, driving them firmly into the arms of the West...
Diplomats are now searching for ways to make Moscow pay some price for its actions, to weaken its standing in international bodies, suspend some agreements, break some joint enterprises. These are all worth looking into but it's also worth noting that we only have this leverage with the Russians because we have spent the last two decades building up ties with them. In fact, the real challenge we face in dealing with Moscow is that we have too few such ties and, as a result, too little leverage...The problem is not that Russia has been integrated into a world order that has failed to deter it, but rather that the country remains largely unintegrated—and thus feels it has little to lose by breaking the rules...A strategy that further isolates Moscow would only reduce the levers that we have to affect its behavior.
Imagine if we had kicked Russia out of the G8 and broken most ties with Moscow—as the Republican nominee, John McCain, and many neoconservatives have long wanted to do. Then, when the Russians attacked Georgia, we would have had only two options—appeasement or war.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/156350
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