TW: For those who do not frequent the Chi Tribune website this was the #2 story on the site for awhile. Many men have expressed real concern about whether the new owners of the Cubs would do away with one of Wrigley's more infamous attributes. Thankfully, tradition will be continued.
From the Chicago Tribune:
"Wrigley troughs to survive bathroom renovations, Cubs say
Modern urinals apparently not on immediate horizon
Good news for men who enjoy urinating in stainless steel troughs at professional baseball games: The Chicago Cubs will renovate the bathrooms at Wrigley Field this offseason, but a team spokesman has assured the Tribune that the treasured urinal troughs, long a part of the stadium's lore, will remain.
Specifics of the loo renewal effort were not released. The Cubs also offered no explanation as to why the team has decided not to invest in more modern-day urinal technology -- say something along the lines of a "Nano Pint Ultra-Low Consumption Urinal System."
Generations of male Cubs fans have stood side-by-side depositing the remnants of their ballpark beer into the troughs. The silver receptacles are spoken of both lovingly -- in that they give the place character -- and loathsomely -- in that some struggle to go in the close company of others."
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-talk-wrigley-field-bathroomsdec11,0,7445107.story
TW: And who can forget this classic youtube video...to give u a feel for what they look like
Friday, December 11, 2009
A Little Nostalgia
TW: Many folks prefer the approach below to that of our current POTUS. Below reminds me of a Palin homage except W. Bush at least appeared to be more sincere about his "syrup". These Norman Rockwell caricatures in addition to being patronizing are just ridiculous. I know Noonan was trying to make W. Bush into the second coming of Reagan but it is more complicated than that.
From Peggy Noonan in the WSJ February 2004:
"Mr. Bush is the triumph of the seemingly average American man. He's normal. He thinks in a sort of common-sense way. He speaks the language of business and sports and politics. You know him. He's not exotic. But if there's a fire on the block, he'll run out and help. He'll help direct the rig to the right house and count the kids coming out and say, "Where's Sally?" He's responsible. He's not an intellectual. Intellectuals start all the trouble in the world. And then when the fire comes they say, "I warned Joe about that furnace." And, "Does Joe have children?" And "I saw a fire once. It spreads like syrup. No, it spreads like explosive syrup. No, it's formidable and yet fleeting." When the fire comes they talk. Bush ain't that guy. Republicans love the guy who ain't that guy. Americans love the guy who ain't that guy.
Someone said to me: But how can you call him normal when he came from such privilege? Indeed he did. But there's nothing lemonade-on-the-porch-overlooking-the-links-at-the-country-club about Mr. Bush. He isn't smooth. He actually has some of the roughness and the resentments of the self-made man. I think the reason for this is Texas. He grew up in a white T-shirt and jeans playing ball in the street with the other kids in the subdivision. Barbara Bush wasn't exactly fancy. They lived like everyone else. She spoke to me once with great nostalgia of her early days in Texas, when she and her husband and young George slept in the same bed in an apartment in Midland. A prostitute lived in the complex. Barbara Bush just thought she was popular. Then they lived in a series of suburban houses.
George W. Bush didn't grow up at Greenwich Country Day with a car and a driver dropping him off, as his father had. Until he went off to boarding school, he thought he was like everyone else. That's a gift, to think you're just like everyone else in America. It can be the making of you"
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pnoonan/?id=110004712
From Peggy Noonan in the WSJ February 2004:
"Mr. Bush is the triumph of the seemingly average American man. He's normal. He thinks in a sort of common-sense way. He speaks the language of business and sports and politics. You know him. He's not exotic. But if there's a fire on the block, he'll run out and help. He'll help direct the rig to the right house and count the kids coming out and say, "Where's Sally?" He's responsible. He's not an intellectual. Intellectuals start all the trouble in the world. And then when the fire comes they say, "I warned Joe about that furnace." And, "Does Joe have children?" And "I saw a fire once. It spreads like syrup. No, it spreads like explosive syrup. No, it's formidable and yet fleeting." When the fire comes they talk. Bush ain't that guy. Republicans love the guy who ain't that guy. Americans love the guy who ain't that guy.
Someone said to me: But how can you call him normal when he came from such privilege? Indeed he did. But there's nothing lemonade-on-the-porch-overlooking-the-links-at-the-country-club about Mr. Bush. He isn't smooth. He actually has some of the roughness and the resentments of the self-made man. I think the reason for this is Texas. He grew up in a white T-shirt and jeans playing ball in the street with the other kids in the subdivision. Barbara Bush wasn't exactly fancy. They lived like everyone else. She spoke to me once with great nostalgia of her early days in Texas, when she and her husband and young George slept in the same bed in an apartment in Midland. A prostitute lived in the complex. Barbara Bush just thought she was popular. Then they lived in a series of suburban houses.
George W. Bush didn't grow up at Greenwich Country Day with a car and a driver dropping him off, as his father had. Until he went off to boarding school, he thought he was like everyone else. That's a gift, to think you're just like everyone else in America. It can be the making of you"
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pnoonan/?id=110004712
A Sophisticated Vision
TW: The viewpoints outlined below represent, amongst other reasons, why I voted for BHO. He demonstrates the right vision and with some cooperation and luck will hopefully be able to execute the vision. He understands the pacifists in his own party focus too much on the costs of war to the detriment of providing any security, while the jingoistic paranoids in the other party focus too much on the risks to our security resulting in grasping for an impossible level of security and dimishment of liberty. National security is a chess game requiring balance, skill and will.
From POTUS December 10, 2009 Oslo, Norway:
"We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth: We will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations -- acting individually or in concert -- will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.
I make this statement mindful of what Martin Luther King Jr. said in this same ceremony years ago: "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones." As someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King's life work, I am living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there's nothing weak -- nothing passive -- nothing naïve -- in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King.
But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism -- it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.
I raise this point, I begin with this point because in many countries there is a deep ambivalence about military action today, no matter what the cause. And at times, this is joined by a reflexive suspicion of America, the world's sole military superpower."
http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/12/10/a-noble-lecture/
From POTUS December 10, 2009 Oslo, Norway:
"We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth: We will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations -- acting individually or in concert -- will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.
I make this statement mindful of what Martin Luther King Jr. said in this same ceremony years ago: "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones." As someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King's life work, I am living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there's nothing weak -- nothing passive -- nothing naïve -- in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King.
But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism -- it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.
I raise this point, I begin with this point because in many countries there is a deep ambivalence about military action today, no matter what the cause. And at times, this is joined by a reflexive suspicion of America, the world's sole military superpower."
http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/12/10/a-noble-lecture/
Thursday, December 10, 2009
So That's How They Did It
TW: Batman may have won the award as my childhood favorite show (in re-runs, it was close with Gilligans Island). And if we run across now, well still worth a watch. But nothing symbolized the campiness of the show than the dynamic duos fearless ascent up the outside of buildings. To now learn it was an optical illusion is truly demoralizing.
We Get What We Want
From Economist:
"A Bloomberg National Poll conducted Dec. 3-7 shows two- thirds of Americans favor taxing the rich to reduce the deficit.
Even though almost 9 of 10 respondents also say they believe the middle class will have to make financial sacrifices to achieve that goal, only a little more than one-fourth support an increase in taxes on the middle class. Fewer still back cuts in entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare or a new national consumption tax."
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2009/12/bloomberg_headline_of_the_day?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+economist%2Fblogs%2Ffreeexchange+%28The+Economist%3A+Free+exchange%29
TW: The poll validates a frequent lament here at the White House. Our deficits are the result of our own selfishness, not politicians acting irrationaly. Do I support raising taxes on the wealthy back to where they were in 2000? Absolutely. Would that be anywhere near enough to end deficits? Absolutely not. Folks want to raise taxes and cut spending on anyone but themselves. They are also pretty adament about voting OUT of office anyone who does not pander to their selfishness. Hence, we have budget clusterfuggery seasoned with demagougery.
"A Bloomberg National Poll conducted Dec. 3-7 shows two- thirds of Americans favor taxing the rich to reduce the deficit.
Even though almost 9 of 10 respondents also say they believe the middle class will have to make financial sacrifices to achieve that goal, only a little more than one-fourth support an increase in taxes on the middle class. Fewer still back cuts in entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare or a new national consumption tax."
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2009/12/bloomberg_headline_of_the_day?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+economist%2Fblogs%2Ffreeexchange+%28The+Economist%3A+Free+exchange%29
TW: The poll validates a frequent lament here at the White House. Our deficits are the result of our own selfishness, not politicians acting irrationaly. Do I support raising taxes on the wealthy back to where they were in 2000? Absolutely. Would that be anywhere near enough to end deficits? Absolutely not. Folks want to raise taxes and cut spending on anyone but themselves. They are also pretty adament about voting OUT of office anyone who does not pander to their selfishness. Hence, we have budget clusterfuggery seasoned with demagougery.
Bartlett Right Literally But Wrong In Substance
TW: Bartlett brings out a quote from one of his books to counter Harry Reid's comparison of the Civil Rights Act passage to the current health reform process. Comments like Reid's are not particularly useful since they are easily countered with passages like below. But while Bartlett's point about Republican participation in the Civil Rights Act is accurate, it's accuracy holds only relative to the electoral composition as of 1965.
The Civil Rights Act itself was a primary (although not exclusive) catalyst for the fracturing of the Democratic party whereby almost all of those inclined to vote against things like the Act migrated in ever more rapid fashion to the Republican party. Yes relics like Byrd exist but then he is over 90 years old. When his genre have died or retired they have not been replaced within the Democratic party. The transition did not happen overnight it has taken decades but it is now nearly complete.
So while Bartlett's quotes are literally true, the more important lesson is what happened after the passage of the Act. Not only are the old Southern Dems nearly extinct, those Republicans of 1965 who voted for the Act are a nearly extinct species in today's Republican party.
Bartlett failed to mention the wing of the Republican party which also voted against the Act, the Goldwater wing the direct forebears to the Reaganites of the 1980's and the W. Bushies of the 00's. Combine those blocs with today's tea bagging, Palin worshipping base of the Republican party, who would have had nothing to do with the Act in 1965 just as today it viscerally opposes efforts to legitimize gay marriage and rails against any perceived "government" intervention which was a prime argument of those Southern Dems in 1965 (and for decades prior) to the Civil Rights Act, and voila you have today's Republican party. Little wonder any moderation in opposition to any moderate to progressive legislation is considered a vice by the Republicans.
This stratification of the parties where the odd alliance within the Democratic party of the old Southern bloc and the Yankee liberals no longer holds. Whilst the Rockefeller Republican social liberals no longer align with old line Midwestern conservatives has greatly altered electoral equations and made comparisons to pre-1965 party alignments and bi-partisanship efforts largely irrelevant.
From Bruce Bartlett:
"The enormous desire to memorialize the senseless murder of John F. Kennedy, plus Johnson’s determination to demonstrate his power and purge his own racist past by getting a substantive civil rights bill through the Senate, proved a formidable combination...[but the bill was filibustered anyway] people like Senator Robert C. Byrd, Democrat of West Virginia, whose individual filibuster of the 1964 civil rights bill is the second longest in history..Only a true believer would ever undertake such a futile effort.
Even so, one final element was essential to passage of the civil rights bill—the strong support of Republicans. Although Democrats had a historically large majority in the House of Representatives with 259 members to 176 Republicans, almost as many Republicans voted for the civil rights bill as Democrats. The final vote was 290 for the bill and 130 against. Of the “yea” votes, 152 were Democrats and 138 were Republicans. Of the “nay” votes, three-fourths were Democrats. In short, the bill could not have passed without Republican support. As Time Magazine observed, “In one of the most lopsidedly Democratic Houses since the days of F.D.R., Republicans were vital to the passage of a bill for which the Democratic administration means to take full political credit this year.”
A similar story is told in the Senate...Of those voting “nay,” 80 percent were Democrats, including Robert C. Byrd and former Vice President Al Gore’s father, who was then a senator from Tennessee...Close observers of the Senate deliberations recognized that the Republican leader, Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, had done yeoman work in responding to the objections of individual Republicans and holding almost all of them together in support of the bill. “More than any other single individual,” the New York Times acknowledged, “he was responsible for getting the civil rights bill through the Senate.”
http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/bruce-bartlett/1300/who-opposed-civil-rights-act-1964
The Civil Rights Act itself was a primary (although not exclusive) catalyst for the fracturing of the Democratic party whereby almost all of those inclined to vote against things like the Act migrated in ever more rapid fashion to the Republican party. Yes relics like Byrd exist but then he is over 90 years old. When his genre have died or retired they have not been replaced within the Democratic party. The transition did not happen overnight it has taken decades but it is now nearly complete.
So while Bartlett's quotes are literally true, the more important lesson is what happened after the passage of the Act. Not only are the old Southern Dems nearly extinct, those Republicans of 1965 who voted for the Act are a nearly extinct species in today's Republican party.
Bartlett failed to mention the wing of the Republican party which also voted against the Act, the Goldwater wing the direct forebears to the Reaganites of the 1980's and the W. Bushies of the 00's. Combine those blocs with today's tea bagging, Palin worshipping base of the Republican party, who would have had nothing to do with the Act in 1965 just as today it viscerally opposes efforts to legitimize gay marriage and rails against any perceived "government" intervention which was a prime argument of those Southern Dems in 1965 (and for decades prior) to the Civil Rights Act, and voila you have today's Republican party. Little wonder any moderation in opposition to any moderate to progressive legislation is considered a vice by the Republicans.
This stratification of the parties where the odd alliance within the Democratic party of the old Southern bloc and the Yankee liberals no longer holds. Whilst the Rockefeller Republican social liberals no longer align with old line Midwestern conservatives has greatly altered electoral equations and made comparisons to pre-1965 party alignments and bi-partisanship efforts largely irrelevant.
From Bruce Bartlett:
"The enormous desire to memorialize the senseless murder of John F. Kennedy, plus Johnson’s determination to demonstrate his power and purge his own racist past by getting a substantive civil rights bill through the Senate, proved a formidable combination...[but the bill was filibustered anyway] people like Senator Robert C. Byrd, Democrat of West Virginia, whose individual filibuster of the 1964 civil rights bill is the second longest in history..Only a true believer would ever undertake such a futile effort.
Even so, one final element was essential to passage of the civil rights bill—the strong support of Republicans. Although Democrats had a historically large majority in the House of Representatives with 259 members to 176 Republicans, almost as many Republicans voted for the civil rights bill as Democrats. The final vote was 290 for the bill and 130 against. Of the “yea” votes, 152 were Democrats and 138 were Republicans. Of the “nay” votes, three-fourths were Democrats. In short, the bill could not have passed without Republican support. As Time Magazine observed, “In one of the most lopsidedly Democratic Houses since the days of F.D.R., Republicans were vital to the passage of a bill for which the Democratic administration means to take full political credit this year.”
A similar story is told in the Senate...Of those voting “nay,” 80 percent were Democrats, including Robert C. Byrd and former Vice President Al Gore’s father, who was then a senator from Tennessee...Close observers of the Senate deliberations recognized that the Republican leader, Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, had done yeoman work in responding to the objections of individual Republicans and holding almost all of them together in support of the bill. “More than any other single individual,” the New York Times acknowledged, “he was responsible for getting the civil rights bill through the Senate.”
http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/bruce-bartlett/1300/who-opposed-civil-rights-act-1964
Cleveland Clinic As a Model For Reform
TW: This Newsweek piece examines the Cleveland Clinic as a possible symbol of what our health care system could like. Extrapolating top-end clinics like Mayo and Cleveland is not linear but certain characteristics: the team approach, non-volume based provider compensation (e.g. a doc does not make money every time she prescribes a scan or treatment), heavy use of integrated data systems etc. are likely relevant.
I did not clip it, so read it instead.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/224585
I did not clip it, so read it instead.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/224585
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
Comparing Theory To Reality
Ezra Klein relating some testimony from a Brookings expert:
"From Brookings Institution expert Ted Gayer-
'I acknowledge that my arguments in favor of a carbon tax over cap-and-trade are made easier in that I am comparing my ideal hypothetical carbon tax to the actual cap-and- trade programs either passed by the House or proposed in the Senate. Indeed, a cap-and-trade program that included a safety valve and that auctioned allowances would achieve many of the economic advantages of a carbon tax.
The most frequent criticism of a carbon tax is that it would be politically unpopular. But to quote Milton Friedman, I think my role is to “prescribe what should be done in light of what can be done, politics aside, and not to predict what is ‘politically feasible’ and then to recommend it.” You, of course, have the more difficult task of determining what is politically feasible. But given the magnitudes of the costs and benefits associated with any climate policy, I recommend to you a careful consideration of the merits of a carbon tax.'
That's Brookings' Ted Gayer testifying before Congress on the merits of a carbon tax. Gayer is having this argument with the right people: Legislators who might not support a carbon tax, but should. Right now, a compromised cap-and-trade plan is more politically feasible, but that would of course change if congressmen stopped being terrible about this and threw in behind the policy that makes the most sense"
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/12/the_right_argument_for_a_carbo.html
TW: Both Gayer and Klein are progressives, as am I as u might have noticed. We all support a carbon tax over cap and trade. It is not that cap and trade is bad, it is that a carbon tax is more elegant and most importantly easier to understand. And to be clear, the single biggest complaint about the current cap and trade legislation is that it gives away the initial credits rather than sells them. Why is this? Bi-partisan opposition in coal states to any legislation that actually penalizes high carbon emissions. This dynamic would result in tax credits being provided to those same producers in a carbon tax regime.
But cap and trade is on the board, a carbon tax despite the occasional conservative think tank support remains theory only. As mentioned yesterday, if there was an opposition party interested in actual governing rather than single-minded opposition we might get a carbon tax.
"From Brookings Institution expert Ted Gayer-
'I acknowledge that my arguments in favor of a carbon tax over cap-and-trade are made easier in that I am comparing my ideal hypothetical carbon tax to the actual cap-and- trade programs either passed by the House or proposed in the Senate. Indeed, a cap-and-trade program that included a safety valve and that auctioned allowances would achieve many of the economic advantages of a carbon tax.
The most frequent criticism of a carbon tax is that it would be politically unpopular. But to quote Milton Friedman, I think my role is to “prescribe what should be done in light of what can be done, politics aside, and not to predict what is ‘politically feasible’ and then to recommend it.” You, of course, have the more difficult task of determining what is politically feasible. But given the magnitudes of the costs and benefits associated with any climate policy, I recommend to you a careful consideration of the merits of a carbon tax.'
That's Brookings' Ted Gayer testifying before Congress on the merits of a carbon tax. Gayer is having this argument with the right people: Legislators who might not support a carbon tax, but should. Right now, a compromised cap-and-trade plan is more politically feasible, but that would of course change if congressmen stopped being terrible about this and threw in behind the policy that makes the most sense"
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/12/the_right_argument_for_a_carbo.html
TW: Both Gayer and Klein are progressives, as am I as u might have noticed. We all support a carbon tax over cap and trade. It is not that cap and trade is bad, it is that a carbon tax is more elegant and most importantly easier to understand. And to be clear, the single biggest complaint about the current cap and trade legislation is that it gives away the initial credits rather than sells them. Why is this? Bi-partisan opposition in coal states to any legislation that actually penalizes high carbon emissions. This dynamic would result in tax credits being provided to those same producers in a carbon tax regime.
But cap and trade is on the board, a carbon tax despite the occasional conservative think tank support remains theory only. As mentioned yesterday, if there was an opposition party interested in actual governing rather than single-minded opposition we might get a carbon tax.
Calling Out the Deficit Poseurs
TW: POTUS and Mr. Blogger are of the same mind. Although he is easier on the public than I would be.
From POTUS December 8, 2009:
"Despite what some have claimed, the cost of the Recovery Act is only a very small part of our current budget imbalance. In reality, the deficit had been building dramatically over the previous eight years. We have a structural gap between the money going out and the money coming in.
Folks passed tax cuts and expansive entitlement programs without paying for any of it -- even as health care costs kept rising, year after year. As a result, the deficit had reached $1.3 trillion when we walked into the White House. And I'd note: These budget-busting tax cuts and spending programs were approved by many of the same people who are now waxing political about fiscal responsibility, while opposing our efforts to reduce deficits by getting health care costs under control. It's a sight to see...
In the end, the economic crisis of the past year was not just the result of weaknesses in our economy. It was also the result of weaknesses in our political system, because for decades, too many in Washington put off the hard decisions. For decades, we've watched as efforts to solve tough problems have fallen prey to the bitterness of partisanship, to prosaic concerns of politics, to ever-quickening news cycles, to endless campaigns focused on scoring points instead of meeting our common challenges.
We've seen the consequences of this failure of responsibility. The American people have paid a heavy price. And the question we'll have to answer now is if we're going to learn from our past, or if -- even in the aftermath of disaster -- we're going to repeat those same mistakes. As the alarm bells fade, the din of Washington rises, as the forces of the status quo marshal their resources, we can be sure that answering this question will be a fight to the finish."
http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/12/08/a-jobs-speech-with-elbows/
From POTUS December 8, 2009:
"Despite what some have claimed, the cost of the Recovery Act is only a very small part of our current budget imbalance. In reality, the deficit had been building dramatically over the previous eight years. We have a structural gap between the money going out and the money coming in.
Folks passed tax cuts and expansive entitlement programs without paying for any of it -- even as health care costs kept rising, year after year. As a result, the deficit had reached $1.3 trillion when we walked into the White House. And I'd note: These budget-busting tax cuts and spending programs were approved by many of the same people who are now waxing political about fiscal responsibility, while opposing our efforts to reduce deficits by getting health care costs under control. It's a sight to see...
In the end, the economic crisis of the past year was not just the result of weaknesses in our economy. It was also the result of weaknesses in our political system, because for decades, too many in Washington put off the hard decisions. For decades, we've watched as efforts to solve tough problems have fallen prey to the bitterness of partisanship, to prosaic concerns of politics, to ever-quickening news cycles, to endless campaigns focused on scoring points instead of meeting our common challenges.
We've seen the consequences of this failure of responsibility. The American people have paid a heavy price. And the question we'll have to answer now is if we're going to learn from our past, or if -- even in the aftermath of disaster -- we're going to repeat those same mistakes. As the alarm bells fade, the din of Washington rises, as the forces of the status quo marshal their resources, we can be sure that answering this question will be a fight to the finish."
http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/12/08/a-jobs-speech-with-elbows/
Classic Posts: My Gratuitous Opinion On an AfPak Escalation Part 3
TW: The final re-post on AfPak
From October 21, 2009:
"TW: Why is AfPak different than other contemporary U.S. quagmires?
Simply put unlike Vietnam or Iraq, we should be there. In Iraq our engagement was controversial before, during and after its start. Ultimately it was clear within months of the initial invasion that our basis for invading had been dubious at best. In Vietnam our engagement had been incremental from day one and evolved into a classic case of our continuing involvement feeding ever increasing escalation in order to avoid defeat. The further we looked back in either Iraq or Vietnam the less clear it became why we had engaged in the first place.
Why were Iraq and Vietnam the wrong wars at the wrong time? In Iraq it remains unclear what precisely motivated the Bush administration's casus belli. Was it a legitimate intelligence failure? Imperialist overstretch in pursuit of "democracy" and "regional game-changers"? Political opportunism? Whatever it was, in hindsight it was insufficient.
In Vietnam we fundamentally mistook nationalist Vietnamese agitation for a world-wide communist conspiracy. We engaged haphazardly into an war where our national interests paled in comparison to the costs of our engagement.
This dynamic is fatal. War is immensely costly most of all in human terms. It inevitably becomes controversial. If the basis for our involvement is dubious at best and wrong at worst, our collective energies are sapped and moral clarity decisively obscured. These type wars gnaw at the fabric of our nation. They result in our politicians emitting piles of bullshit to justify our involvement. Justifications of sufficient cynicism as to make reasonable citizens questions nearly any use of our armed forces. Political polarization results as partisans take sides based less on the merits of the situation and more on the derivative political impacts.
These type wars should never be started and if started ended ASAP.
But for Afghanistan few, if any, questioned why we initiated the war. More importantly, eight years into this war few question the imperative to seek a stable AfPak region and minimize the risks from radical jihadists. What folks do legitimately debate is how best to prosecute this war. And nearly everyone laments and is chastened by the human and economic costs of a war conducted amidst very challenging circumstances. Or in other words can we succeed?
Questioning how we can succeed is crucially different than questioning why we started or are continuing a war in the first place. One must recall few mainstream leaders (I do not consider Ron Paul or Dennis Kucinich mainstream) are calling for a withdrawal from AfPak. The debate is between a smaller footprint counter-terrorism (CT) or a larger footprint counter-insurgency (COIN) focus. This is not a binary choice as sometimes portrayed in the media between "all-in" or "all-out" or even "largely out". There are degrees and nuance.
It should also be remembered that, unlike say the Viet Cong who were a unitary force more or less as legitimate (or illegitimate) as any other Vietnamese political group, the Taliban are a tribal minority with attributes (misogynism, radical Islamism) inimical to a majority of Afghans (and Pakistanis). There are groups in AfPak very motivated to defeat the Taliban (Shiites, Uzbeks, Tajiks, secularists etc.). While these groups may be weak, dispersed and ill-led; they very much exist and in time can provide the framework for an alternative governance structure. Furthermore, even our frenemies in the region (e.g. Iran, Russia) have interests more aligned with us than the Taliban (unlike say the Iranians in Iraq or Russians in Vietnam).
In my view a clear national security imperative exists in AfPak. Our nation, in conjunction with our allies and frenemies, should exert maximum effort to stabilize the region. There are times when nations must step up militarily and economically to protect their interests, this is one of those times. An integrated military, economic and diplomatic program using the vast resources of the ourselves, allies and frenemies should be sufficient to accomplish the goal.
Obama should not hedge on the human and economic costs of this endeavor, nor should he avoid making the necessary diplomatic moves (Iran, Russia etc.) in order to optimize our chances of success. AfPak is hard and will continue to be so, that does not mean we should not face up to the challenges.
This is the final installment of this particular gratuitous thought stream. Feel free to share any comments."
From October 21, 2009:
"TW: Why is AfPak different than other contemporary U.S. quagmires?
Simply put unlike Vietnam or Iraq, we should be there. In Iraq our engagement was controversial before, during and after its start. Ultimately it was clear within months of the initial invasion that our basis for invading had been dubious at best. In Vietnam our engagement had been incremental from day one and evolved into a classic case of our continuing involvement feeding ever increasing escalation in order to avoid defeat. The further we looked back in either Iraq or Vietnam the less clear it became why we had engaged in the first place.
Why were Iraq and Vietnam the wrong wars at the wrong time? In Iraq it remains unclear what precisely motivated the Bush administration's casus belli. Was it a legitimate intelligence failure? Imperialist overstretch in pursuit of "democracy" and "regional game-changers"? Political opportunism? Whatever it was, in hindsight it was insufficient.
In Vietnam we fundamentally mistook nationalist Vietnamese agitation for a world-wide communist conspiracy. We engaged haphazardly into an war where our national interests paled in comparison to the costs of our engagement.
This dynamic is fatal. War is immensely costly most of all in human terms. It inevitably becomes controversial. If the basis for our involvement is dubious at best and wrong at worst, our collective energies are sapped and moral clarity decisively obscured. These type wars gnaw at the fabric of our nation. They result in our politicians emitting piles of bullshit to justify our involvement. Justifications of sufficient cynicism as to make reasonable citizens questions nearly any use of our armed forces. Political polarization results as partisans take sides based less on the merits of the situation and more on the derivative political impacts.
These type wars should never be started and if started ended ASAP.
But for Afghanistan few, if any, questioned why we initiated the war. More importantly, eight years into this war few question the imperative to seek a stable AfPak region and minimize the risks from radical jihadists. What folks do legitimately debate is how best to prosecute this war. And nearly everyone laments and is chastened by the human and economic costs of a war conducted amidst very challenging circumstances. Or in other words can we succeed?
Questioning how we can succeed is crucially different than questioning why we started or are continuing a war in the first place. One must recall few mainstream leaders (I do not consider Ron Paul or Dennis Kucinich mainstream) are calling for a withdrawal from AfPak. The debate is between a smaller footprint counter-terrorism (CT) or a larger footprint counter-insurgency (COIN) focus. This is not a binary choice as sometimes portrayed in the media between "all-in" or "all-out" or even "largely out". There are degrees and nuance.
It should also be remembered that, unlike say the Viet Cong who were a unitary force more or less as legitimate (or illegitimate) as any other Vietnamese political group, the Taliban are a tribal minority with attributes (misogynism, radical Islamism) inimical to a majority of Afghans (and Pakistanis). There are groups in AfPak very motivated to defeat the Taliban (Shiites, Uzbeks, Tajiks, secularists etc.). While these groups may be weak, dispersed and ill-led; they very much exist and in time can provide the framework for an alternative governance structure. Furthermore, even our frenemies in the region (e.g. Iran, Russia) have interests more aligned with us than the Taliban (unlike say the Iranians in Iraq or Russians in Vietnam).
In my view a clear national security imperative exists in AfPak. Our nation, in conjunction with our allies and frenemies, should exert maximum effort to stabilize the region. There are times when nations must step up militarily and economically to protect their interests, this is one of those times. An integrated military, economic and diplomatic program using the vast resources of the ourselves, allies and frenemies should be sufficient to accomplish the goal.
Obama should not hedge on the human and economic costs of this endeavor, nor should he avoid making the necessary diplomatic moves (Iran, Russia etc.) in order to optimize our chances of success. AfPak is hard and will continue to be so, that does not mean we should not face up to the challenges.
This is the final installment of this particular gratuitous thought stream. Feel free to share any comments."
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
We Are Alien Too
TW: Mr. Silver has traveled to Copenhagen this week for the climate summit. His brief observation reminds us the narrow and convoluted prisms through which we view the world and the world views us. Folks look at American somewhat cross-eyed and no doubt marred with bias and disinformation. And the U.S. for better or worse is huge and sufficiently important to receive concentrated attention. Our views of other countries are similarly biased and based upon limited information and further distorted by our attention being diffused across numerous allies, frenemies and foes.
From Nate Silver at 538.com:
"...I did have a good conversation with a couple of Brits while waiting in line for my NGO badge. They were very bright and keyed in -- they run a green taxi company in London -- but I was surprised at how confusing they found American politics to be. How can the Senate require 60 percent to pass something? How can Delaware have as many senators as New York? What's up with the whole electoral college thing? How can Obama go from 70 percent popularity to 50 percent in a half a year? Could Sarah Palin really become President someday? The Guardian, among others, has some very good Washington coverage, but I think there's an opportunity for one of the UK dailies to provide a Washington column that's specifically geared toward a British or European audience: we tend to take for granted how freakin' weird our politics can be to the rest of the world.
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/12/copenhagen-dispatch.html
From Nate Silver at 538.com:
"...I did have a good conversation with a couple of Brits while waiting in line for my NGO badge. They were very bright and keyed in -- they run a green taxi company in London -- but I was surprised at how confusing they found American politics to be. How can the Senate require 60 percent to pass something? How can Delaware have as many senators as New York? What's up with the whole electoral college thing? How can Obama go from 70 percent popularity to 50 percent in a half a year? Could Sarah Palin really become President someday? The Guardian, among others, has some very good Washington coverage, but I think there's an opportunity for one of the UK dailies to provide a Washington column that's specifically geared toward a British or European audience: we tend to take for granted how freakin' weird our politics can be to the rest of the world.
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/12/copenhagen-dispatch.html
Political Footballs v. Actual Legislation
TW: The sentiment expressed below jives with my own. I do not regard cap and trade as an ideal approach to climate change or more specifically energy and tax policy. A carbon tax would better. Many conservative pundits and economists agree with me. BUT where are the Republicans proposing a carbon tax. Answer there are none. Therefore one finds the conservatives screeching about cap and trade but again providing no actual alternative. If Republicans were front and center with a carbon tax, you would find me fully supporting them, but they are not because part of their party denies climate change and most of their party is paralyzed when it comes to anything remotely associated with increased taxation.
I circumvent the climate change denialists by arguing measures to manage carbon are needed independently of climate change. The imperatives to refine American energy and tax policy alone demand action regardless of one's views on climate change (which to be clear I am on the side of the vast majority of scientists who argue it is real). Pursuing a "green" economy with its related reduction of reliance on petro-states (both foreign and domestic) and re-vamping our taxes towards consumption instead of income are sufficiently worthy goals.
Things like health care reform and cap and trade wither when faced with the political realities of transformation into real legislation. Theoretical possibilities like a carbon tax are nice to talk up but ultimately ephemeral unless also exposed to those same political realities.
From Ezra Klein at WaPo:
"Quoting Paul Krugman-
'For here’s the way it is: we have a real chance of getting a serious cap and trade program in place within a year or two. We have no chance of getting a carbon tax for the foreseeable future. It’s just destructive to denounce the program we can actually get — a program that won’t be perfect, won’t be enough, but can be made increasingly effective over time — in favor of something that can’t possibly happen in time to avoid disaster.'
One way to make this point is that you see an enormous amount of smart commentary on the question of "what carbon pricing policy would we favor in a perfect world" but very little commentary on the question of "how do you improve the bills we're likely to pass?" Nor do many people argue that not passing anything now and not passing anything in the future is better than passing a compromised bill now. Instead, it's all just imagine a carbon-pricing pony ..."
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/12/the_carbon_pricing_pony.html
I circumvent the climate change denialists by arguing measures to manage carbon are needed independently of climate change. The imperatives to refine American energy and tax policy alone demand action regardless of one's views on climate change (which to be clear I am on the side of the vast majority of scientists who argue it is real). Pursuing a "green" economy with its related reduction of reliance on petro-states (both foreign and domestic) and re-vamping our taxes towards consumption instead of income are sufficiently worthy goals.
Things like health care reform and cap and trade wither when faced with the political realities of transformation into real legislation. Theoretical possibilities like a carbon tax are nice to talk up but ultimately ephemeral unless also exposed to those same political realities.
From Ezra Klein at WaPo:
"Quoting Paul Krugman-
'For here’s the way it is: we have a real chance of getting a serious cap and trade program in place within a year or two. We have no chance of getting a carbon tax for the foreseeable future. It’s just destructive to denounce the program we can actually get — a program that won’t be perfect, won’t be enough, but can be made increasingly effective over time — in favor of something that can’t possibly happen in time to avoid disaster.'
One way to make this point is that you see an enormous amount of smart commentary on the question of "what carbon pricing policy would we favor in a perfect world" but very little commentary on the question of "how do you improve the bills we're likely to pass?" Nor do many people argue that not passing anything now and not passing anything in the future is better than passing a compromised bill now. Instead, it's all just imagine a carbon-pricing pony ..."
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/12/the_carbon_pricing_pony.html
Classic Posts: My Gratuitous Opinion On an AfPak Escalation Part 2
TW: Re-post number 2 from October on AfPak
From October 20, 2009:
"TW: Why and how do I think the U.S. can achieve a successful escalation in AfPak?
1) Everything I read about Gen. McChrystal is that he is the right person to formulate and execute an effective COIN strategy (I know there is some blow back on his involvement in the Pat Tillman fiasco but not anywhere enough to diminish his other credentials and accomplishments) One cannot forget the neglect with which the U.S. treated the AfPak theater after the overthrow of the Taliban. Resources of all kinds were severely restricted partially due to the small footprint strategy (which has been a dismal failure) and partly as special forces, satellite intel and other resources were re-deployed to Iraq.
The U.S. left a huge void in AfPak hoping friendly indigenous forces would assume full control. This strategy failed miserably creating a void into which the Taliban gradually back-filled. For the first time in AfPak we may finally have a strategy and resources to re-build Afghanistan.
2) From Economist: "The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war."
All good points and not at all slam dunks. Credible partner governments have been the bane of COIN throughout history. Any partner government starts out at a severe disadvantage as they at some level are subservient to the outside power involved. Immediately the insurgents can claim a certain legitimacy as the more "true" nationalist representative.
The U.S. made a further mistake in Afghanistan by attempting to impose democracy where none had existed and where centralized government in general has always been weak. We now see many observers twisted in knots about the recent fraudulent election. To me the elections are a distraction. The key will be the U.S. and others working with Afghani to de-centralize governance through various tribal entities regardless of who occupies executive power in Kabul.
3) From Economist: "The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war."
AfPak has been under-resourced from day one. Obama must define the stakes and ask for commitment from Americans, from Europeans and from others. W. Bush said many things as POTUS but one thing he never articulated was how the so-called "war on terror" was existential yet did not require significant sacrifice on the part of average Americans. No extra taxes, no national service, no spending cuts in other areas and no clear delineation of the price Americans must pay in order to address our strategic challenges.
If the U.S. is to have a legitimate chance at success in AfPak. very significant human and financial costs will be necessary. These costs cannot be defined precisely but they will be significant. If Americans are unable or unwilling to absorb these costs, then Americans should be prepared to live in a world where the risk of instability will be much higher with the commensurate risks to American national interests.
4) America is not and should not be alone in AfPak. We tend as always to focus on our ourselves but AfPak impacts nearly everyone throughout the world. The strategic imperatives in AfPak are not American only, they are relevant to any nation seeking to minimize terrorism risks, minimize the negative impacts of radical Islam and minimize the risks of the regional powers in the area (Pakistan, Iran, India, the Stans, China, Russia) coming to blows over instability in the AfPak area.
Unlike Iraq where allied support (for good reason it turns out) but for the Brits was largely either brief (e.g. Spain), motivated by secondary political considerations (e.g. the Georgians, Poles) or extremely limited (about all others); many nations have contributed forces in AfPak. While these forces have been limited and frequently restricted in capability and aggressiveness, they are substantial (roughly 40,000). Few Americans realize for instance that several nations in particular the Brits, the Dutch, the Danes and the Canadians have fought expensive, disproportionate and deadly battles in Afghanistan.
Understand we broke the Taliban (while excluding almost all allied involvement in the actual initial fights, everyone wanted to pitch in post 9/11 but we said no thanks we will kill them ourselves), then we largely left Afgahnistan (we had fewer than 20,000 troops for the first several years). We sold NATO on AfPak being a peacekeeping mission not an actual war. Sending one's soldiers off to serve under someone else's leadership is never an easy task (imagine Americans being asked to send significant troops to serve under say French leadership in Africa). All the while with our strategies in AfPak meandering between "small footprint", counter-terror and partial COIN.
But now with a new American commitment and strategy it is imperative that our allies and near allies commit as well. Otherwise they will be guilty of free-riding. The U.S. as the leader will always bear a disproportionate share that goes with making the decisions and driving policy. We cannot expect others to merely follow lemming like behind us. But we can expect folks to pitch in.
Part of the new strategy will be to work with the nearby regional powers including Iran to engage their help stabilizing the AfPak area. But if the Brazilians, Japanese, South Koreans, Indonesians etc. want to enjoy the benefits of globalization then they need to step up to help ensure global stability is enhanced as well.
To be continued tomorrow with a final piece on why AfPak is not Vietnam, Iraq or any other prior benchmark. "
From October 20, 2009:
"TW: Why and how do I think the U.S. can achieve a successful escalation in AfPak?
1) Everything I read about Gen. McChrystal is that he is the right person to formulate and execute an effective COIN strategy (I know there is some blow back on his involvement in the Pat Tillman fiasco but not anywhere enough to diminish his other credentials and accomplishments) One cannot forget the neglect with which the U.S. treated the AfPak theater after the overthrow of the Taliban. Resources of all kinds were severely restricted partially due to the small footprint strategy (which has been a dismal failure) and partly as special forces, satellite intel and other resources were re-deployed to Iraq.
The U.S. left a huge void in AfPak hoping friendly indigenous forces would assume full control. This strategy failed miserably creating a void into which the Taliban gradually back-filled. For the first time in AfPak we may finally have a strategy and resources to re-build Afghanistan.
2) From Economist: "The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war."
All good points and not at all slam dunks. Credible partner governments have been the bane of COIN throughout history. Any partner government starts out at a severe disadvantage as they at some level are subservient to the outside power involved. Immediately the insurgents can claim a certain legitimacy as the more "true" nationalist representative.
The U.S. made a further mistake in Afghanistan by attempting to impose democracy where none had existed and where centralized government in general has always been weak. We now see many observers twisted in knots about the recent fraudulent election. To me the elections are a distraction. The key will be the U.S. and others working with Afghani to de-centralize governance through various tribal entities regardless of who occupies executive power in Kabul.
3) From Economist: "The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war."
AfPak has been under-resourced from day one. Obama must define the stakes and ask for commitment from Americans, from Europeans and from others. W. Bush said many things as POTUS but one thing he never articulated was how the so-called "war on terror" was existential yet did not require significant sacrifice on the part of average Americans. No extra taxes, no national service, no spending cuts in other areas and no clear delineation of the price Americans must pay in order to address our strategic challenges.
If the U.S. is to have a legitimate chance at success in AfPak. very significant human and financial costs will be necessary. These costs cannot be defined precisely but they will be significant. If Americans are unable or unwilling to absorb these costs, then Americans should be prepared to live in a world where the risk of instability will be much higher with the commensurate risks to American national interests.
4) America is not and should not be alone in AfPak. We tend as always to focus on our ourselves but AfPak impacts nearly everyone throughout the world. The strategic imperatives in AfPak are not American only, they are relevant to any nation seeking to minimize terrorism risks, minimize the negative impacts of radical Islam and minimize the risks of the regional powers in the area (Pakistan, Iran, India, the Stans, China, Russia) coming to blows over instability in the AfPak area.
Unlike Iraq where allied support (for good reason it turns out) but for the Brits was largely either brief (e.g. Spain), motivated by secondary political considerations (e.g. the Georgians, Poles) or extremely limited (about all others); many nations have contributed forces in AfPak. While these forces have been limited and frequently restricted in capability and aggressiveness, they are substantial (roughly 40,000). Few Americans realize for instance that several nations in particular the Brits, the Dutch, the Danes and the Canadians have fought expensive, disproportionate and deadly battles in Afghanistan.
Understand we broke the Taliban (while excluding almost all allied involvement in the actual initial fights, everyone wanted to pitch in post 9/11 but we said no thanks we will kill them ourselves), then we largely left Afgahnistan (we had fewer than 20,000 troops for the first several years). We sold NATO on AfPak being a peacekeeping mission not an actual war. Sending one's soldiers off to serve under someone else's leadership is never an easy task (imagine Americans being asked to send significant troops to serve under say French leadership in Africa). All the while with our strategies in AfPak meandering between "small footprint", counter-terror and partial COIN.
But now with a new American commitment and strategy it is imperative that our allies and near allies commit as well. Otherwise they will be guilty of free-riding. The U.S. as the leader will always bear a disproportionate share that goes with making the decisions and driving policy. We cannot expect others to merely follow lemming like behind us. But we can expect folks to pitch in.
Part of the new strategy will be to work with the nearby regional powers including Iran to engage their help stabilizing the AfPak area. But if the Brazilians, Japanese, South Koreans, Indonesians etc. want to enjoy the benefits of globalization then they need to step up to help ensure global stability is enhanced as well.
To be continued tomorrow with a final piece on why AfPak is not Vietnam, Iraq or any other prior benchmark. "
Monday, December 7, 2009
The New Populism
TW: Populism always flourishes in challenging economic times. Overlay our economy with a rapidly evolving international landscape whereby the U.S. and Europe no longer rule the roost without close peers, and it is bar the door Katie the woofin' is just startin'. The Republicans with their oppose Obama everyday on everything whilst whipping up the populist rage are now beginning wonder exactly where the rage will lead.
From Jon Alter at Newsweek:
"With unemployment surging and the public mood souring, populism is in the air. Sarah Palin, flattered in recent days by a comparison to William Jennings Bryan, is a plausible presidential candidate, according to George W. Bush's pollster. Lou Dobbs, the modern incarnation of the Know-Nothing Party of the 1850s, is dropping hints about running for the White House in 2012, presumably without the benefit of the Hispanic vote. And Glenn Beck is planning a huge rally next summer in Washington dedicated to "Re-founding America." If Beck pulls a big crowd and wins some credit for decimating Democrats in the midterms, it's not hard to guess what he might try next...
We haven't elected a populist president since Andrew Jackson 180 years ago. But we haven't had a black guy with no experience and a Muslim name as president either. Our omnipresent mediacracy makes a lot of unthinkable things thinkable...
The resulting Tower of Babel has good news and bad news for would-be populists. The good news for them is that the dissemination of outlandish ideas is easier than ever. Where cranks were once limited to red-ribbon typewriter rants or maybe a radio show, they now have unlimited potential to get their message out. The bad news for them is that they have nothing to say. They say nothing loudly, colorfully, and sometimes even charmingly, but it still doesn't amount to a new vision for the country. If their means of communicating are dramatically enhanced, their ends are hopelessly conventional.
Populism has been expanded to include anyone on the side of the people against the elites. But the word once had a more particular meaning. The anger had content. Populists of the past like Bryan in the 1890s, Huey Long and Father Coughlin in the 1930s, and even Pat Buchanan in the 1990s were angry about East Coast capitalists who were hurting the little guy in the heartland. They were anti–Wall Street, strongly protectionist, and committed to economic justice, even when some of them descended into racism and anti-Semitism.
Today's faux populists also feast on emotions—anxiety, anger, resentment—that intensify in hard times. But they are more accurately described as plain old reactionaries, a wonderfully precise word that has gone out of common usage. They're reacting against the pace of change and feeding right-wing nostalgia for a bygone era... Palin might try to echo Bryan, but she would consider Bryan's Populist Party platform of 1896 communistic were she to add it to her famous reading list...Beck said recently that his reading of history suggested it was in the progressive era that the United States first started going to hell. He wants to make the country safe for the 1880s.
...Populism—reactionary or progressive—is disruptive of the social order at a time when most people crave some sense of control over fast-moving events. Sure we want someone to give voice to our frustrations. But from the heart and head, not the spleen."http://www.newsweek.com/id/224672
From Jon Alter at Newsweek:
"With unemployment surging and the public mood souring, populism is in the air. Sarah Palin, flattered in recent days by a comparison to William Jennings Bryan, is a plausible presidential candidate, according to George W. Bush's pollster. Lou Dobbs, the modern incarnation of the Know-Nothing Party of the 1850s, is dropping hints about running for the White House in 2012, presumably without the benefit of the Hispanic vote. And Glenn Beck is planning a huge rally next summer in Washington dedicated to "Re-founding America." If Beck pulls a big crowd and wins some credit for decimating Democrats in the midterms, it's not hard to guess what he might try next...
We haven't elected a populist president since Andrew Jackson 180 years ago. But we haven't had a black guy with no experience and a Muslim name as president either. Our omnipresent mediacracy makes a lot of unthinkable things thinkable...
The resulting Tower of Babel has good news and bad news for would-be populists. The good news for them is that the dissemination of outlandish ideas is easier than ever. Where cranks were once limited to red-ribbon typewriter rants or maybe a radio show, they now have unlimited potential to get their message out. The bad news for them is that they have nothing to say. They say nothing loudly, colorfully, and sometimes even charmingly, but it still doesn't amount to a new vision for the country. If their means of communicating are dramatically enhanced, their ends are hopelessly conventional.
Populism has been expanded to include anyone on the side of the people against the elites. But the word once had a more particular meaning. The anger had content. Populists of the past like Bryan in the 1890s, Huey Long and Father Coughlin in the 1930s, and even Pat Buchanan in the 1990s were angry about East Coast capitalists who were hurting the little guy in the heartland. They were anti–Wall Street, strongly protectionist, and committed to economic justice, even when some of them descended into racism and anti-Semitism.
Today's faux populists also feast on emotions—anxiety, anger, resentment—that intensify in hard times. But they are more accurately described as plain old reactionaries, a wonderfully precise word that has gone out of common usage. They're reacting against the pace of change and feeding right-wing nostalgia for a bygone era... Palin might try to echo Bryan, but she would consider Bryan's Populist Party platform of 1896 communistic were she to add it to her famous reading list...Beck said recently that his reading of history suggested it was in the progressive era that the United States first started going to hell. He wants to make the country safe for the 1880s.
...Populism—reactionary or progressive—is disruptive of the social order at a time when most people crave some sense of control over fast-moving events. Sure we want someone to give voice to our frustrations. But from the heart and head, not the spleen."http://www.newsweek.com/id/224672
A Real Problem Seeking Solution
TW: I still think many folks believe health care reform is focused on providing more health care to the poor. It is not. It is focused on those working and middle class folks who for various reasons struggle to obtain care. Amongst other attributes, universal care would facilitate labor market participation by those currently likely to drop out due to health reasons. More importantly how would the nattering nabobs of health care reform negativity address the situation outlined below.
From Economist describing a Nic Kristof story from NYT:
"...what it's like to have a brain disease in America when you don't have health insurance. John Brodniak, a sawmill worker from Mr Kristof's hometown in Oregon, was diagnosed this spring with an abnormal growth of blood vessels in the brain which periodically leaks, causing him intense pain, blackouts, and memory loss. He was 23.
'With John unable to work, he lost his job — and his insurance coverage. [His wife] Esther had insurance for herself and for her two children (from a previous marriage) through her job building manufactured homes. But she couldn’t add John to her plan because of his pre-existing condition.
Without insurance, John has been unable to get surgery or even help managing the pain. When he collapses or suffers particularly excruciating headaches, Esther rushes him to the emergency room of one hospital or another, but an E.R. can’t do much for him. One hospital has told them not to come back unless he gets insurance, they say.
Esther used up her family leave time to look after her new husband. “Then I went back to work, and he fell several times,” she said. “I told my boss that I had to quit. Taking care of John was more important than building someone else’s house.”
That meant that the couple had no income—and no insurance for anyone in the family, including the children. Neighbors have helped, and a community program has paid the rent so that they are not homeless. But bills are piling up, and John and Esther don’t know how they will cope.
The doctors warn that pressure from the growth could lead a major blood vessel nearby to burst, killing him. “They tell me I’m a time bomb,” John said.'
When Ted Kennedy died in August, a number of right-wing commentators made the absurd suggestion that creating a universal health-insurance system in America was risky because, in such a system, the 77-year-old Mr Kennedy might not have been eligible for the high-quality care he received for a possibly inoperable brain tumour in the final year of his life. John Brodniak is a young, healthy man dying of an operable brain growth because America's current insurance system will not cover him.
Mr Brodniak's story is not without its complications: he has qualified for an Oregon Medicaid programme, but no hospital in the area will accept its low reimbursement rates for the treatment he needs. The health-reform plan currently moving through Congress would remedy such situations by requiring private insurance plans to accept people like Mr Brodniak, regardless of pre-existing conditions, and providing subsidies for those too poor to afford private plans. But the main point is that the idea that people might be refused urgent, life-saving medical care for fiscal reasons isn't some kind of future dystopia. It's the way things are right now. If we call that a "death panel", we're all sitting on it, and John Brodniak is waiting for our verdict."
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/11/we_have_met_the_death_panel
From Economist describing a Nic Kristof story from NYT:
"...what it's like to have a brain disease in America when you don't have health insurance. John Brodniak, a sawmill worker from Mr Kristof's hometown in Oregon, was diagnosed this spring with an abnormal growth of blood vessels in the brain which periodically leaks, causing him intense pain, blackouts, and memory loss. He was 23.
'With John unable to work, he lost his job — and his insurance coverage. [His wife] Esther had insurance for herself and for her two children (from a previous marriage) through her job building manufactured homes. But she couldn’t add John to her plan because of his pre-existing condition.
Without insurance, John has been unable to get surgery or even help managing the pain. When he collapses or suffers particularly excruciating headaches, Esther rushes him to the emergency room of one hospital or another, but an E.R. can’t do much for him. One hospital has told them not to come back unless he gets insurance, they say.
Esther used up her family leave time to look after her new husband. “Then I went back to work, and he fell several times,” she said. “I told my boss that I had to quit. Taking care of John was more important than building someone else’s house.”
That meant that the couple had no income—and no insurance for anyone in the family, including the children. Neighbors have helped, and a community program has paid the rent so that they are not homeless. But bills are piling up, and John and Esther don’t know how they will cope.
The doctors warn that pressure from the growth could lead a major blood vessel nearby to burst, killing him. “They tell me I’m a time bomb,” John said.'
When Ted Kennedy died in August, a number of right-wing commentators made the absurd suggestion that creating a universal health-insurance system in America was risky because, in such a system, the 77-year-old Mr Kennedy might not have been eligible for the high-quality care he received for a possibly inoperable brain tumour in the final year of his life. John Brodniak is a young, healthy man dying of an operable brain growth because America's current insurance system will not cover him.
Mr Brodniak's story is not without its complications: he has qualified for an Oregon Medicaid programme, but no hospital in the area will accept its low reimbursement rates for the treatment he needs. The health-reform plan currently moving through Congress would remedy such situations by requiring private insurance plans to accept people like Mr Brodniak, regardless of pre-existing conditions, and providing subsidies for those too poor to afford private plans. But the main point is that the idea that people might be refused urgent, life-saving medical care for fiscal reasons isn't some kind of future dystopia. It's the way things are right now. If we call that a "death panel", we're all sitting on it, and John Brodniak is waiting for our verdict."
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/11/we_have_met_the_death_panel
Classic Posts: My Gratuitous Opinion On an AfPak Escalation
TW: Our POTUS announced his plan last week. I posted my opinions six weeks ago. I put much time into them and thought they would be relevant to review now that a real plan has been defined.
From October 20, 2009
TW: Should the U.S. escalate its troop commitment in the AfPak region. Yes. Certainly I am not privy to the exact force structure options presented to our POTUS but I will assume the 40,000 number bandied about is about the number current military leadership believes necessary to prosecute an effective COIN operation in the AfPak area.
I do not say yes merely because the local commander has made the request. Local commanders are paid to develop contingencies, our political leaders are paid to assess those contingencies within the context of our overall strategic interests. Had local commanders been followed blindly in Korea in 1951 or Cuba in 1962 the U.S. would have entered broad and open-ended conflicts which in retrospect seem wisely avoided.
But escalating our military, economic and humanitarian commitments in AfPak are in our strategic interest and are strategic necessities. Here are the reasons why:
1) U.S. knows how to break places (i.e. shock and awe) but can we fix anyplace ?
"The Afghan conflict, it is often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year wars. NATO comes off worse each time. And so to the fourth and most important reason for persisting in Afghanistan: the coalition can do much better.[Economist]"
We have since 9/11 invaded two sovereign nations overwhelming their limited conventional militaries. Both "re-building" wars have proven far more challenging than the initial battles. We have yet to succeed in either. Should we fail again our legitimacy as a force for long-term good would be called into question. We must get away from we can break things but cannot re-build things. Our nation must also accept that short, sharp engagements based upon our current technological power are not a valid strategic posture. We must accept the aftermath's consequences as well, once we do perhaps we will be less apt to attempt one without the other.
2) "The United States has had one central objective: to deny Al Qaeda the means to reconstitute, train, and plan major terror attacks" (from Zakaria at Newsweek).
This is correct only partially. Al Qaeda is not the end all be all of American national security interests. Al Qaeda suppression is certainly a goal but by no means our only goal. Afghanistan is the armpit of the world and I mean that both metaphorically and literally. It has been fought over for centuries precisely due to its strategic value as a physical and tribal crossroads for the East and West. The Taliban have become a petri dish for extremist Islam and they are firmly implanted in AfPak.
Just as importantly AfPak is the "four corners" of international relations in the 21st century. We have have Iran to its west, Russia and its former Islamic states (the "stans") to the north, India to its east with China just over the hills. Leaving a festering, terrorist supporting Taliban in control of AfPak would be an unacceptable development for our national interest. Such an occurrence could lead to direct and indirect de-stabilization for too many critical allies (India) and frenemies (Pakistan, Russia, China, the "stans").
3) Again from Zakaria-"let's please remember that there is virtually no Qaeda presence there...Al Qaeda is in Pakistan, as is the leadership of the hard-core Afghan Taliban...There's little evidence that Pakistan's generals have truly accepted that they must defeat all the jihadis in their country (as opposed to just those who threaten the Pakistani state). But they have been more cooperative and active in the past year than ever before."
This is where Zakaria is most wrong in his analysis. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been pushed largely into Pakistan. That does not mean they will stay there. Furthermore the more I read about the current Taliban the more I see their radicalism meshing with Al Qaeda, not completely aligned but sufficiently so to be more than a mere nationalist Pashtun entity.
If the U.S. leaves AfPak a void is created. The Taliban and Al Qaeda would stream right back into Afghanistan. Just as importantly, should a void be created Pakistan will release pressure on its side of the border on the Taliban. Pakistan sees the Taliban as a strategic ally relative to India and perhaps Iran. The Pakistanis will only contain the Taliban as long as a strong U.S./NATO presence in Afghanistan provides an alternative strategic reality.
Fundamentally the U.S. must exert pressure in Afghanistan in order to have Pakistanis exert pressure within their own borders. Afghans and Pakistanis and other regional players are looking for a long-term commitment from U.S. To date even post 9/11 the U.S. and NATO have appeared more interested in leaving ASAP which would lead right back to the status quo pre 9-11 (i.e. a Pakistani supported Taliban operating throughout the AfPak area serving as Al Qaeda's host).
The above speaks to why we must continue and enlarge our engagement in AfPak. The next post will speak to why and how I think we can succeed.
From October 20, 2009
TW: Should the U.S. escalate its troop commitment in the AfPak region. Yes. Certainly I am not privy to the exact force structure options presented to our POTUS but I will assume the 40,000 number bandied about is about the number current military leadership believes necessary to prosecute an effective COIN operation in the AfPak area.
I do not say yes merely because the local commander has made the request. Local commanders are paid to develop contingencies, our political leaders are paid to assess those contingencies within the context of our overall strategic interests. Had local commanders been followed blindly in Korea in 1951 or Cuba in 1962 the U.S. would have entered broad and open-ended conflicts which in retrospect seem wisely avoided.
But escalating our military, economic and humanitarian commitments in AfPak are in our strategic interest and are strategic necessities. Here are the reasons why:
1) U.S. knows how to break places (i.e. shock and awe) but can we fix anyplace ?
"The Afghan conflict, it is often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year wars. NATO comes off worse each time. And so to the fourth and most important reason for persisting in Afghanistan: the coalition can do much better.[Economist]"
We have since 9/11 invaded two sovereign nations overwhelming their limited conventional militaries. Both "re-building" wars have proven far more challenging than the initial battles. We have yet to succeed in either. Should we fail again our legitimacy as a force for long-term good would be called into question. We must get away from we can break things but cannot re-build things. Our nation must also accept that short, sharp engagements based upon our current technological power are not a valid strategic posture. We must accept the aftermath's consequences as well, once we do perhaps we will be less apt to attempt one without the other.
2) "The United States has had one central objective: to deny Al Qaeda the means to reconstitute, train, and plan major terror attacks" (from Zakaria at Newsweek).
This is correct only partially. Al Qaeda is not the end all be all of American national security interests. Al Qaeda suppression is certainly a goal but by no means our only goal. Afghanistan is the armpit of the world and I mean that both metaphorically and literally. It has been fought over for centuries precisely due to its strategic value as a physical and tribal crossroads for the East and West. The Taliban have become a petri dish for extremist Islam and they are firmly implanted in AfPak.
Just as importantly AfPak is the "four corners" of international relations in the 21st century. We have have Iran to its west, Russia and its former Islamic states (the "stans") to the north, India to its east with China just over the hills. Leaving a festering, terrorist supporting Taliban in control of AfPak would be an unacceptable development for our national interest. Such an occurrence could lead to direct and indirect de-stabilization for too many critical allies (India) and frenemies (Pakistan, Russia, China, the "stans").
3) Again from Zakaria-"let's please remember that there is virtually no Qaeda presence there...Al Qaeda is in Pakistan, as is the leadership of the hard-core Afghan Taliban...There's little evidence that Pakistan's generals have truly accepted that they must defeat all the jihadis in their country (as opposed to just those who threaten the Pakistani state). But they have been more cooperative and active in the past year than ever before."
This is where Zakaria is most wrong in his analysis. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been pushed largely into Pakistan. That does not mean they will stay there. Furthermore the more I read about the current Taliban the more I see their radicalism meshing with Al Qaeda, not completely aligned but sufficiently so to be more than a mere nationalist Pashtun entity.
If the U.S. leaves AfPak a void is created. The Taliban and Al Qaeda would stream right back into Afghanistan. Just as importantly, should a void be created Pakistan will release pressure on its side of the border on the Taliban. Pakistan sees the Taliban as a strategic ally relative to India and perhaps Iran. The Pakistanis will only contain the Taliban as long as a strong U.S./NATO presence in Afghanistan provides an alternative strategic reality.
Fundamentally the U.S. must exert pressure in Afghanistan in order to have Pakistanis exert pressure within their own borders. Afghans and Pakistanis and other regional players are looking for a long-term commitment from U.S. To date even post 9/11 the U.S. and NATO have appeared more interested in leaving ASAP which would lead right back to the status quo pre 9-11 (i.e. a Pakistani supported Taliban operating throughout the AfPak area serving as Al Qaeda's host).
The above speaks to why we must continue and enlarge our engagement in AfPak. The next post will speak to why and how I think we can succeed.
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)