TW: A pro-escalation case from the Economist editorial board:
"...The decision may define his presidency. Despite the difficulty—indeed, because of the difficulty—he should give the general what he needs.
The alternative is not, as some opponents of an Afghan “surge” suggest, less intensive, more surgical “counter-terrorism”, relying on unmanned air raids and assassination. Mr Obama seems, rightly, to have ruled that out. General McChrystal, a special-forces veteran, is emphatic it would not work. On its own, it is more likely to kill civilians and create new enemies than to decapitate and disable al-Qaeda. A counter-terrorist strategy is a euphemism for withdrawal—which is what plenty of Westerners think should happen.
If the West is wearying of its Afghan adventure, it is hardly surprising. The country’s unruly tribes and mountainous landscape make the place hard to pacify. Voters thousands of miles away struggle to remember why their soldiers are dying there. Reminders that they are depriving al-Qaeda of the base from which it plots the West’s destruction stretch credulity when the terrorists do just that from Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Yet the arguments for staying remain strong. First, the West has a security interest in preventing the region from slipping into a maelstrom of conflict. Pakistan, with 170m people and nuclear weapons, is vulnerable to the Taliban’s potent mixture of ethnic-Pushtun nationalism and extremist Islam. Anarchy in Afghanistan, or a Taliban restoration, would leave it prey to permanent cross-border instability. Second, defeat for the West in Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but all around the world, leaving it open to more attacks. And, third, withdrawal would amount to a terrible betrayal of the Afghan people, some of whose troubles are the result of Western intervention.
Millions of refugees have returned and millions of children have the chance to go to school. But the West has failed to protect civilian lives, to bring the development it promised, to wean the economy off its poppy-addiction and to ensure fair elections—and failed even to agree about what it is trying to do in the country. The Western-dominated United Nations mission has fractured in a public row between its two senior officials. Locally, NATO forces have done fine and heroic work. But too often the best initiatives are dropped when the best commanders end their tours. The Afghan conflict, it is often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year wars. NATO comes off worse each time. And so to the fourth and most important reason for persisting in Afghanistan: the coalition can do much better.
General McChrystal is an impressive soldier with a coherent plan. The West’s forces have got to know their enemies: not just the Taliban but also other terrorist networks and countless local warlords and thugs. The coalition’s leaders, at least, seem to have grasped that it must behave not as an occupying army but as a partner, whose aim is to build up the local forces that will ultimately ensure Afghanistan’s security. And soldiers and civilians are beginning to understand that development aid can benefit local people rather than foreign consultants and contractors.
The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war.
Many Afghans find it bizarre that the West should devote so much money to Mr Karzai, yet be unable to hold him to account over something so basic as stuffing ballot boxes on an industrial scale. For most, however, the local and provincial leaders matter more than the distant central government.
That is where the constitution drawn up after the overthrow of the Taliban went wrong. It envisages a centralised state. Provincial governors, for example, are appointed by the president. This flawed framework needs to be replaced with one which reflects the reality of a diverse, decentralised country. Agreeing on a new constitution would also help shift the focus of political debate and get around the election debacle.
If you’re going to do it, do it properly
As for resources, it is worth remembering that in 2006, before the American surge, prospects in Iraq looked far bleaker than they do now in Afghanistan, even though the allies had many more foreign and local troops. General McChrystal is believed to have offered a range of proposals to increase the number of American forces—at present about 62,000 out of a total of some 100,000 foreign troops—by between 10,000 and 60,000 troops. Mr Obama may be tempted to compromise—to show military resolve by acceding to the commander’s request, yet appease anti-war opinion by picking the lowest number.
This would be a mistake. General McChrystal says that the core of his strategy is its first stage: to regain the initiative. To do that, a substantial surge is needed. Gordon Brown’s announcement of an extra 500 is a welcome gesture, but will make little difference. Mr Obama should send at least 40,000 more.
Most of all, Mr Obama needs to fight this war with conviction. His wobbles over the last month have done more to comfort his enemies and worry his allies than any recent losses on the ground. Only if he persuades his troops, his countrymen and the Taliban that America is there for the long haul does he have a chance of turning this war around."
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14644385
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