Insight And Ignorance

TW: The tragedy in Haiti will be politicized within 48 hours, you can count on that. Gahlran frames one issue that will emerge quickly- potential massive immigration towards the U.S. Then he does something that drives me crazy. He tries to tie Haiti to health care reform by insinuating we cannot afford more poor people sinice health care reform is meant to fund all of "those" poor people. This is just ignorant. Health care reform has little to do with poor folks. Poor folks over 65 have Medicare, those under Medicaid. Health care reform is about every fricking one else in particular working, middle class folks without good or ANY coverage today!!

And Gahlran while conservatively oriented is by no means a rabid Limbovian/Palin type.

From Gahlran at Info Dissemination:
"There is a legitimate National Security Risk Assessment that has yet to be discussed anywhere in the media, at least that I have seen. The annual immigration season from Haiti to Florida by sea usually begins in February every year. If it has historically been easy for Haitians to choose the risks of sea immigration when they have a home and family, how much easier is it for a Haitian to risk the dangerous journey when their home is destroyed or family is dead? This is a critical point, because the US is in big trouble if 100,000 people, or potentially a lot more, attempt a massive migration at sea following this catastrophe. The Obama administration is going to have to spend money - potentially many billion dollars - to keep three million homeless people in Haiti. This a serious problem that will directly impact you and me unless you are somehow stupid enough to believe the US is ready to absorb the cost of a mass immigration of a population with a high illiteracy rate at the same time the government intends to pass National Health Care to protect the poorest in our country."
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/01/all-things-maritime-and-haiti.html

Nuclear Power At Sea?

TW: Cargo ships are big and prodigious users of oil, usually highly pollutive dirty oils. What about creating nuke powered ships? Innovators will search for workarounds, perhaps nuke cargo ships will provide an answer.

From Gahlran at Info Dissemination:
"...The head of Chinese shipping giant Cosco has suggested that container ships should be powered by nuclear reactors in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from shipping, said to account for 4% of the global total. Shipping companies have gradually been introducing 'super slow steaming', a measure designed to cut fuel consumption and substantially reduce emissions by running engines at very low speed. However, Wei Jiafu, Cosco's president and CEO, speaking at the Senior Maritime Forum of the China International Maritime Exhibition (Marintec China) in Shanghai, said that introducing nuclear-powered ships could be an even cleaner solution. He said, "As they are already onboard submarines, why not cargo ships?" He said that Cosco is in talks with China's nuclear authority to develop nuclear powered freight vessels.

...Let’s begin by noting that a merchant vessel with nuclear power is likely going to be gigantic and will require a highly specialized crew. The costs of operating such a ship will be very high, but with its great size, potential speed, endurance, and cost tradeoffs there may in fact be a lucrative profit margin behind such a vessel. It is also important to note that the vast majority of trained nuclear propulsion experts today are American, so to expect American business interests to immediately dismiss this would be to misunderstand the size, scope, and depth of the discussion.

...What about accidents and piracy? The seas are not immune to Murphy's Law. What happens when a nuclear powered COSCO ship hits a bridge in San Francisco?

...The political ramifications will be enormous, from national security to environment; the range of policy issues will be quite large. Many countries do not allow nuclear powered ships in port, although with ships as large as the ones likely envisioned by COSCO, most countries who object may not have the facilities or the demand to support such large ships. For example, Canada may reject allowing such a ship into their country, but the US may allow nuclear merchant vessels into specific ports. It would be interesting if it ever became more efficient for China to ship into the US on large nuclear ships, then rail cargo into Canada instead of shipping directly to Canada. That is just an example, because I can envision a scenario where Mexico allows huge nuclear ships, and California, Washington, and Oregon did not..."
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/12/will-cosco-save-planet-with-nuclear.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+InformationDissemination+%28Information+Dissemination%29

Parsing Obama's AfPak Strategy

TW: Military analyst Gahlran parsed Obama's speech in detail. Take a couple of minutes to read it. As with many issues, sound bites do not come close to doing justice to AfPak (I watched Chris Matthews issue verbal garbagefor about 45 seconds post speech then turned off cable for good). There is an extensive and relatively well-informed and intelligent debate on AfPak in the blogosphere amongst military and national security analysts with non-partisan credentials. It is worth plugging into by hitting the link below.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/12/obamas-speech-at-west-point-about.html

A Bridge Too Far?

TW: Info Dissemination has excerpts from a recent COIN seminar. They are pretty interesting. The challenge that strikes me amongst many is the folks discussing COIN are Lt. Colonel and Colonel level. Folks with 20 or so years of experience (with multiple war tours) and usually multiple degrees, they are as qualified and competent as we can produce. Yet they struggle with the strategies and how to execute them. Ultimately the execution will not be done by upper level officers, it will be done by junior officers and enlisted personnel.

Can we legitimately expect COIN with its unbelievable needs for patience, local knowledge and extraordinary risks to percolate downward to 18 and 20 year olds. Are we debating a viable strategy?

From Info Dissemination:
"...what I see in Afghanistan, and I had the opportunity to travel around the entire country, visit many, many units including our NATO partners, that we’re completely an enemy-centric force.

We need to re-position a significant portion of our FOBs and COPs among the population because right now they’re not. The problem is they were built for CT missions in ’02 and ’03 and in ’04 in wrong locations for a population-centric COIN effort.

And the second thing is we talk about it a lot, we write about it a lot but we are not focused on the Afghan army and the Afghan police and the Afghan border police. We don’t live with them as partnered units. We consider partnering to link up and do operations. If you’re not sleeping with them, eating with them, and crapping in the same bucket, you’re not partnered and we’re not partnered in Afghanistan.Real quick.

COIN population centric is not about being nice to them like – (inaudible) – said. “Hearts and minds” gets confused sometimes. It’s about separating the population from the insurgents, protecting them, influencing them, and controlling the population, especially in the initial stages. And we talked about already about the enemy. It’s fluid; it hides in plain sight.

The enemy does it.And what do we mean by hearts and minds? I think, Dr. Mansoor, you brought up “trust and confidence.” I totally agree. The heart or the trust is that we’re in their best self-interests. We’re in their best self-interest. The people have to be believe that and in their mind or their confidence in us they have to believe that we are going to win, and when I say we, it’s the Afghan army and police with our support and their government. They have to believe that we’re going to win and we’re going to protect them. In their heart they have to believe we’re in their best self-interest and in their mind they believe that we are going to win. We’re failing to do that...

They’ve learned to survive 30 years of war by hedging their bets. They’ve learned to play both sides. And they are still doing it. Why? Because they’re getting slapped on one cheek by their government and the other cheek by the Taliban. They don’t have a good choice and we’re not providing them a good choice because we’re not population centric, we’re not amongst the people, and we’re not with their army and police force...

The next thing is these people can read you better than any people I’ve ever been around including my uncles that live in north Georgia which are very similar to. (Laughter.) They live off the land. They’ve learned over their lifetime in order to survive how to read people. You’ve got to understand that when you deal with then on a daily basis. If you’re not sincere, they will see through you in a heartbeat and you will not be successful with them..."
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/10/art-of-battalion-command-in.html

Good Move On Missile Defense

TW: Much going on with the move by Obama to shift the focus of our regional BMD from Eastern Europe to other venues (sea-based and perhaps nations closer to Iran).
1) It is an explicit change from Bush policy which is relatively rare and naturally gets the usual suspects up in arms but one must keep in mind the Polish/Czech BMD deployment's purpose was always meant in substance to create a shield against limited missile launches by a regional power such as Iran. It was not meant to provide cover against a major power such as Russia. If we had started encircling Russia with BMD then the Russians would have rightly regarded that as a massive escalation and unfriendly move on our part. Those shrieking about "caving" to the Russians are wrong.
2) This does not mean there will not be a quid pro quo from Russia which many expect will be greatly enhanced cooperation in addressing the Iranian nuke program.
3) As far as supporting the Poles (and to lesser extent the Czechs), public support in those countries for the BMD deployment was marginal. There are many things we can do besides BMD deployment against in Iran in Poland to express our support for strong Eastern European allies.
4) If one hears military folks lament the change in approach then I would be more concerned but I suspect any such concerns will not be forthcoming as militarily the new BMD approach makes sense.
4) There is much chatter in the blogosphere about signs pointing to significant stars aligning for some sort of inflection point relative to the Iran nukes program. The likely outcome being aggressive sanctions soon with Russian and some Chinese cooperation. We shall see.

From Information Dissemenation (no national defense shrinking violet):
"The reaction in Poland and the Czech Republic clearly illustrates that the purpose of the ballistic missiles in those countries was to influence Russia, yet the Bush administration always sold the concept domestically from the political position that the shield protects the US from Iranian ballistic missiles, an obvious disingenuous position. To me, that indicated Bush was sending a signal to Russia that the ballistic missile shield was on the negotiating table for the subject of Iran.

I look at the decision today and see a smart move by Gates, for reasons previously discussed, but believe the politics of this has everything to do with the Obama administration successfully trading the ballistic missile shield deployment to eastern Europe for something in regards to Iran.

France is now 'sure' Iran is working on nukes. Israel is sending every signal it can that it is poised to attack. The IAEA now says Iran has sufficient information to build a bomb. Israel is calling for tough sanctions, and suggests they will attack if tough sanctions aren't applied.

Then there is the immediate effect the timing the Eastern European decision has on Israel. All that equipment heading to Israel for the Juniper Cobra exercise in mid-October is supposedly going to stay put now. That will be useful.We seem to be heading towards one of two conclusions. Either big time sanctions are applied on Iran, or Israel attacks Iran by the end of the year. Today's actions suggest Russia will support the sanctions, but I guess we will have to wait and see."

AfPak: A Conundrum Wrapped Inside an Enigma

TW: I butchered that cliche on purpose. AfPak with George Will's op-ed this morning calling for a drastic reduction in U.S. forces in Afghanistan is pulling AfPak, which had been evolving from simmer to boil, closer to the boil. I have been meaning to post on it for awhile but it is challenging to wrap one's head around and will take a series of posts. But it is time.

Will start with this piece from Gahlran a respected military naval analyst. The piece frames for me the quandary, Gahlran is no dove generally but even he at this point appears twisted into a bit of a pretzel. He seemingly senses on one hand that we must persevere yet he senses on the other that a viable strategy by which to persevere remains highly perhaps fatally elusive. Much more to come.

From Information Dissemination:
"Gahlran quoting John Nagl:
'America has vital national security interests in Afghanistan that make fighting there necessary. The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. Afghanistan also serves as a base from which the United States attacks al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win.

U.S. policymakers must, of course, weigh all actions against America's global interests and the possible opportunity costs. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, low-cost strategies do not have an encouraging record of success. U.S. efforts to secure Afghanistan on the cheap after 2001 led it to support local strongmen whose actions alienated the population and thereby enabled the Taliban to reestablish itself as an insurgent force. Drone attacks, although efficient eliminators of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders, have not prevented extremist forces from spreading and threatening to undermine both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.'

Back to Gahlran:
I read a great book once discussing the less than encouraging record of success in counterinsurgency campaigns...Look, I get it... what we are doing in Afghanistan isn't working and we have approached a moment of decision, but ineffective efforts and the ability to select alternative options neither suggests the way ahead nor the destination.

My problem with the massive increase towards a new counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan isn't that I believe the method couldn't be effective, indeed I believe with enough troops and investment, we have a decent shot at successfully securing population centers. What I don't understand is how that translates into the strategic objectives of preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists when in fact Pakistan is serving as a sanctuary for terrorists today. It seems to me we have a serious geography problem in strategy execution, and I do not see how any strategic method, counterinsurgency or otherwise, is going to achieve the strategic object of denying safe havens to the enemy as long as the approach includes allowing the enemy a safe haven (in Pakistan).

John Nagl is completely wrong btw, the so-called "light footprint" option has not failed to secure US objectives, at least the objectives as I knew them to be after 9/11. Afghanistan is currently not serving as a sanctuary for terrorists to enact attacks with global reach, which is the specific strategic objective he cited that the US is fighting to achieve. US military objectives have been unclear in Afghanistan for so long that his statement almost sounds accurate. It isn't accurate.

...until someone clearly articulates what the ends of strategy are for the US/NATO effort in Afghanistan, the discussions concerning ways and means to execute strategy serve only to distract from the objective, not achieve the objective. Until I see a meaningful strategy that addresses the drug issues, the Pakistan issues, and the NATO combat support issues - count me in favor of whatever liberally violent, low-cost strategy the President comes up with that kills the most bad guys."
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/09/strategic-shift-coming.html

Why Ending F-22 Procurement Is So Important

"THE fact that the F-22 program is no longer needed beyond where it stands today, that it is no longer wanted by the most senior civilian and uniformed officials in the Pentagon—exercising their best professional judgment—and that it is simply no longer affordable cannot be disputed. However, in the face of those facts, the full weight of all those interests that have—for a period of over 20 years—become invested in the survival of the program has been brought to bear on the decision-making process on this body today. That is the military-industrial-congressional complex at work."
-- check at bottom for the quotee

From Robert Gates speech to Chicago Econ Club last week:
"...Authorization for more F-22s is in both versions of the defense bill working its way through the Congress. The president has indicated that he has real red lines in this budget, including the F-22.

Some might ask, why threaten a veto and risk a confrontation over a couple of billion dollars and for a dozen or so more -- a dozen or so more planes?

The grim reality is that with regard to the defense budget, we have entered a zero-sum game. Every defense dollar devoted to -- diverted to fund excess or unneeded capacity, whether for more F-22s or anything else, is a dollar that will be unavailable to take care of our people, to win the wars we are in, to deter potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas where America is underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I cannot accept and one that I will not take.

And with regard to something like the F-22, regardless of whether the number of aircraft at issue is 12 or 200, if we can't bring ourselves to make this tough but straightforward decision -- reflecting the judgment of two very different presidents, two secretaries of defense, two chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the current Air Force secretary and chief of staff -- where do we draw the line? And if not now, when? If we can't get this right, what on earth can we get right? It is time to draw the line on doing defense business as usual. The president has drawn that line, and that line is with regard to a veto. And it is real..."

TW: Congress is trying to continue funding the F-22 fighter aircraft in the face of opposition from Gates and our POTUS. Obama has threatened a veto if F-22 funding emerges in the new defense spending bills. I sincerely hope he holds the line. There are strong arguments in favor of the F-22 but we cannot have everything at some point tough choices have to be made. The F-22 is a metaphor for government spending in general.

The reason the F-22 remains alive is not overriding military needs but strong political pull exerted by the F-22 manufacturer which cannily (like most contractors) spread F-22 production contracts across as many congressional districts as possible. This is a bi-partisan pork project but where are those allegedly ferocious spending police in the Republican party to help Gates and Obama fend of the budget busters?

It appears, as of yesterday, the Senate has voted to back the Gates/Obama position. Good news. These things tend to have nine lives (at least) so I suspect further votes will be necessary. The quotee btw, Mr. John McCain (Sen AZ) well-known pacifist left-wing weak on defense type.

Oink, Oink Goes the Defense Budget (cont.)

TW: This was ironic given this morning's post. The Info Dissemination blogger saw the same article and posted as well with the difference that he knows much more about the Navy than I do. Yet, the conclusion is the same. As you can tell the LCS (littoral combatant ship) is not one of the blogger's favorite ships.

The point is how pandering flows both ways in government leading to sub-optimal results, this is not a partisan issue. If folks wants improved government we need to improve the processes.

From Information Dissemination:
"...Anytime ADM Mullen is acting in his role as CJCS for the wars, I think Mullen is excellent. With that said, anytime Mullen is speaking for the Navy, he doesn't do the Navy any favors.

Shelby also coaxed Mullen to praise Alabama's very own littoral combat ships.

"Could you tell us here the advantages that the Navy will gain once the service begins to utilize the LCS?" he asked."Okay,"
Mullen obliged. "I need the LCS at sea, deployed today. . . . It offers unique characteristics in terms of speed and mobility and . . ."
"Also firepower," Shelby added.
"And firepower," Mullen agreed. Sigh.

ADM Mullen is a former Chief of Naval Operations who knows the Littoral Combat Ship so well, he signed off on the construction of 2 Littoral Combat Ships. He is currently serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest ranking military officer in the United States.

Maybe we should just pretend ADM Mullen is ignorant about the LCS, instead of acknowledging Mullen is being dishonest in front of a Senator, telling that Senator exactly what he wanted to hear.

Firepower on the LCS? When a 4 star Admiral is obviously dishonest about a controversial platform in a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing about the capabilities of a program more than 300% over budget, as LCS-2 is, for the purposes of telling a Senator representing his district exactly what he wants to hear, and what you want him to believe, so he will fund your program...

What are people supposed to think? What does this say about the Navy? What does this say about the LCS? What does this say about everyone in OSD, the Senate, the House, the Executive branch, and the Navy who stands quiet when they know this is clear dishonesty? It is impossible to assume that Mullen, the CNO who was so intimately involved in the development of this system, is either ignorant regarding the 'firepower' of the LCS, or actually believes the 57mm and RAM represents firepower.No amount of spin can fix the image of a controversial ship obviously discussed dishonesty in a widely read article in the Washington Post. The LCS earns every bit of skepticism and criticism it gets."
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/06/when-smile-and-nod-goes-bad.html

A Shootdown That Was Not

(L-R) German Ace Franz Stigler, artist Ernie Boyett, and B-17 pilot Charlie Brown. TW: The Memorial Day posts were of the somber variety, ran across this story which had a happier ending many years ago.

From the Lisbon Reporter and Info Dissmenation:
"Charlie Brown was a B-17 Flying Fortress pilot...at Kimbolton, England. His B-17 was called 'Ye Old Pub' and was in a terrible state, having been hit by flak and fighters. The compass was damaged and they were flying deeper over enemy territory instead of heading home to Kimbolton.

After flying the B-17 over an enemy airfield, a German pilot named Franz Steigler was ordered to take off and shoot down the B-17. When he got near the B-17, he could not believe his eyes. In his words, he 'had never seen a plane in such a bad state'. The tail and rear section was severely damaged, and the tail gunner wounded. The top gunner was all over the top of the fuselage. The nose was smashed and there were holes everywhere.

Despite having ammunition, Franz flew to the side of the B-17 and looked at Charlie Brown, the pilot. Brown was scared and struggling to control his damaged and blood-stained plane.

Aware that they had no idea where they were going, Franz waved at Charlie to turn 180degrees. Franz escorted and guided the stricken plane to, and slightly over, the North Sea towards England. He then saluted Charlie Brown and turned away, back to Europe. When Franz landed he told the CO that the plane had been shot down over the sea, and never told the truth to anybody. Charlie Brown and the remains of his crew told all at their briefing, but were ordered never to talk about it.

More than 40 years later, Charlie Brown wanted to find the Luftwaffe pilot who saved the crew. After years of research, Franz was found. He had never talked about the incident, not even at post-war reunions.

They met in the USA at a 379th Bomber Group reunion, together with 25 people who are alive now - all because Franz never fired his guns that day.

When asked why he didn’t shoot them down, Stigler later said, “I didn’t have the heart to finish those brave men. I flew beside them for a long time. They were trying desperately to get home and I was going to let them do that. I could not have shot at them. It would have been the same as shooting at a man in a parachute.”

Both men died in 2008."

http://www.lisbonreporter.com/2009/05/true-story-worth-reading-least-we-not.html

Dealing With the Pirates

TW: With the hijacking and subsequent rescue of the American sailors off Somalia, the piracy in that area has achieved a new level of publicity at least here in the U.S. The pirates have been operating extensively for many months now despite the presence of significant naval forces from numerous nations. Superficially the ability of pirates to operate effectively in the 21st century seems ludicrous, but as Galrahn at the Information Dissemination site articulates, it should not be.

The pirates are low tech and well-disguised amidst the thousands of legitimate fishing vessels circulating over thousands of square miles of sea in the area. No matter how many nations and how many hundreds of millions of $ are devoted to the problem, conventional naval forces will struggle to subdue the pirates unless extremely broad and politically unrealistic rules of engagement were deployed. Even then the probability of success would be dubious and potentially hundreds of non-combatants would be likely casualties in the process.

To date the pirates have focused on money, not personal harm. With this week's actions, things may escalate. Galrahn's site provides a more or less centrist (as opposed to the lets bomb kaht chewing bastards to smithereens types on some of righty sites) and well-informed take on all matters naval. If you are interested in following the Somalia situation, I would highly recommend his site. Below are links to three of his stories providing background and suggestions on how to address the issue.

From Information Dissemination:
"...But even when military action is reserved for only the most dire circumstances, and as precise as what was demonstrated today, every Presidential decision to use military action carries trickling effects, and these three bullets will have that effect

Somali pirates were quick to vow revenge over the shooting of their comrades, as well as a French military assault to rescue a yacht on Friday.

"The French and the Americans will regret starting this killing. We do not kill, but take only ransom. We shall do something to anyone we see as French or American from now," Hussein, a pirate, told Reuters by satellite phone.

When the Secretary of Defense began the week discussing the need to bring asymmetric warfare to the table at the DoD procurement buffet, no one could have predicted the week would play out in a way to prove it. For the first time since WWII, the United States is being openly challenged at sea, not from a military force of a major power capable of challenging the US Navy, rather a band of clan brothers who are vowing to stalk Americans on the high seas, and "do something."

The Navy may soon find themselves in an asymmetric war because the Somali pirates didn't get their ransom money. This probably won't be seen as bad thing with many, right up until the point American merchant mariners are being executed. The escalation from piracy to maritime terrorism will leave many questioning a law enforcement approach [TW: this refers to the alternative of aggressive military action on land relative to the pirates]. Like I said, when it comes to the issues of Somalia the Obama administration is facing a complex series of choices where none of the options are any good.
http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2009/04/somali-pirates-vow-revenge.html

Why ending the piracy is easier said than done:
http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2009/04/somalia-piracy-backgrounder.html

Some ideas on what to do differently than we have been:
http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2009/04/observing-obama-administration-somali.html