From Joe Quinn via the Tom Ricks blog:
"Al Qaeda murdered my brother Jimmy nine years ago...My brother Jimmy worked on the 101st floor. Not a single remnant of my brother would be recovered.
...Due to my emotions (and engineering classes), I barely graduated West Point in the spring of 2002...Nine years after my brother's death..I am currently contributing to the fight here in Afghanistan.
I have recounted the last nine years of my life because my journey through these wars has been similar to yours. You were devastated by the events of 9/11. You wanted revenge, or at least some sort of justice, where you supported the invasion of Afghanistan. You were sidetracked by the Iraq War in 2003 and then again by the Iraq "Surge" in 2007. Nine years after 9/11, you are tired of war, but finally find your blood and treasure in Afghanistan.
My greatest fear is that we will lose the Afghan war because of the Iraq war. The American people are tired of war mostly due to the painful doldrums brought on by the Iraq campaign. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) also siphoned resources and attention away from Afghanistan, allowing an insurgency to rise and for the U.S. to never fully realize a plan for winning. What is winning? Winning is achieving irreversible momentum towards a stable Afghanistan, free from Taliban control, which will never serve as a base for terrorism.
After nine years of neglecting the Afghan war, we finally have a plan for winning, with the right resources, the right leadership and the right programs. At the end of August, the last of the 30,000 additional U.S. troops are finally in place. Undoubtedly, these additional troops will clear and hold large swaths of Taliban strongholds.
In General Petraeus, we also have the right leadership to orchestrate the Afghan war. Saying that General Petraeus will not make a difference in Afghanistan is like saying Michael Jordan would not make a difference in Chicago after coming out of retirement in 1994. Eventually the team will improve.
The right programs in Afghanistan have only just begun. General Petraeus made an immediate impact by partnering with President Karzai to begin the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program that will leverage local Afghans to provide village-level security. The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is another concept that has just been ratified, where the effects of the program will only truly be felt in the months ahead. The right resources, leadership and programs in Afghanistan have just begun. Winning the Afghan war has just begun.
So after nine years, why are we still in Afghanistan? For me it's still simple. The men that killed my brother on 9/11 were five of 20,000 terrorists trained by Al Qaeda in a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan will only embolden Al Qaeda even more to perpetrate terrorist attacks like on 9/11. It's easy to forget the connection between Afghanistan and 9/11 after all this time. For me, it's impossible to forget. Perhaps remembering is the luxury of my family's tragedy.
In the end, I do not want revenge anymore. The truth is that the perpetrators that murdered my brother died that same day. I now have a new goal: to leave Afghanistan. To leave Afghanistan as a stable country, free from Taliban control, which will never serve as a base for terrorism.
Joe Quinn currently works in Afghanistan as a Counterinsurgency Advisor for the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF's) Counterinsurgency Assistance and Advisory Team (CAAT). He graduated in May from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government."
Ricks Foreign Policy
Showing posts with label AfPak. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AfPak. Show all posts
Saturday, September 11, 2010
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
It Is Not As Simple As: "Kill And Torture As Many As You Can"
TW:...but perhaps ultimately more effective and less costly in blood and treasure
"Amazing what can happen when you have a foreign policy that includes diplomacy and force and sophistication."
--Andrew Sullivan's comment on the Coll article
From Steve Coll at New Yorker:
"The news that a joint C.I.A.-Pakistani raid in Karachi resulted last week in the capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is a big deal...Why would Pakistan move decisively against Afghan Taliban leadership now? The Times suggests that Pakistani generals under the lame-duck Army chief, General Ashraf Kiyani, are coming around to the view that they require a national-security doctrine that does not involve sheltering the Afghan Taliban...
I would guess at a more subtle motivation, one that might suggest a favorable pattern now emerging in the Obama Administration’s and Central Command’s approach to Pakistan’s role in the Afghan conflict. Over the last few months, by multiple means, the United States and its allies have been seeking to persuade Pakistan that it can best achieve its legitimate security goals in Afghanistan through political negotiations, rather than through the promotion of endless (and futile) Taliban guerrilla violence—and that the United States will respect and accommodate Pakistan’s agenda in such talks. Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban, especially in recent years, was always best understood as a military lever to promote political accommodations of Pakistan in Kabul. Baradar, however, has defiantly refused to participate in such political strategies...The more the Taliban’s leaders enjoying sanctuary in Karachi or Quetta refuse to lash themselves to Pakistani political strategy, the more vulnerable they become to a knock on the door in the middle of the night.
If, through a combination of pressure and enticement, Pakistan and the United States can draw sections of the Taliban into peaceful negotiations, while incarcerating those who refuse to participate, it will produce a sweeping change in the war. With enough momentum, such a strategy would also increase the incentives for Pakistan and Taliban elements to betray Al Qaeda’s top leaders. It’s been a while since there has been unadulterated good news out of Pakistan. Today there is."
"Amazing what can happen when you have a foreign policy that includes diplomacy and force and sophistication."
--Andrew Sullivan's comment on the Coll article
From Steve Coll at New Yorker:
"The news that a joint C.I.A.-Pakistani raid in Karachi resulted last week in the capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is a big deal...Why would Pakistan move decisively against Afghan Taliban leadership now? The Times suggests that Pakistani generals under the lame-duck Army chief, General Ashraf Kiyani, are coming around to the view that they require a national-security doctrine that does not involve sheltering the Afghan Taliban...
I would guess at a more subtle motivation, one that might suggest a favorable pattern now emerging in the Obama Administration’s and Central Command’s approach to Pakistan’s role in the Afghan conflict. Over the last few months, by multiple means, the United States and its allies have been seeking to persuade Pakistan that it can best achieve its legitimate security goals in Afghanistan through political negotiations, rather than through the promotion of endless (and futile) Taliban guerrilla violence—and that the United States will respect and accommodate Pakistan’s agenda in such talks. Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban, especially in recent years, was always best understood as a military lever to promote political accommodations of Pakistan in Kabul. Baradar, however, has defiantly refused to participate in such political strategies...The more the Taliban’s leaders enjoying sanctuary in Karachi or Quetta refuse to lash themselves to Pakistani political strategy, the more vulnerable they become to a knock on the door in the middle of the night.
If, through a combination of pressure and enticement, Pakistan and the United States can draw sections of the Taliban into peaceful negotiations, while incarcerating those who refuse to participate, it will produce a sweeping change in the war. With enough momentum, such a strategy would also increase the incentives for Pakistan and Taliban elements to betray Al Qaeda’s top leaders. It’s been a while since there has been unadulterated good news out of Pakistan. Today there is."
Monday, February 8, 2010
AfPak: Good News Front
From the analysts at Nightwatch
Afghanistan: General Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said 4 February that while the situation in Afghanistan still is serious, it is no longer deteriorating, Reuters reported. McChrystal said U.S. and NATO forces in the country have not yet "turned the corner" on stability but that the situation has improved from last summer.
Comment: The NightWatch analysis reported months ago is that the Taliban have failed to expand beyond their Pashtun base. Detailed reports on combat in the past two weeks continue to reinforce the conclusion that the Taliban have failed to evolve into a revolutionary movement of broad appeal and, thus, have peaked.
There also is no sign of a large Taliban combat surge this winter, despite some ISAF predictions to the contrary in December, which have proven to be inaccurate. This winter is a lot like most of the past. The anti-government fighters appear to be riding out the winter, with the occasional sensational attack by the Haqqani syndicate. Most of the fighting in January appears to be NATO-initiated."
Afghanistan: General Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said 4 February that while the situation in Afghanistan still is serious, it is no longer deteriorating, Reuters reported. McChrystal said U.S. and NATO forces in the country have not yet "turned the corner" on stability but that the situation has improved from last summer.
Comment: The NightWatch analysis reported months ago is that the Taliban have failed to expand beyond their Pashtun base. Detailed reports on combat in the past two weeks continue to reinforce the conclusion that the Taliban have failed to evolve into a revolutionary movement of broad appeal and, thus, have peaked.
There also is no sign of a large Taliban combat surge this winter, despite some ISAF predictions to the contrary in December, which have proven to be inaccurate. This winter is a lot like most of the past. The anti-government fighters appear to be riding out the winter, with the occasional sensational attack by the Haqqani syndicate. Most of the fighting in January appears to be NATO-initiated."
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Somebody Is Gonna Be Wrong...
TW: Or alternatively, life is relative...
From Foreign Policy's Passport blog:
"Percentage of Afghans who believe their country is going in the "right direction": 70
Percentage of Americans who believe their country is going in the "right direction": 36.6"
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/11/the_right_track
From Foreign Policy's Passport blog:
"Percentage of Afghans who believe their country is going in the "right direction": 70
Percentage of Americans who believe their country is going in the "right direction": 36.6"
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/11/the_right_track
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
Classic Posts: My Gratuitous Opinion On an AfPak Escalation Part 3
TW: The final re-post on AfPak
From October 21, 2009:
"TW: Why is AfPak different than other contemporary U.S. quagmires?
Simply put unlike Vietnam or Iraq, we should be there. In Iraq our engagement was controversial before, during and after its start. Ultimately it was clear within months of the initial invasion that our basis for invading had been dubious at best. In Vietnam our engagement had been incremental from day one and evolved into a classic case of our continuing involvement feeding ever increasing escalation in order to avoid defeat. The further we looked back in either Iraq or Vietnam the less clear it became why we had engaged in the first place.
Why were Iraq and Vietnam the wrong wars at the wrong time? In Iraq it remains unclear what precisely motivated the Bush administration's casus belli. Was it a legitimate intelligence failure? Imperialist overstretch in pursuit of "democracy" and "regional game-changers"? Political opportunism? Whatever it was, in hindsight it was insufficient.
In Vietnam we fundamentally mistook nationalist Vietnamese agitation for a world-wide communist conspiracy. We engaged haphazardly into an war where our national interests paled in comparison to the costs of our engagement.
This dynamic is fatal. War is immensely costly most of all in human terms. It inevitably becomes controversial. If the basis for our involvement is dubious at best and wrong at worst, our collective energies are sapped and moral clarity decisively obscured. These type wars gnaw at the fabric of our nation. They result in our politicians emitting piles of bullshit to justify our involvement. Justifications of sufficient cynicism as to make reasonable citizens questions nearly any use of our armed forces. Political polarization results as partisans take sides based less on the merits of the situation and more on the derivative political impacts.
These type wars should never be started and if started ended ASAP.
But for Afghanistan few, if any, questioned why we initiated the war. More importantly, eight years into this war few question the imperative to seek a stable AfPak region and minimize the risks from radical jihadists. What folks do legitimately debate is how best to prosecute this war. And nearly everyone laments and is chastened by the human and economic costs of a war conducted amidst very challenging circumstances. Or in other words can we succeed?
Questioning how we can succeed is crucially different than questioning why we started or are continuing a war in the first place. One must recall few mainstream leaders (I do not consider Ron Paul or Dennis Kucinich mainstream) are calling for a withdrawal from AfPak. The debate is between a smaller footprint counter-terrorism (CT) or a larger footprint counter-insurgency (COIN) focus. This is not a binary choice as sometimes portrayed in the media between "all-in" or "all-out" or even "largely out". There are degrees and nuance.
It should also be remembered that, unlike say the Viet Cong who were a unitary force more or less as legitimate (or illegitimate) as any other Vietnamese political group, the Taliban are a tribal minority with attributes (misogynism, radical Islamism) inimical to a majority of Afghans (and Pakistanis). There are groups in AfPak very motivated to defeat the Taliban (Shiites, Uzbeks, Tajiks, secularists etc.). While these groups may be weak, dispersed and ill-led; they very much exist and in time can provide the framework for an alternative governance structure. Furthermore, even our frenemies in the region (e.g. Iran, Russia) have interests more aligned with us than the Taliban (unlike say the Iranians in Iraq or Russians in Vietnam).
In my view a clear national security imperative exists in AfPak. Our nation, in conjunction with our allies and frenemies, should exert maximum effort to stabilize the region. There are times when nations must step up militarily and economically to protect their interests, this is one of those times. An integrated military, economic and diplomatic program using the vast resources of the ourselves, allies and frenemies should be sufficient to accomplish the goal.
Obama should not hedge on the human and economic costs of this endeavor, nor should he avoid making the necessary diplomatic moves (Iran, Russia etc.) in order to optimize our chances of success. AfPak is hard and will continue to be so, that does not mean we should not face up to the challenges.
This is the final installment of this particular gratuitous thought stream. Feel free to share any comments."
From October 21, 2009:
"TW: Why is AfPak different than other contemporary U.S. quagmires?
Simply put unlike Vietnam or Iraq, we should be there. In Iraq our engagement was controversial before, during and after its start. Ultimately it was clear within months of the initial invasion that our basis for invading had been dubious at best. In Vietnam our engagement had been incremental from day one and evolved into a classic case of our continuing involvement feeding ever increasing escalation in order to avoid defeat. The further we looked back in either Iraq or Vietnam the less clear it became why we had engaged in the first place.
Why were Iraq and Vietnam the wrong wars at the wrong time? In Iraq it remains unclear what precisely motivated the Bush administration's casus belli. Was it a legitimate intelligence failure? Imperialist overstretch in pursuit of "democracy" and "regional game-changers"? Political opportunism? Whatever it was, in hindsight it was insufficient.
In Vietnam we fundamentally mistook nationalist Vietnamese agitation for a world-wide communist conspiracy. We engaged haphazardly into an war where our national interests paled in comparison to the costs of our engagement.
This dynamic is fatal. War is immensely costly most of all in human terms. It inevitably becomes controversial. If the basis for our involvement is dubious at best and wrong at worst, our collective energies are sapped and moral clarity decisively obscured. These type wars gnaw at the fabric of our nation. They result in our politicians emitting piles of bullshit to justify our involvement. Justifications of sufficient cynicism as to make reasonable citizens questions nearly any use of our armed forces. Political polarization results as partisans take sides based less on the merits of the situation and more on the derivative political impacts.
These type wars should never be started and if started ended ASAP.
But for Afghanistan few, if any, questioned why we initiated the war. More importantly, eight years into this war few question the imperative to seek a stable AfPak region and minimize the risks from radical jihadists. What folks do legitimately debate is how best to prosecute this war. And nearly everyone laments and is chastened by the human and economic costs of a war conducted amidst very challenging circumstances. Or in other words can we succeed?
Questioning how we can succeed is crucially different than questioning why we started or are continuing a war in the first place. One must recall few mainstream leaders (I do not consider Ron Paul or Dennis Kucinich mainstream) are calling for a withdrawal from AfPak. The debate is between a smaller footprint counter-terrorism (CT) or a larger footprint counter-insurgency (COIN) focus. This is not a binary choice as sometimes portrayed in the media between "all-in" or "all-out" or even "largely out". There are degrees and nuance.
It should also be remembered that, unlike say the Viet Cong who were a unitary force more or less as legitimate (or illegitimate) as any other Vietnamese political group, the Taliban are a tribal minority with attributes (misogynism, radical Islamism) inimical to a majority of Afghans (and Pakistanis). There are groups in AfPak very motivated to defeat the Taliban (Shiites, Uzbeks, Tajiks, secularists etc.). While these groups may be weak, dispersed and ill-led; they very much exist and in time can provide the framework for an alternative governance structure. Furthermore, even our frenemies in the region (e.g. Iran, Russia) have interests more aligned with us than the Taliban (unlike say the Iranians in Iraq or Russians in Vietnam).
In my view a clear national security imperative exists in AfPak. Our nation, in conjunction with our allies and frenemies, should exert maximum effort to stabilize the region. There are times when nations must step up militarily and economically to protect their interests, this is one of those times. An integrated military, economic and diplomatic program using the vast resources of the ourselves, allies and frenemies should be sufficient to accomplish the goal.
Obama should not hedge on the human and economic costs of this endeavor, nor should he avoid making the necessary diplomatic moves (Iran, Russia etc.) in order to optimize our chances of success. AfPak is hard and will continue to be so, that does not mean we should not face up to the challenges.
This is the final installment of this particular gratuitous thought stream. Feel free to share any comments."
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Classic Posts: My Gratuitous Opinion On an AfPak Escalation Part 2
TW: Re-post number 2 from October on AfPak
From October 20, 2009:
"TW: Why and how do I think the U.S. can achieve a successful escalation in AfPak?
1) Everything I read about Gen. McChrystal is that he is the right person to formulate and execute an effective COIN strategy (I know there is some blow back on his involvement in the Pat Tillman fiasco but not anywhere enough to diminish his other credentials and accomplishments) One cannot forget the neglect with which the U.S. treated the AfPak theater after the overthrow of the Taliban. Resources of all kinds were severely restricted partially due to the small footprint strategy (which has been a dismal failure) and partly as special forces, satellite intel and other resources were re-deployed to Iraq.
The U.S. left a huge void in AfPak hoping friendly indigenous forces would assume full control. This strategy failed miserably creating a void into which the Taliban gradually back-filled. For the first time in AfPak we may finally have a strategy and resources to re-build Afghanistan.
2) From Economist: "The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war."
All good points and not at all slam dunks. Credible partner governments have been the bane of COIN throughout history. Any partner government starts out at a severe disadvantage as they at some level are subservient to the outside power involved. Immediately the insurgents can claim a certain legitimacy as the more "true" nationalist representative.
The U.S. made a further mistake in Afghanistan by attempting to impose democracy where none had existed and where centralized government in general has always been weak. We now see many observers twisted in knots about the recent fraudulent election. To me the elections are a distraction. The key will be the U.S. and others working with Afghani to de-centralize governance through various tribal entities regardless of who occupies executive power in Kabul.
3) From Economist: "The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war."
AfPak has been under-resourced from day one. Obama must define the stakes and ask for commitment from Americans, from Europeans and from others. W. Bush said many things as POTUS but one thing he never articulated was how the so-called "war on terror" was existential yet did not require significant sacrifice on the part of average Americans. No extra taxes, no national service, no spending cuts in other areas and no clear delineation of the price Americans must pay in order to address our strategic challenges.
If the U.S. is to have a legitimate chance at success in AfPak. very significant human and financial costs will be necessary. These costs cannot be defined precisely but they will be significant. If Americans are unable or unwilling to absorb these costs, then Americans should be prepared to live in a world where the risk of instability will be much higher with the commensurate risks to American national interests.
4) America is not and should not be alone in AfPak. We tend as always to focus on our ourselves but AfPak impacts nearly everyone throughout the world. The strategic imperatives in AfPak are not American only, they are relevant to any nation seeking to minimize terrorism risks, minimize the negative impacts of radical Islam and minimize the risks of the regional powers in the area (Pakistan, Iran, India, the Stans, China, Russia) coming to blows over instability in the AfPak area.
Unlike Iraq where allied support (for good reason it turns out) but for the Brits was largely either brief (e.g. Spain), motivated by secondary political considerations (e.g. the Georgians, Poles) or extremely limited (about all others); many nations have contributed forces in AfPak. While these forces have been limited and frequently restricted in capability and aggressiveness, they are substantial (roughly 40,000). Few Americans realize for instance that several nations in particular the Brits, the Dutch, the Danes and the Canadians have fought expensive, disproportionate and deadly battles in Afghanistan.
Understand we broke the Taliban (while excluding almost all allied involvement in the actual initial fights, everyone wanted to pitch in post 9/11 but we said no thanks we will kill them ourselves), then we largely left Afgahnistan (we had fewer than 20,000 troops for the first several years). We sold NATO on AfPak being a peacekeeping mission not an actual war. Sending one's soldiers off to serve under someone else's leadership is never an easy task (imagine Americans being asked to send significant troops to serve under say French leadership in Africa). All the while with our strategies in AfPak meandering between "small footprint", counter-terror and partial COIN.
But now with a new American commitment and strategy it is imperative that our allies and near allies commit as well. Otherwise they will be guilty of free-riding. The U.S. as the leader will always bear a disproportionate share that goes with making the decisions and driving policy. We cannot expect others to merely follow lemming like behind us. But we can expect folks to pitch in.
Part of the new strategy will be to work with the nearby regional powers including Iran to engage their help stabilizing the AfPak area. But if the Brazilians, Japanese, South Koreans, Indonesians etc. want to enjoy the benefits of globalization then they need to step up to help ensure global stability is enhanced as well.
To be continued tomorrow with a final piece on why AfPak is not Vietnam, Iraq or any other prior benchmark. "
From October 20, 2009:
"TW: Why and how do I think the U.S. can achieve a successful escalation in AfPak?
1) Everything I read about Gen. McChrystal is that he is the right person to formulate and execute an effective COIN strategy (I know there is some blow back on his involvement in the Pat Tillman fiasco but not anywhere enough to diminish his other credentials and accomplishments) One cannot forget the neglect with which the U.S. treated the AfPak theater after the overthrow of the Taliban. Resources of all kinds were severely restricted partially due to the small footprint strategy (which has been a dismal failure) and partly as special forces, satellite intel and other resources were re-deployed to Iraq.
The U.S. left a huge void in AfPak hoping friendly indigenous forces would assume full control. This strategy failed miserably creating a void into which the Taliban gradually back-filled. For the first time in AfPak we may finally have a strategy and resources to re-build Afghanistan.
2) From Economist: "The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war."
All good points and not at all slam dunks. Credible partner governments have been the bane of COIN throughout history. Any partner government starts out at a severe disadvantage as they at some level are subservient to the outside power involved. Immediately the insurgents can claim a certain legitimacy as the more "true" nationalist representative.
The U.S. made a further mistake in Afghanistan by attempting to impose democracy where none had existed and where centralized government in general has always been weak. We now see many observers twisted in knots about the recent fraudulent election. To me the elections are a distraction. The key will be the U.S. and others working with Afghani to de-centralize governance through various tribal entities regardless of who occupies executive power in Kabul.
3) From Economist: "The coalition, however, lacks three essential components of a successful strategy. It needs a credible, legitimate government to work with, the resources to do the job and the belief that America’s president is behind this war."
AfPak has been under-resourced from day one. Obama must define the stakes and ask for commitment from Americans, from Europeans and from others. W. Bush said many things as POTUS but one thing he never articulated was how the so-called "war on terror" was existential yet did not require significant sacrifice on the part of average Americans. No extra taxes, no national service, no spending cuts in other areas and no clear delineation of the price Americans must pay in order to address our strategic challenges.
If the U.S. is to have a legitimate chance at success in AfPak. very significant human and financial costs will be necessary. These costs cannot be defined precisely but they will be significant. If Americans are unable or unwilling to absorb these costs, then Americans should be prepared to live in a world where the risk of instability will be much higher with the commensurate risks to American national interests.
4) America is not and should not be alone in AfPak. We tend as always to focus on our ourselves but AfPak impacts nearly everyone throughout the world. The strategic imperatives in AfPak are not American only, they are relevant to any nation seeking to minimize terrorism risks, minimize the negative impacts of radical Islam and minimize the risks of the regional powers in the area (Pakistan, Iran, India, the Stans, China, Russia) coming to blows over instability in the AfPak area.
Unlike Iraq where allied support (for good reason it turns out) but for the Brits was largely either brief (e.g. Spain), motivated by secondary political considerations (e.g. the Georgians, Poles) or extremely limited (about all others); many nations have contributed forces in AfPak. While these forces have been limited and frequently restricted in capability and aggressiveness, they are substantial (roughly 40,000). Few Americans realize for instance that several nations in particular the Brits, the Dutch, the Danes and the Canadians have fought expensive, disproportionate and deadly battles in Afghanistan.
Understand we broke the Taliban (while excluding almost all allied involvement in the actual initial fights, everyone wanted to pitch in post 9/11 but we said no thanks we will kill them ourselves), then we largely left Afgahnistan (we had fewer than 20,000 troops for the first several years). We sold NATO on AfPak being a peacekeeping mission not an actual war. Sending one's soldiers off to serve under someone else's leadership is never an easy task (imagine Americans being asked to send significant troops to serve under say French leadership in Africa). All the while with our strategies in AfPak meandering between "small footprint", counter-terror and partial COIN.
But now with a new American commitment and strategy it is imperative that our allies and near allies commit as well. Otherwise they will be guilty of free-riding. The U.S. as the leader will always bear a disproportionate share that goes with making the decisions and driving policy. We cannot expect others to merely follow lemming like behind us. But we can expect folks to pitch in.
Part of the new strategy will be to work with the nearby regional powers including Iran to engage their help stabilizing the AfPak area. But if the Brazilians, Japanese, South Koreans, Indonesians etc. want to enjoy the benefits of globalization then they need to step up to help ensure global stability is enhanced as well.
To be continued tomorrow with a final piece on why AfPak is not Vietnam, Iraq or any other prior benchmark. "
Monday, December 7, 2009
Classic Posts: My Gratuitous Opinion On an AfPak Escalation
TW: Our POTUS announced his plan last week. I posted my opinions six weeks ago. I put much time into them and thought they would be relevant to review now that a real plan has been defined.
From October 20, 2009
TW: Should the U.S. escalate its troop commitment in the AfPak region. Yes. Certainly I am not privy to the exact force structure options presented to our POTUS but I will assume the 40,000 number bandied about is about the number current military leadership believes necessary to prosecute an effective COIN operation in the AfPak area.
I do not say yes merely because the local commander has made the request. Local commanders are paid to develop contingencies, our political leaders are paid to assess those contingencies within the context of our overall strategic interests. Had local commanders been followed blindly in Korea in 1951 or Cuba in 1962 the U.S. would have entered broad and open-ended conflicts which in retrospect seem wisely avoided.
But escalating our military, economic and humanitarian commitments in AfPak are in our strategic interest and are strategic necessities. Here are the reasons why:
1) U.S. knows how to break places (i.e. shock and awe) but can we fix anyplace ?
"The Afghan conflict, it is often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year wars. NATO comes off worse each time. And so to the fourth and most important reason for persisting in Afghanistan: the coalition can do much better.[Economist]"
We have since 9/11 invaded two sovereign nations overwhelming their limited conventional militaries. Both "re-building" wars have proven far more challenging than the initial battles. We have yet to succeed in either. Should we fail again our legitimacy as a force for long-term good would be called into question. We must get away from we can break things but cannot re-build things. Our nation must also accept that short, sharp engagements based upon our current technological power are not a valid strategic posture. We must accept the aftermath's consequences as well, once we do perhaps we will be less apt to attempt one without the other.
2) "The United States has had one central objective: to deny Al Qaeda the means to reconstitute, train, and plan major terror attacks" (from Zakaria at Newsweek).
This is correct only partially. Al Qaeda is not the end all be all of American national security interests. Al Qaeda suppression is certainly a goal but by no means our only goal. Afghanistan is the armpit of the world and I mean that both metaphorically and literally. It has been fought over for centuries precisely due to its strategic value as a physical and tribal crossroads for the East and West. The Taliban have become a petri dish for extremist Islam and they are firmly implanted in AfPak.
Just as importantly AfPak is the "four corners" of international relations in the 21st century. We have have Iran to its west, Russia and its former Islamic states (the "stans") to the north, India to its east with China just over the hills. Leaving a festering, terrorist supporting Taliban in control of AfPak would be an unacceptable development for our national interest. Such an occurrence could lead to direct and indirect de-stabilization for too many critical allies (India) and frenemies (Pakistan, Russia, China, the "stans").
3) Again from Zakaria-"let's please remember that there is virtually no Qaeda presence there...Al Qaeda is in Pakistan, as is the leadership of the hard-core Afghan Taliban...There's little evidence that Pakistan's generals have truly accepted that they must defeat all the jihadis in their country (as opposed to just those who threaten the Pakistani state). But they have been more cooperative and active in the past year than ever before."
This is where Zakaria is most wrong in his analysis. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been pushed largely into Pakistan. That does not mean they will stay there. Furthermore the more I read about the current Taliban the more I see their radicalism meshing with Al Qaeda, not completely aligned but sufficiently so to be more than a mere nationalist Pashtun entity.
If the U.S. leaves AfPak a void is created. The Taliban and Al Qaeda would stream right back into Afghanistan. Just as importantly, should a void be created Pakistan will release pressure on its side of the border on the Taliban. Pakistan sees the Taliban as a strategic ally relative to India and perhaps Iran. The Pakistanis will only contain the Taliban as long as a strong U.S./NATO presence in Afghanistan provides an alternative strategic reality.
Fundamentally the U.S. must exert pressure in Afghanistan in order to have Pakistanis exert pressure within their own borders. Afghans and Pakistanis and other regional players are looking for a long-term commitment from U.S. To date even post 9/11 the U.S. and NATO have appeared more interested in leaving ASAP which would lead right back to the status quo pre 9-11 (i.e. a Pakistani supported Taliban operating throughout the AfPak area serving as Al Qaeda's host).
The above speaks to why we must continue and enlarge our engagement in AfPak. The next post will speak to why and how I think we can succeed.
From October 20, 2009
TW: Should the U.S. escalate its troop commitment in the AfPak region. Yes. Certainly I am not privy to the exact force structure options presented to our POTUS but I will assume the 40,000 number bandied about is about the number current military leadership believes necessary to prosecute an effective COIN operation in the AfPak area.
I do not say yes merely because the local commander has made the request. Local commanders are paid to develop contingencies, our political leaders are paid to assess those contingencies within the context of our overall strategic interests. Had local commanders been followed blindly in Korea in 1951 or Cuba in 1962 the U.S. would have entered broad and open-ended conflicts which in retrospect seem wisely avoided.
But escalating our military, economic and humanitarian commitments in AfPak are in our strategic interest and are strategic necessities. Here are the reasons why:
1) U.S. knows how to break places (i.e. shock and awe) but can we fix anyplace ?
"The Afghan conflict, it is often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year wars. NATO comes off worse each time. And so to the fourth and most important reason for persisting in Afghanistan: the coalition can do much better.[Economist]"
We have since 9/11 invaded two sovereign nations overwhelming their limited conventional militaries. Both "re-building" wars have proven far more challenging than the initial battles. We have yet to succeed in either. Should we fail again our legitimacy as a force for long-term good would be called into question. We must get away from we can break things but cannot re-build things. Our nation must also accept that short, sharp engagements based upon our current technological power are not a valid strategic posture. We must accept the aftermath's consequences as well, once we do perhaps we will be less apt to attempt one without the other.
2) "The United States has had one central objective: to deny Al Qaeda the means to reconstitute, train, and plan major terror attacks" (from Zakaria at Newsweek).
This is correct only partially. Al Qaeda is not the end all be all of American national security interests. Al Qaeda suppression is certainly a goal but by no means our only goal. Afghanistan is the armpit of the world and I mean that both metaphorically and literally. It has been fought over for centuries precisely due to its strategic value as a physical and tribal crossroads for the East and West. The Taliban have become a petri dish for extremist Islam and they are firmly implanted in AfPak.
Just as importantly AfPak is the "four corners" of international relations in the 21st century. We have have Iran to its west, Russia and its former Islamic states (the "stans") to the north, India to its east with China just over the hills. Leaving a festering, terrorist supporting Taliban in control of AfPak would be an unacceptable development for our national interest. Such an occurrence could lead to direct and indirect de-stabilization for too many critical allies (India) and frenemies (Pakistan, Russia, China, the "stans").
3) Again from Zakaria-"let's please remember that there is virtually no Qaeda presence there...Al Qaeda is in Pakistan, as is the leadership of the hard-core Afghan Taliban...There's little evidence that Pakistan's generals have truly accepted that they must defeat all the jihadis in their country (as opposed to just those who threaten the Pakistani state). But they have been more cooperative and active in the past year than ever before."
This is where Zakaria is most wrong in his analysis. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been pushed largely into Pakistan. That does not mean they will stay there. Furthermore the more I read about the current Taliban the more I see their radicalism meshing with Al Qaeda, not completely aligned but sufficiently so to be more than a mere nationalist Pashtun entity.
If the U.S. leaves AfPak a void is created. The Taliban and Al Qaeda would stream right back into Afghanistan. Just as importantly, should a void be created Pakistan will release pressure on its side of the border on the Taliban. Pakistan sees the Taliban as a strategic ally relative to India and perhaps Iran. The Pakistanis will only contain the Taliban as long as a strong U.S./NATO presence in Afghanistan provides an alternative strategic reality.
Fundamentally the U.S. must exert pressure in Afghanistan in order to have Pakistanis exert pressure within their own borders. Afghans and Pakistanis and other regional players are looking for a long-term commitment from U.S. To date even post 9/11 the U.S. and NATO have appeared more interested in leaving ASAP which would lead right back to the status quo pre 9-11 (i.e. a Pakistani supported Taliban operating throughout the AfPak area serving as Al Qaeda's host).
The above speaks to why we must continue and enlarge our engagement in AfPak. The next post will speak to why and how I think we can succeed.
Saturday, December 5, 2009
Governing v. Pontificating
From NBC News:
"John McCain, GOP point person on Afghanistan? For those of us who followed nearly every minute of the 2008 presidential campaign, it's fascinating to watch how John McCain has become the GOP point person in arguing that July 2011 is a date certain that will embolden the enemy. For starters, McCain never called for more troops to Afghanistan until July 15, 2008 -- nearly a year after Obama; for McCain, Iraq was the center on the war on terrorism, not Afghanistan. Second, he never put up much a fight when the Iraqi government and Bush White House established a "time horizon" to withdraw from Iraq. And third, he himself talked about timetables during the campaign, saying that Maliki’s 16-month timeframe was “a pretty good timetable” and also saying that all U.S. forces would be home from Iraq by 2013. McCain would argue -- rightly -- that his talk about timetables was always tied to conditions on the ground. But that's also true for Obama's July 2011 date. Here’s what the president said on Tuesday: “Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.”
TW: Inevitably the Republicans will support Obama in AfPak in a most back-handed way, neither surprising nor particularly perplexing. The specific point they are foisting as the worst part of the plan is the timeline. Questions: 1) would you prefer an entirely open-ended plan? 2) is it possible Obama/Gates/Jones et al. believe the timeline provides value in creating incentives for the Afghans to assume responsibility for their own security? This is a complex chess game, pondering implications beyond the immediate horizon is imperative.
"John McCain, GOP point person on Afghanistan? For those of us who followed nearly every minute of the 2008 presidential campaign, it's fascinating to watch how John McCain has become the GOP point person in arguing that July 2011 is a date certain that will embolden the enemy. For starters, McCain never called for more troops to Afghanistan until July 15, 2008 -- nearly a year after Obama; for McCain, Iraq was the center on the war on terrorism, not Afghanistan. Second, he never put up much a fight when the Iraqi government and Bush White House established a "time horizon" to withdraw from Iraq. And third, he himself talked about timetables during the campaign, saying that Maliki’s 16-month timeframe was “a pretty good timetable” and also saying that all U.S. forces would be home from Iraq by 2013. McCain would argue -- rightly -- that his talk about timetables was always tied to conditions on the ground. But that's also true for Obama's July 2011 date. Here’s what the president said on Tuesday: “Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.”
TW: Inevitably the Republicans will support Obama in AfPak in a most back-handed way, neither surprising nor particularly perplexing. The specific point they are foisting as the worst part of the plan is the timeline. Questions: 1) would you prefer an entirely open-ended plan? 2) is it possible Obama/Gates/Jones et al. believe the timeline provides value in creating incentives for the Afghans to assume responsibility for their own security? This is a complex chess game, pondering implications beyond the immediate horizon is imperative.
Friday, December 4, 2009
Armitage on AfPak
TW: Armitage was a foreign policy advisor for several Republicans, close to Colin Powell and then blown out with Powell, as he was no friend of Cheney. His insight on AfPak seem highly relevant though.
From Tom Ricks at Foreign Policy mag:
"Richard Armitage is an unusual guy in Washington -- both candid and well-spoken...he has given an interesting interview to Prism...new publication at the National Defense University.
Some highlights:
At first, the U.S. government was able to keep Pakistani intelligence from meddling in Afghanistan. "The second surprise was frankly how successful we were for the first 4 years-almost 5 years-at keeping the ISI [Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence] relatively out of it. They were so shocked with the speed at which we invaded Afghanistan that I think the ISI felt it was only a matter of time until we prevailed." Armitage's timeline here suggests to me that Afghanistan started really falling apart when the ISI went back in. That's an interesting conclusion
He says Bush and his war cabinet never formally considered whether to invade Iraq. "Never to my knowledge, and I'm pretty sure I'm right on this, did the President ever sit around with his advisors and say, 'Should we do this or not?' He never did it."
The Bush administration didn't understand democracy and how to encourage it. "The Bush administration's push for votes as though voting equals democracy was wrong-headed because a vote is something that happens inside a democracy, but is not necessary for a democracy. You can have a democratic system without having people raise their hands and have a secret ballot. Loya jirgas to some extent are these."
He believes Bush administration actions undercut the American position abroad. "It's harder and made more complex when we abuse the writ of habeas corpus here or when we torture people."
Reading he recommends, and why: "Have you read the novels of Naguib Mahfouz? They're great, and through them all you get a couple of things, I think. First, the good humor of Egyptians; they have enormous good humor. Second, patience and long suffering, but you realize that at some point in time you can't joke something away. You can't outwait it. I would be afraid the tipping point is going to come, and particularly now that the strategic center of gravity in the Middle East has shifted to Riyadh and away from Cairo."
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/03/armitage_on_pakistan_s_spies_bush_s_errors_egypt_s_novels
From Tom Ricks at Foreign Policy mag:
"Richard Armitage is an unusual guy in Washington -- both candid and well-spoken...he has given an interesting interview to Prism...new publication at the National Defense University.
Some highlights:
At first, the U.S. government was able to keep Pakistani intelligence from meddling in Afghanistan. "The second surprise was frankly how successful we were for the first 4 years-almost 5 years-at keeping the ISI [Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence] relatively out of it. They were so shocked with the speed at which we invaded Afghanistan that I think the ISI felt it was only a matter of time until we prevailed." Armitage's timeline here suggests to me that Afghanistan started really falling apart when the ISI went back in. That's an interesting conclusion
He says Bush and his war cabinet never formally considered whether to invade Iraq. "Never to my knowledge, and I'm pretty sure I'm right on this, did the President ever sit around with his advisors and say, 'Should we do this or not?' He never did it."
The Bush administration didn't understand democracy and how to encourage it. "The Bush administration's push for votes as though voting equals democracy was wrong-headed because a vote is something that happens inside a democracy, but is not necessary for a democracy. You can have a democratic system without having people raise their hands and have a secret ballot. Loya jirgas to some extent are these."
He believes Bush administration actions undercut the American position abroad. "It's harder and made more complex when we abuse the writ of habeas corpus here or when we torture people."
Reading he recommends, and why: "Have you read the novels of Naguib Mahfouz? They're great, and through them all you get a couple of things, I think. First, the good humor of Egyptians; they have enormous good humor. Second, patience and long suffering, but you realize that at some point in time you can't joke something away. You can't outwait it. I would be afraid the tipping point is going to come, and particularly now that the strategic center of gravity in the Middle East has shifted to Riyadh and away from Cairo."
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/03/armitage_on_pakistan_s_spies_bush_s_errors_egypt_s_novels
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Parsing Obama's AfPak Strategy
TW: Military analyst Gahlran parsed Obama's speech in detail. Take a couple of minutes to read it. As with many issues, sound bites do not come close to doing justice to AfPak (I watched Chris Matthews issue verbal garbagefor about 45 seconds post speech then turned off cable for good). There is an extensive and relatively well-informed and intelligent debate on AfPak in the blogosphere amongst military and national security analysts with non-partisan credentials. It is worth plugging into by hitting the link below.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/12/obamas-speech-at-west-point-about.html
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/12/obamas-speech-at-west-point-about.html
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
So You Think You Want To Be POTUS
From Andrew Sullivan:
"Big Dems On Obama's War Plan...Almost uniformly negative. And the GOP will do all they can to destroy this commander-in-chief."
TW: The joy of being a Democratic POTUS. The Dem base is largely pacifist (in a Euro kind of way). The Republican base rabid jingoists (but for the libertarian wing). As a Dem your base will not carry your water, whilst the Republicans circle waiting (or not even waiting) to pounce at the inevitable challenges of a complex conflict.
In a way it frees Obama to do whatever is right as politically it is a no-win situation. So all in all doing the right thing has an actual chance.
"Big Dems On Obama's War Plan...Almost uniformly negative. And the GOP will do all they can to destroy this commander-in-chief."
TW: The joy of being a Democratic POTUS. The Dem base is largely pacifist (in a Euro kind of way). The Republican base rabid jingoists (but for the libertarian wing). As a Dem your base will not carry your water, whilst the Republicans circle waiting (or not even waiting) to pounce at the inevitable challenges of a complex conflict.
In a way it frees Obama to do whatever is right as politically it is a no-win situation. So all in all doing the right thing has an actual chance.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Leviathan and SysAdmin In a New World
TW: For those of you not familiar with Barnett's books, he argues that military forces consist of Leviathan and SysAdmin type components. The U.S. has since the fall of the USSR had a Leviathan force, the stuff (planes, missiles etc.) the kills and blows up things, without compare worldwide. The SysAdmin stuff does nation-building, peacekeeping; we have too little of those forces as evidenced by Iraq and AfPak. Leviathan forces get the testosterone crowd gung-ho; its use tends to be quick and decisive if brutal. SysAdmin is a slog albeit a deadly one in some respects even more deadly than Leviathan activities, it breeds cynicism and tired populaces.
Another theme of Barnett's is that the old NATO/Anglo-Saxon security structures are no longer adequate to manage globalization. He advocates a strong presence in AfPak but he does so within the context of embracing new allies and participants- India, China, Brazil, Iran, Turkey etc. The challenge for Obama or any POTUS is that those open to the new alliances in the U.S. tend to wilt at aggressive military action, those supporting aggressive (although typically Leviathan oriented) military action, are not comfortable with new alliances which inherently would require sharing of not only blood but power.
This stuff is nuanced which is to say not easily explained to a populace far more inclined to follow the minutiae of Tiger Woods' marriage or a couple of losers who crash a State dinner.
From Tom Barnett:
"So the math is easy: 40k troops for Afghanistan equals $40B.
...We can play Leviathan given our force structure, but we are inherently limited by the same regarding the follow-on SysAdmin stuff, hence my oft-stated line that America writes checks with its Leviathan that it can't possibly cash with its SysAdmin forces...
One answer is to build in the direction of the SysAdmin, of course, but to do so in sufficient fashion would make the Leviathan too small, thus my argument from day one that the answer is to shift the old burden sharing arguments from the Leviathan (where little exists anyway) to the SysAdmin (where our allies are far more comfortable operating anyway).
Extending the logic further: since our old allies (Europe, Industrialized Asia) typically can't muster the necessary ROE (rules of engagement), because SysAdmin work ain't all passing out food packets, we need to expand the pool of allies to include people willing to kill and sacrifice in defending globalization's expanding networks (colonialism to the small-minded who believe people should be left alone to enjoy their pristine poverty).
At that point, you're talking logically about the rising pillars with expanding economic interests--meaning the incentivized.
These states will typically claim, "I don't want to get involved with such nasty stuff. Everybody loves me! Leave it to the Americans."
But, in truth, if you're an agent of globalization's advance, eventually the enemies of that advance come looking for you, so given enough time and enough hassles, the motivation will arise. Why? You like your future more than you're willing to preserve THEIR past.
Then, in the final calculation, you get past the hyperbole and nonsense and realize that the opponents of connectivity fall into two, rather small but still potent camps: 1) the dictators that must maintain it to maintain their power; and 2) the fundamentalists who must detach from this "evil" assimilation process that liberates women, "ruins" kids, and gives people all sorts of "dangerous" ideas.
Do-able?
Not with our current set of allies. But when the entirety of the Core is considered? Absolutely."
http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2009/11/post_1.html
Another theme of Barnett's is that the old NATO/Anglo-Saxon security structures are no longer adequate to manage globalization. He advocates a strong presence in AfPak but he does so within the context of embracing new allies and participants- India, China, Brazil, Iran, Turkey etc. The challenge for Obama or any POTUS is that those open to the new alliances in the U.S. tend to wilt at aggressive military action, those supporting aggressive (although typically Leviathan oriented) military action, are not comfortable with new alliances which inherently would require sharing of not only blood but power.
This stuff is nuanced which is to say not easily explained to a populace far more inclined to follow the minutiae of Tiger Woods' marriage or a couple of losers who crash a State dinner.
From Tom Barnett:
"So the math is easy: 40k troops for Afghanistan equals $40B.
...We can play Leviathan given our force structure, but we are inherently limited by the same regarding the follow-on SysAdmin stuff, hence my oft-stated line that America writes checks with its Leviathan that it can't possibly cash with its SysAdmin forces...
One answer is to build in the direction of the SysAdmin, of course, but to do so in sufficient fashion would make the Leviathan too small, thus my argument from day one that the answer is to shift the old burden sharing arguments from the Leviathan (where little exists anyway) to the SysAdmin (where our allies are far more comfortable operating anyway).
Extending the logic further: since our old allies (Europe, Industrialized Asia) typically can't muster the necessary ROE (rules of engagement), because SysAdmin work ain't all passing out food packets, we need to expand the pool of allies to include people willing to kill and sacrifice in defending globalization's expanding networks (colonialism to the small-minded who believe people should be left alone to enjoy their pristine poverty).
At that point, you're talking logically about the rising pillars with expanding economic interests--meaning the incentivized.
These states will typically claim, "I don't want to get involved with such nasty stuff. Everybody loves me! Leave it to the Americans."
But, in truth, if you're an agent of globalization's advance, eventually the enemies of that advance come looking for you, so given enough time and enough hassles, the motivation will arise. Why? You like your future more than you're willing to preserve THEIR past.
Then, in the final calculation, you get past the hyperbole and nonsense and realize that the opponents of connectivity fall into two, rather small but still potent camps: 1) the dictators that must maintain it to maintain their power; and 2) the fundamentalists who must detach from this "evil" assimilation process that liberates women, "ruins" kids, and gives people all sorts of "dangerous" ideas.
Do-able?
Not with our current set of allies. But when the entirety of the Core is considered? Absolutely."
http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2009/11/post_1.html
Friday, November 27, 2009
A Pause
From David Wood at Politics Daily:
"... My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie; Dulce et Decorum est
Pro patria mori.
Wilfred Owens' ghastly homage to youth and war, written in the dark winter of 1917-1918, sprang to mind recently as I flew into Columbia, South Carolina. I sat beside a teenager wearing a buzz cut, a Transformers Autobot T-shirt, baggy jeans and a nervous grin. He chattered nonstop until our little commuter jet touched down. He told me he was on his way to Fort Jackson to begin basic training, and that he'd enlisted for the steady income, to support his wife and baby back home in small-town Kentucky. He was 20 years old and that was his first airplane ride, ever"
"... My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie; Dulce et Decorum est
Pro patria mori.
Wilfred Owens' ghastly homage to youth and war, written in the dark winter of 1917-1918, sprang to mind recently as I flew into Columbia, South Carolina. I sat beside a teenager wearing a buzz cut, a Transformers Autobot T-shirt, baggy jeans and a nervous grin. He chattered nonstop until our little commuter jet touched down. He told me he was on his way to Fort Jackson to begin basic training, and that he'd enlisted for the steady income, to support his wife and baby back home in small-town Kentucky. He was 20 years old and that was his first airplane ride, ever"
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Why Not Pay For Wars?
From Ezra Klein at WaPo:
"A couple of weeks back, Matthew Yglesias had an insightful post noting that 'by far the fastest way to end the war in Afghanistan would be to ask General McChrystal’s staff to produce a plan to make it deficit neutral and find sixty votes in the Senate for his financing plan.'..."
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/11/death_and_taxes.html
From Joe Klein at Time:
"Congressman David Obey, who called for a tax to pay for the war in Iraq two years ago, has done it again. He's calling for a tax to pay for Afghanistan. It's a very good idea for several reasons:
1. A war is, one would hope, a temporary aberration from budget norms, requiring a jolt of new revenues. It is also the most consequential decision that a President and Congress can make; therefore, they should be willing to put their money where their mouths are.
2. The notion of shared sacrifice has somehow gotten lost in the shuffle. If we really "support" the troops, we should support the troops...In a war, every citizen should have to contribute something to the effort.
Some will say: it won't pass, and we have national security interests in Afghanistan. Trye enough. I'm in favor of continuing the Afghan campaign, and I'd be more than willing to pay my fair share for it...But there's a larger national interest that needs to be tested: in the Reagan era, a disconnect has developed between the people and their fiscal responsibilities. Any tax that ties one to the other over a concrete matter, like a war, will help rebuild the necessary relationship between spending and taxing. For Republicans who favor the war but oppose taxation, this would be a particularly crucial test of citizenship. (Although it should be noted that the Democrat Lyndon Johnson was the first to fudge the funding of a war, in Vietnam.)
If the public honestly wants the Taliban to return to power in Afghanistan and increase the risk of an Islamist military coup in Pakistan, then its views should be honored. I can't believe that will be the case...if the case is properly made. But if the public believes that U.S. national security requires a continuing presence in Afghanistan, then it should be willing to pay the tab."
http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/11/23/obeys-war-tax/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+timeblogs%2Fswampland+%28TIME%3A+Swampland%29
"A couple of weeks back, Matthew Yglesias had an insightful post noting that 'by far the fastest way to end the war in Afghanistan would be to ask General McChrystal’s staff to produce a plan to make it deficit neutral and find sixty votes in the Senate for his financing plan.'..."
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/11/death_and_taxes.html
From Joe Klein at Time:
"Congressman David Obey, who called for a tax to pay for the war in Iraq two years ago, has done it again. He's calling for a tax to pay for Afghanistan. It's a very good idea for several reasons:
1. A war is, one would hope, a temporary aberration from budget norms, requiring a jolt of new revenues. It is also the most consequential decision that a President and Congress can make; therefore, they should be willing to put their money where their mouths are.
2. The notion of shared sacrifice has somehow gotten lost in the shuffle. If we really "support" the troops, we should support the troops...In a war, every citizen should have to contribute something to the effort.
Some will say: it won't pass, and we have national security interests in Afghanistan. Trye enough. I'm in favor of continuing the Afghan campaign, and I'd be more than willing to pay my fair share for it...But there's a larger national interest that needs to be tested: in the Reagan era, a disconnect has developed between the people and their fiscal responsibilities. Any tax that ties one to the other over a concrete matter, like a war, will help rebuild the necessary relationship between spending and taxing. For Republicans who favor the war but oppose taxation, this would be a particularly crucial test of citizenship. (Although it should be noted that the Democrat Lyndon Johnson was the first to fudge the funding of a war, in Vietnam.)
If the public honestly wants the Taliban to return to power in Afghanistan and increase the risk of an Islamist military coup in Pakistan, then its views should be honored. I can't believe that will be the case...if the case is properly made. But if the public believes that U.S. national security requires a continuing presence in Afghanistan, then it should be willing to pay the tab."
http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/11/23/obeys-war-tax/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+timeblogs%2Fswampland+%28TIME%3A+Swampland%29
Monday, November 2, 2009
Inside Pakistan
TW: Londonstani is a pseudonym for a reporter from the Abu Maqawama blog. His stories reflect the challenges we face in Pakistan. No doubt our use of targeted missile strikes inside Pakistan does not curry favor with many locals. Nor does our support of the Pakistani elites who are frequently corrupt (kind like many of our elites). On the other hand, Pakistan's comfort with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda means we are bound for a certain level of conflict. Oh the conundrums...
From Abu Muqawama blog:
"...Part of the reason for Londonstani's tour was to find out what the much-mentioned "real" Pakistanis think. In Londonstani's mind this phrase is used when people mean "poor, probably illiterate and unexposed to Western media, outlooks or views". There is a nagging feeling then that wealthy, literate (at least in English) and Western educated/travelled Pakistanis are then "unreal", however, that is another discussion.
What follows is a summary of many conversations had in Punjab, Pakistani Kashmir, NWFP and Sindh:
In very stark terms; the army has lost its traditional authority as the only neutral and relatively competent public institution. Previously, the army stepped in to separate warring tribes in FATA. Now the tribes gang up to take on the army. It's previous aura has gone.
The government is full of incompetent crooks, installed by the Americans, who are like rabbits in headlights when it comes to the country's many economic and political problems (not even counting security). While the country slides off a cliff, the ruling party guys line their pockets and wait for the last plane to Dubai/London. The government is not providing educational services, electricity, water, jobs or anything else. At the same time, for the average man or woman any interaction with the government is likely to be short and brutal or long and grindingly painful. This is true whether to you getting paperwork done or are stopped for a driving offence.
Outside the main cities, the army/police is not in control. Even in the towns where they have garrisons, they are boxed in. There's a definite sense that "ungoverned spaces" are expanding and government control is shrinking. On certain main roads in Punjab (let alone NWFP or Sindh) locals advise against driving at night in case of banditry.
In terms of perception of religious observance and its role in public life, there seems to be a shift towards the more severe and less tolerant. This doesn't necessarily translate always into practice, but more a shared understanding that more severe and more rigid must equal more righteous, and that those who are very severe (or even just look it) must be deferred to.
Now, where this gets scary is when you hear a conversation like:
Person 1: "The Taliban couldn't have blown up the market in Peshawar because a Muslim wouldn't do that."
Person 2: "No, the Americans did it. But you know, the market that got blown up catered for women. And you know it's haram for women to go out of the house."
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/11/pakistan-dispatch-state-nation.html
From Abu Muqawama blog:
"...Part of the reason for Londonstani's tour was to find out what the much-mentioned "real" Pakistanis think. In Londonstani's mind this phrase is used when people mean "poor, probably illiterate and unexposed to Western media, outlooks or views". There is a nagging feeling then that wealthy, literate (at least in English) and Western educated/travelled Pakistanis are then "unreal", however, that is another discussion.
What follows is a summary of many conversations had in Punjab, Pakistani Kashmir, NWFP and Sindh:
In very stark terms; the army has lost its traditional authority as the only neutral and relatively competent public institution. Previously, the army stepped in to separate warring tribes in FATA. Now the tribes gang up to take on the army. It's previous aura has gone.
The government is full of incompetent crooks, installed by the Americans, who are like rabbits in headlights when it comes to the country's many economic and political problems (not even counting security). While the country slides off a cliff, the ruling party guys line their pockets and wait for the last plane to Dubai/London. The government is not providing educational services, electricity, water, jobs or anything else. At the same time, for the average man or woman any interaction with the government is likely to be short and brutal or long and grindingly painful. This is true whether to you getting paperwork done or are stopped for a driving offence.
Outside the main cities, the army/police is not in control. Even in the towns where they have garrisons, they are boxed in. There's a definite sense that "ungoverned spaces" are expanding and government control is shrinking. On certain main roads in Punjab (let alone NWFP or Sindh) locals advise against driving at night in case of banditry.
In terms of perception of religious observance and its role in public life, there seems to be a shift towards the more severe and less tolerant. This doesn't necessarily translate always into practice, but more a shared understanding that more severe and more rigid must equal more righteous, and that those who are very severe (or even just look it) must be deferred to.
Now, where this gets scary is when you hear a conversation like:
Person 1: "The Taliban couldn't have blown up the market in Peshawar because a Muslim wouldn't do that."
Person 2: "No, the Americans did it. But you know, the market that got blown up catered for women. And you know it's haram for women to go out of the house."
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/11/pakistan-dispatch-state-nation.html
Friday, October 30, 2009
Pondering the Implications Of One's Acts
From David Frum at New Majority:
"...This was the right thing to do, but it cannot have been easy - especially as he is making the decision that may lead to more such sad homecomings"
TW: From the comment thread to Frum's post:
balconesfault // Oct 29, 2009 at 10:35 am
Respectfully, no political talk on this thread.
2 sek // Oct 29, 2009 at 10:36 am
I certainly have no problem at all with President Obama visiting Dover or with families of fallen soldiers. I think that is a solemn duty of any Commander in Chief. But I don’t like it when the President (of either party) turns it into a photo op. I think that’s disrespectful.
3 ottovbvs // Oct 29, 2009 at 10:38 am
……..It was the right thing to do………who knows maybe he saw it part of the decision making process……..there’s a world of difference between sitting in Washington conference rooms with smart lawyers and military brass discussing theoreticals and dealing with the reality of coffins which are bringing grief to so many ordinary American homes.
4 LauraNo // Oct 29, 2009 at 10:39 am
I bet this meant a lot to the families. I hope he does it every once in a while. Presidents should have to face the awful results, not just the families, showing respect at the same time.
6 demosthenes // Oct 29, 2009 at 1:12 pm
Like most Americans, regardless of political party, I applaud the president for doing this. I understand the angst among some that photographs were taken, but honoring our heroes is what matters! Bravo, Mr. President!
7 andydp // Oct 29, 2009 at 1:26 pm
This was more meaningful to me as a Soldier.
Gerneral George Patton insisted his staff officers visited the front daily to insure they realized what their decisions really meant.
8 seeker656 // Oct 29, 2009 at 1:49 pm
Thank you for this video David. As the grandfather of two young men who will very likely be in Afghanistan next year, I respect and honor the families of these fallen heroes. I am grateful for the decision of the family that allowed this video of this emotionally painful moment to be shared.
It is important that the President experienced this event and listened to the families who were present last night as he considers the options for the future of this conflict.
11 mi-goper // Oct 29, 2009 at 5:47 pm
David, as a Marine and father of 3, I can tell you that I don’t agree with your sentiments nor your willingness to cut Obama any slack –especially with this ploy.
His presence at Dover was a calculated political manipulation to gain some momentum and credibility back with Americans because, rightly so, he’s been portrayed of late as dithering on this important decision. Dithering, many think, because he’s in hot water with his Far Left Cut & Run Democrat Kamp on escalating the war, agreeing and implementing the Cheney Plan for Afghanistan… a heresy that, when disclosed, caused his far Left flank to start nipping at his loins.
The man is a consumate actor and fake. He can look you in the eye, over the teleprompter, and tell you –with a straight face– that a public option will bring competition to the health insurance markets when its will drive free markets out. He can tell you his reform won’t require new taxes –even though they do–it won’t require cuts in services –even as he gets the OMB scissors out to whack MediCare by $500b– it won’t force you to change medical care plans –even though he’s counting on employers dropping millions of covered employees and dumping them into the public plan.
Afterall, this is the man who ran on not much more than “Hope & Change” and he’s been personally responsible for making Washington more intractable, more partisan, more divisive with his attack-dog, Chicago Thuggery attacks on anyone who dares to disagree with the Messiah Obama.
You may be willing to act naive in the face of Obama’s latest political maneuver to curry favor with a public that’s losing confidence in his role as Commander in Chief, but his moves in Dover were intended to use those flag-draped coffins as chits in his public relations effort to downscale America’s commitment to the people of Afghanistan. He doesn’t care about the dead soldiers. He cares about getting out of Afghanistan as quickly and efficiently as possible and he’s worried that if his far Left flank gets unsettled, he’s toast. Of course, his publicity stunt caters to the pro-war crowd too because, for a man who wouldn’t wear a flag pin or put his hand over his heart to say the Pledge, this stunt makes them question whether he’s truly the anti-military Democrat he was on the campaign trail.
And he’s willing to use these brave, dead soldiers as props in his Theatre of the Absurd.
Shame on you for giving him cover, David.
12 arch // Oct 29, 2009 at 5:59 pm
I don’t believe the man is a fake. I think he’s a liberal, wanna-be transformational politician with whom I don’t agree on everything. But acknowledging our fallen is important to the families and important to the country. It may seem like a no brainer, but I still applaud the President for this.
13 ottovbvs // Oct 29, 2009 at 6:38 pm
mi-goper // Oct 29, 2009 at 5:47 pm
…….Have you no self control?"
"...This was the right thing to do, but it cannot have been easy - especially as he is making the decision that may lead to more such sad homecomings"
TW: From the comment thread to Frum's post:
balconesfault // Oct 29, 2009 at 10:35 am
Respectfully, no political talk on this thread.
2 sek // Oct 29, 2009 at 10:36 am
I certainly have no problem at all with President Obama visiting Dover or with families of fallen soldiers. I think that is a solemn duty of any Commander in Chief. But I don’t like it when the President (of either party) turns it into a photo op. I think that’s disrespectful.
3 ottovbvs // Oct 29, 2009 at 10:38 am
……..It was the right thing to do………who knows maybe he saw it part of the decision making process……..there’s a world of difference between sitting in Washington conference rooms with smart lawyers and military brass discussing theoreticals and dealing with the reality of coffins which are bringing grief to so many ordinary American homes.
4 LauraNo // Oct 29, 2009 at 10:39 am
I bet this meant a lot to the families. I hope he does it every once in a while. Presidents should have to face the awful results, not just the families, showing respect at the same time.
6 demosthenes // Oct 29, 2009 at 1:12 pm
Like most Americans, regardless of political party, I applaud the president for doing this. I understand the angst among some that photographs were taken, but honoring our heroes is what matters! Bravo, Mr. President!
7 andydp // Oct 29, 2009 at 1:26 pm
This was more meaningful to me as a Soldier.
Gerneral George Patton insisted his staff officers visited the front daily to insure they realized what their decisions really meant.
8 seeker656 // Oct 29, 2009 at 1:49 pm
Thank you for this video David. As the grandfather of two young men who will very likely be in Afghanistan next year, I respect and honor the families of these fallen heroes. I am grateful for the decision of the family that allowed this video of this emotionally painful moment to be shared.
It is important that the President experienced this event and listened to the families who were present last night as he considers the options for the future of this conflict.
11 mi-goper // Oct 29, 2009 at 5:47 pm
David, as a Marine and father of 3, I can tell you that I don’t agree with your sentiments nor your willingness to cut Obama any slack –especially with this ploy.
His presence at Dover was a calculated political manipulation to gain some momentum and credibility back with Americans because, rightly so, he’s been portrayed of late as dithering on this important decision. Dithering, many think, because he’s in hot water with his Far Left Cut & Run Democrat Kamp on escalating the war, agreeing and implementing the Cheney Plan for Afghanistan… a heresy that, when disclosed, caused his far Left flank to start nipping at his loins.
The man is a consumate actor and fake. He can look you in the eye, over the teleprompter, and tell you –with a straight face– that a public option will bring competition to the health insurance markets when its will drive free markets out. He can tell you his reform won’t require new taxes –even though they do–it won’t require cuts in services –even as he gets the OMB scissors out to whack MediCare by $500b– it won’t force you to change medical care plans –even though he’s counting on employers dropping millions of covered employees and dumping them into the public plan.
Afterall, this is the man who ran on not much more than “Hope & Change” and he’s been personally responsible for making Washington more intractable, more partisan, more divisive with his attack-dog, Chicago Thuggery attacks on anyone who dares to disagree with the Messiah Obama.
You may be willing to act naive in the face of Obama’s latest political maneuver to curry favor with a public that’s losing confidence in his role as Commander in Chief, but his moves in Dover were intended to use those flag-draped coffins as chits in his public relations effort to downscale America’s commitment to the people of Afghanistan. He doesn’t care about the dead soldiers. He cares about getting out of Afghanistan as quickly and efficiently as possible and he’s worried that if his far Left flank gets unsettled, he’s toast. Of course, his publicity stunt caters to the pro-war crowd too because, for a man who wouldn’t wear a flag pin or put his hand over his heart to say the Pledge, this stunt makes them question whether he’s truly the anti-military Democrat he was on the campaign trail.
And he’s willing to use these brave, dead soldiers as props in his Theatre of the Absurd.
Shame on you for giving him cover, David.
12 arch // Oct 29, 2009 at 5:59 pm
I don’t believe the man is a fake. I think he’s a liberal, wanna-be transformational politician with whom I don’t agree on everything. But acknowledging our fallen is important to the families and important to the country. It may seem like a no brainer, but I still applaud the President for this.
13 ottovbvs // Oct 29, 2009 at 6:38 pm
mi-goper // Oct 29, 2009 at 5:47 pm
…….Have you no self control?"
Yes AfPak IS Hard
TW: Friedman's column could be summed up as: "AfPak is hard and we are not good at fixing things anyway". I concur with both sentiments. But he also goes on to imply Iraq matters more than AfPak and that we can risk a conflagration in AfPak after our departure. This is dangerously wrong-headed. I have no idea where he is headed with the Iraq story unless he still harbors dreams of some Jeffersonian democracy emerging in that tribally riven nation.
As for AfPak, we have been there for eight years, no one would claim it is easy. Some perhaps thought we would waltz in with a bunch of precision weaponry and a few thousand advisers and things would work out, but those pipe dreams are long gone. Yet few would claim it is not a pivotal region. If Friedman is right and it is not a pivotal region, then yes we should get the hell out. But I believe is very wrong. I have stated my case previously here. Just because it is hard does not make it the wrong place to be.
From Tom Friedman at NYT:
"It is crunch time on Afghanistan, so here’s my vote: We need to be thinking about how to reduce our footprint and our goals there in a responsible way, not dig in deeper. We simply do not have the Afghan partners, the NATO allies, the domestic support, the financial resources or the national interests to justify an enlarged and prolonged nation-building effort in Afghanistan.
I base this conclusion on three principles. First, when I think back on all the moments of progress in that part of the world — all the times when a key player in the Middle East actually did something that put a smile on my face — all of them have one thing in common: America had nothing to do with it.
America helped build out what they started, but the breakthrough didn’t start with us. We can fan the flames, but the parties themselves have to light the fires of moderation. And whenever we try to do it for them, whenever we want it more than they do, we fail and they languish.
The Camp David peace treaty was not initiated by Jimmy Carter. Rather, the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, went to Jerusalem in 1977 after Israel’s Moshe Dayan held secret talks in Morocco with Sadat aide Hassan Tuhami. Both countries decided that they wanted a separate peace — outside of the Geneva comprehensive framework pushed by Mr. Carter...
The message: “People do not change when we tell them they should,” said the Johns Hopkins University foreign policy expert Michael Mandelbaum. “They change when they tell themselves they must.”
And when the moderate silent majorities take ownership of their own futures, we win. When they won’t, when we want them to compromise more than they do, we lose. The locals sense they have us over a barrel, so they exploit our naïve goodwill and presence to loot their countries and to defeat their internal foes.
That’s how I see Afghanistan today. I see no moderate spark. I see our secretary of state pleading with President Hamid Karzai to re-do an election that he blatantly stole. I also see us begging Israelis to stop building more crazy settlements or Palestinians to come to negotiations. It is time to stop subsidizing their nonsense. Let them all start paying retail for their extremism, not wholesale. Then you’ll see movement.
What if we shrink our presence in Afghanistan? Won’t Al Qaeda return, the Taliban be energized and Pakistan collapse? Maybe. Maybe not. This gets to my second principle: In the Middle East, all politics — everything that matters — happens the morning after the morning after. Be patient. Yes, the morning after we shrink down in Afghanistan, the Taliban will celebrate, Pakistan will quake and bin Laden will issue an exultant video.
And the morning after the morning after, the Taliban factions will start fighting each other, the Pakistani Army will have to destroy their Taliban, or be destroyed by them, Afghanistan’s warlords will carve up the country, and, if bin Laden comes out of his cave, he’ll get zapped by a drone.
My last guiding principle: We are the world. A strong, healthy and self-confident America is what holds the world together and on a decent path. A weak America would be a disaster for us and the world. China, Russia and Al Qaeda all love the idea of America doing a long, slow bleed in Afghanistan. I don’t.
The U.S. military has given its assessment. It said that stabilizing Afghanistan and removing it as a threat requires rebuilding that whole country. Unfortunately, that is a 20-year project at best, and we can’t afford it. So our political leadership needs to insist on a strategy that will get the most security for less money and less presence. We simply don’t have the surplus we had when we started the war on terrorism after 9/11 — and we desperately need nation-building at home. We have to be smarter. Let’s finish Iraq, because a decent outcome there really could positively impact the whole Arab-Muslim world, and limit our exposure elsewhere. Iraq matters.
Yes, shrinking down in Afghanistan will create new threats, but expanding there will, too. I’d rather deal with the new threats with a stronger America."
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/opinion/28friedman.html?_r=1&hp
As for AfPak, we have been there for eight years, no one would claim it is easy. Some perhaps thought we would waltz in with a bunch of precision weaponry and a few thousand advisers and things would work out, but those pipe dreams are long gone. Yet few would claim it is not a pivotal region. If Friedman is right and it is not a pivotal region, then yes we should get the hell out. But I believe is very wrong. I have stated my case previously here. Just because it is hard does not make it the wrong place to be.
From Tom Friedman at NYT:
"It is crunch time on Afghanistan, so here’s my vote: We need to be thinking about how to reduce our footprint and our goals there in a responsible way, not dig in deeper. We simply do not have the Afghan partners, the NATO allies, the domestic support, the financial resources or the national interests to justify an enlarged and prolonged nation-building effort in Afghanistan.
I base this conclusion on three principles. First, when I think back on all the moments of progress in that part of the world — all the times when a key player in the Middle East actually did something that put a smile on my face — all of them have one thing in common: America had nothing to do with it.
America helped build out what they started, but the breakthrough didn’t start with us. We can fan the flames, but the parties themselves have to light the fires of moderation. And whenever we try to do it for them, whenever we want it more than they do, we fail and they languish.
The Camp David peace treaty was not initiated by Jimmy Carter. Rather, the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, went to Jerusalem in 1977 after Israel’s Moshe Dayan held secret talks in Morocco with Sadat aide Hassan Tuhami. Both countries decided that they wanted a separate peace — outside of the Geneva comprehensive framework pushed by Mr. Carter...
The message: “People do not change when we tell them they should,” said the Johns Hopkins University foreign policy expert Michael Mandelbaum. “They change when they tell themselves they must.”
And when the moderate silent majorities take ownership of their own futures, we win. When they won’t, when we want them to compromise more than they do, we lose. The locals sense they have us over a barrel, so they exploit our naïve goodwill and presence to loot their countries and to defeat their internal foes.
That’s how I see Afghanistan today. I see no moderate spark. I see our secretary of state pleading with President Hamid Karzai to re-do an election that he blatantly stole. I also see us begging Israelis to stop building more crazy settlements or Palestinians to come to negotiations. It is time to stop subsidizing their nonsense. Let them all start paying retail for their extremism, not wholesale. Then you’ll see movement.
What if we shrink our presence in Afghanistan? Won’t Al Qaeda return, the Taliban be energized and Pakistan collapse? Maybe. Maybe not. This gets to my second principle: In the Middle East, all politics — everything that matters — happens the morning after the morning after. Be patient. Yes, the morning after we shrink down in Afghanistan, the Taliban will celebrate, Pakistan will quake and bin Laden will issue an exultant video.
And the morning after the morning after, the Taliban factions will start fighting each other, the Pakistani Army will have to destroy their Taliban, or be destroyed by them, Afghanistan’s warlords will carve up the country, and, if bin Laden comes out of his cave, he’ll get zapped by a drone.
My last guiding principle: We are the world. A strong, healthy and self-confident America is what holds the world together and on a decent path. A weak America would be a disaster for us and the world. China, Russia and Al Qaeda all love the idea of America doing a long, slow bleed in Afghanistan. I don’t.
The U.S. military has given its assessment. It said that stabilizing Afghanistan and removing it as a threat requires rebuilding that whole country. Unfortunately, that is a 20-year project at best, and we can’t afford it. So our political leadership needs to insist on a strategy that will get the most security for less money and less presence. We simply don’t have the surplus we had when we started the war on terrorism after 9/11 — and we desperately need nation-building at home. We have to be smarter. Let’s finish Iraq, because a decent outcome there really could positively impact the whole Arab-Muslim world, and limit our exposure elsewhere. Iraq matters.
Yes, shrinking down in Afghanistan will create new threats, but expanding there will, too. I’d rather deal with the new threats with a stronger America."
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/opinion/28friedman.html?_r=1&hp
Wednesday, October 28, 2009
The Germans And AfPak
TW: See below for my parsing of some German thoughts on AfPak. We need the Germans and the Germans should want to be engaged in AfPak, else they are free-riders. But if our policies suck (as they have frequently have) then engaging for them is very challenging.
From George Packer at New Yorker:
"Among those waiting for the outcome of the White House review of its Afghanistan strategy are the Germans. The country’s politicians refuse to call the war in Afghanistan a war. Germany’s participation was sold to the public here as peacekeeping and reconstruction, and that’s what it must remain to prevent any further erosion of support...The German politicians and journalists I’ve spoken with want Germany to do more, not less, in Afghanistan, even if that means fighting. Public opinion in this amazingly pacifist country runs otherwise, though only the extreme left and right want an immediate withdrawal. This gap between élite and mass opinion is a dangerous one, since there’s so little attempt by German leaders to explain the country’s position in the war and why it might be necessary to do more than build roads and schools. A single mass-casualty blow against German forces in Afghanistan (or against a soft target here in Germany—the intelligence traffic has been unusually heavy recently) could significantly change the terms of this non-debate.
I spoke with a senior German diplomat earlier this month, and several points he made struck me:
1.The Germans are waiting for an American position to emerge before they come up with their own. [TW: seems fair, they are not the only ones, if we back off most others will flee, on the other hand if we escalate we will need all hands on deck]
2.There is little to no real consultation of the NATO allies on the part of the White House—its strategy review is an internal affair. If so, this is really too bad. We have a lot to learn from our Europeans allies in Afghanistan. Germans in particular have ties there that go back to the nineteenth century. [TW: hopefully this is not literally true, allies always claim to be under-consulted, we should be engaging our allies strenuously, if we want their help we owe them engagement]
3.Germans have a hard time accepting the narrow rationale for the war in Afghanistan, based on preventing another 9/11. For them, the reason to be in Afghanistan is to prevent a return to power of the Taliban and with it an enormous propaganda victory for Islamists all over the world. In other words, Obama’s turn away from Bush’s more ideological agenda and toward a narrow focus on national security is not necessarily persuasive here, in spite of the former’s huge popularity and the latter’s abysmal reputation. (How’s that for irony?) [TW: I disagree with how Packer frames this. If Obama is merely trying to avert another 9/11 he is going to make big mistakes. On the other hand Bush's neo-con ideology was about imposing democracy and asserting American imperial capabilities. What Obama will hopefully do is ignore that ideology whilst pursuing realpolitik policies to stabilize the AfPak region which have little to do with democracy and U.S. imperialism but much to do with containing radical Islam and maintaining a stable Pakistan.]
4.The German attitude toward the fraudulent Afghan election is: what did you expect? It happens all the time in that part of the world. The problem comes when you raise expectations to an unreasonable level. I’ve also heard this view from a couple of American officials. Here, it seems connected to a sense of European realism, if not cynicism, toward America’s universalist approach to democracy when applied to non-European countries...
[TW: I agree with this attitude, getting wrapped up in Karzai's "democratic" credentials is a false errand]."
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2009/10/the-german-view-of-afghanistan.html
From George Packer at New Yorker:
"Among those waiting for the outcome of the White House review of its Afghanistan strategy are the Germans. The country’s politicians refuse to call the war in Afghanistan a war. Germany’s participation was sold to the public here as peacekeeping and reconstruction, and that’s what it must remain to prevent any further erosion of support...The German politicians and journalists I’ve spoken with want Germany to do more, not less, in Afghanistan, even if that means fighting. Public opinion in this amazingly pacifist country runs otherwise, though only the extreme left and right want an immediate withdrawal. This gap between élite and mass opinion is a dangerous one, since there’s so little attempt by German leaders to explain the country’s position in the war and why it might be necessary to do more than build roads and schools. A single mass-casualty blow against German forces in Afghanistan (or against a soft target here in Germany—the intelligence traffic has been unusually heavy recently) could significantly change the terms of this non-debate.
I spoke with a senior German diplomat earlier this month, and several points he made struck me:
1.The Germans are waiting for an American position to emerge before they come up with their own. [TW: seems fair, they are not the only ones, if we back off most others will flee, on the other hand if we escalate we will need all hands on deck]
2.There is little to no real consultation of the NATO allies on the part of the White House—its strategy review is an internal affair. If so, this is really too bad. We have a lot to learn from our Europeans allies in Afghanistan. Germans in particular have ties there that go back to the nineteenth century. [TW: hopefully this is not literally true, allies always claim to be under-consulted, we should be engaging our allies strenuously, if we want their help we owe them engagement]
3.Germans have a hard time accepting the narrow rationale for the war in Afghanistan, based on preventing another 9/11. For them, the reason to be in Afghanistan is to prevent a return to power of the Taliban and with it an enormous propaganda victory for Islamists all over the world. In other words, Obama’s turn away from Bush’s more ideological agenda and toward a narrow focus on national security is not necessarily persuasive here, in spite of the former’s huge popularity and the latter’s abysmal reputation. (How’s that for irony?) [TW: I disagree with how Packer frames this. If Obama is merely trying to avert another 9/11 he is going to make big mistakes. On the other hand Bush's neo-con ideology was about imposing democracy and asserting American imperial capabilities. What Obama will hopefully do is ignore that ideology whilst pursuing realpolitik policies to stabilize the AfPak region which have little to do with democracy and U.S. imperialism but much to do with containing radical Islam and maintaining a stable Pakistan.]
4.The German attitude toward the fraudulent Afghan election is: what did you expect? It happens all the time in that part of the world. The problem comes when you raise expectations to an unreasonable level. I’ve also heard this view from a couple of American officials. Here, it seems connected to a sense of European realism, if not cynicism, toward America’s universalist approach to democracy when applied to non-European countries...
[TW: I agree with this attitude, getting wrapped up in Karzai's "democratic" credentials is a false errand]."
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2009/10/the-german-view-of-afghanistan.html
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Some Hope In Pakistan?
TW: Pakistan as best I can tell has two governing bodies, the military and the civilian government of Zardari. Both are highly relevant. The military has been most reluctant to aggressively strike the Taliban. They have done so periodically and are doing so again presently. Perhaps this time will be more substantial and more permanent than previous efforts. This piece supports the notion that this time could be different in a positive way.
One of the reasons I believe the U.S. should escalate its presence in Afghanistan is to motivate and provide reassurance to the Pakistanis that their efforts within their border regions will backed by similarly aggressive and long-term actions by the U.S. and its allies. The Taliban are not necessarily popular in absolute terms merely somewhat popular in relative terms where security voids exist on both sides of the AfPak border. Coordinated Pakistani and allied efforts could in time crush the Taliban. Alternatively should the U.S. et al. back off in Afghanistan one could expect the Pakistanis to likewise back off leaving the Taliban with growing voids in which to expand.
From David Ignatius at WaPo:
"RAWALPINDI, PAKISTAN Until a few months ago, Pakistani officials often used the term "miscreants" when they described the Taliban fighters operating from the western tribal areas. This moniker conveyed the sense that the Taliban was a nuisance -- a ragtag band of fanatics and gangsters who could be placated with peace deals -- rather than a mortal threat to the nation.
That state of denial appears to be over. This week's offensive against Taliban sanctuaries in South Waziristan is the latest sign that Pakistan has awakened to the seriousness of its domestic terrorism problem...
Popular anger against the Taliban has been building this year. Back in April, the country seemed dazed and politically paralyzed. But as the Islamic extremists broke out of the Swat Valley that month and moved closer to the capital, something changed. The army launched an aggressive campaign in Swat, the Taliban fighters were pushed back and the public cheered.
The Taliban countered with a recent wave of terrorist attacks, and a visitor sees more checkpoints and roadblocks now than a few weeks ago. People are edgy, but the suicide bombers haven't broken public support for the army's assault in Waziristan. Quite the opposite, judging from editorials in the country's sometimes strident newspapers.
"The politicians may be divided over other matters but are united over the need for a military operation against the terrorists," wrote the Daily Times. "If peace is to be restored in Pakistan, militancy has to be crushed," argued the Post. Dawn editorialized that "at the moment, the political will and public support is on the security forces' side."
...Abbas says that to win, the army must be seen as operating independently of the United States: "We told the Americans, stay away. Let us do it." To demonstrate that independence, the Pakistanis asked the United States to halt its highly effective Predator drone attacks over South Waziristan. "Public support is more important," explains one military official.
Pakistan has pledged action against the Taliban in the past, only to make peace agreements when the fighting got tough. It's too early to say whether the early resolve this time will carry through the harsh winter, as the army confronts the notoriously tough Mehsud tribesmen. In the tribal areas, "people are always on the winning side. They wait and see the outcome," says Abbas..."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/21/AR2009102102848.html?hpid=opinionsbox1
One of the reasons I believe the U.S. should escalate its presence in Afghanistan is to motivate and provide reassurance to the Pakistanis that their efforts within their border regions will backed by similarly aggressive and long-term actions by the U.S. and its allies. The Taliban are not necessarily popular in absolute terms merely somewhat popular in relative terms where security voids exist on both sides of the AfPak border. Coordinated Pakistani and allied efforts could in time crush the Taliban. Alternatively should the U.S. et al. back off in Afghanistan one could expect the Pakistanis to likewise back off leaving the Taliban with growing voids in which to expand.
From David Ignatius at WaPo:
"RAWALPINDI, PAKISTAN Until a few months ago, Pakistani officials often used the term "miscreants" when they described the Taliban fighters operating from the western tribal areas. This moniker conveyed the sense that the Taliban was a nuisance -- a ragtag band of fanatics and gangsters who could be placated with peace deals -- rather than a mortal threat to the nation.
That state of denial appears to be over. This week's offensive against Taliban sanctuaries in South Waziristan is the latest sign that Pakistan has awakened to the seriousness of its domestic terrorism problem...
Popular anger against the Taliban has been building this year. Back in April, the country seemed dazed and politically paralyzed. But as the Islamic extremists broke out of the Swat Valley that month and moved closer to the capital, something changed. The army launched an aggressive campaign in Swat, the Taliban fighters were pushed back and the public cheered.
The Taliban countered with a recent wave of terrorist attacks, and a visitor sees more checkpoints and roadblocks now than a few weeks ago. People are edgy, but the suicide bombers haven't broken public support for the army's assault in Waziristan. Quite the opposite, judging from editorials in the country's sometimes strident newspapers.
"The politicians may be divided over other matters but are united over the need for a military operation against the terrorists," wrote the Daily Times. "If peace is to be restored in Pakistan, militancy has to be crushed," argued the Post. Dawn editorialized that "at the moment, the political will and public support is on the security forces' side."
...Abbas says that to win, the army must be seen as operating independently of the United States: "We told the Americans, stay away. Let us do it." To demonstrate that independence, the Pakistanis asked the United States to halt its highly effective Predator drone attacks over South Waziristan. "Public support is more important," explains one military official.
Pakistan has pledged action against the Taliban in the past, only to make peace agreements when the fighting got tough. It's too early to say whether the early resolve this time will carry through the harsh winter, as the army confronts the notoriously tough Mehsud tribesmen. In the tribal areas, "people are always on the winning side. They wait and see the outcome," says Abbas..."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/21/AR2009102102848.html?hpid=opinionsbox1
Friday, October 23, 2009
An AfPak Test
TW: I suspect folks would prefer to think about alternative topics, if so there are roughly a million other websites one can visit. Alternatively I could rant about what a vapid, venomous dick Cheney is but he is yesterday's news, thankfully.
Below is a piece by James Fallows at Atlantic, Fallows tends to be fairly balanced observer:
"The NYT op-ed page that has just gone up, for tomorrow morning's paper, has as concise a paired description of options in Afghanistan as anyone could want. Each of the articles is by an American writer with experience in the region. One says we should send more troops; the other says that would be a mistake. Each is clearly written with a brief passage that distills the outlook and sensibility.One says:
"The United States was born of our ancestors' nationalistic resentment of a foreign power whose troops we saw as occupiers, not protectors. The British never fathomed our basic grievance -- this was our land, not theirs! -- so the more they cracked down, the more they empowered the American insurgency....
"We have been similarly oblivious to the strength of nationalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly among the 40 million Pashtuns who live on both sides of the border there. That's one reason the additional 21,000 troops that President Obama ordered to Afghanistan earlier this year haven't helped achieve stability, and it's difficult to see why 40,000 more would help either."And the other says:
"During 10 days spent in Afghanistan at the invitation of Gen. David Petraeus, the head of Central Command, I observed that a difficult task has been further complicated by the checkered results of the Afghan election. But what seems to be conspicuously absent from the conversation in the United States is the realization that Afghanistan's corruption problem, like its security problem, can be best addressed by additional troops.
"Given what I saw and heard on my visit, I believe it is indeed possible to get Afghanistan's politicos to do a better job -- you just have to watch them closely.... Poor governance is an argument for, not against, a troop surge. "
The writers' identities are after the jump. I'm concentrating on the arguments themselves because I think they represent an extraordinarily pure Rorschach test. There are cases where you can listen to various sides and think, "Well, they've all got good points." But in this case, I bet most people will think: one of these perspectives rings true, and one sounds tragically deluded"
TW: The writers are Nick Kristoff from NYT and Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations. I do not care for either. Kristoff is a standard bleeding heart liberal, Boot a neo-con who would have us blow up more or less everyone who crosses us. But Kristoff misses a fundamental point. What happens if we de-escalate? Practically no one addresses this challenge. Folks so many time fall into a "this is too hard" camp or "by god we are 'Mericans, and folks better do as we say or else".
In retrospect we should not have been in Iraq or Vietnam. But no one can define for me, why leaving AfPak to let the Pashtuns have at each other, whilst concurrently serving as a petri dish and launching pad for radical Islamists and de-stabilizing what has become a highly critical region of the world, is a viable strategy. Until someone does I am going to keep pounding the table about the need for the U.S. to engage aggressively.
http://jamesfallows.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/10/a_rorschach_test_on_afghanista.php
Below is a piece by James Fallows at Atlantic, Fallows tends to be fairly balanced observer:
"The NYT op-ed page that has just gone up, for tomorrow morning's paper, has as concise a paired description of options in Afghanistan as anyone could want. Each of the articles is by an American writer with experience in the region. One says we should send more troops; the other says that would be a mistake. Each is clearly written with a brief passage that distills the outlook and sensibility.One says:
"The United States was born of our ancestors' nationalistic resentment of a foreign power whose troops we saw as occupiers, not protectors. The British never fathomed our basic grievance -- this was our land, not theirs! -- so the more they cracked down, the more they empowered the American insurgency....
"We have been similarly oblivious to the strength of nationalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly among the 40 million Pashtuns who live on both sides of the border there. That's one reason the additional 21,000 troops that President Obama ordered to Afghanistan earlier this year haven't helped achieve stability, and it's difficult to see why 40,000 more would help either."And the other says:
"During 10 days spent in Afghanistan at the invitation of Gen. David Petraeus, the head of Central Command, I observed that a difficult task has been further complicated by the checkered results of the Afghan election. But what seems to be conspicuously absent from the conversation in the United States is the realization that Afghanistan's corruption problem, like its security problem, can be best addressed by additional troops.
"Given what I saw and heard on my visit, I believe it is indeed possible to get Afghanistan's politicos to do a better job -- you just have to watch them closely.... Poor governance is an argument for, not against, a troop surge. "
The writers' identities are after the jump. I'm concentrating on the arguments themselves because I think they represent an extraordinarily pure Rorschach test. There are cases where you can listen to various sides and think, "Well, they've all got good points." But in this case, I bet most people will think: one of these perspectives rings true, and one sounds tragically deluded"
TW: The writers are Nick Kristoff from NYT and Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations. I do not care for either. Kristoff is a standard bleeding heart liberal, Boot a neo-con who would have us blow up more or less everyone who crosses us. But Kristoff misses a fundamental point. What happens if we de-escalate? Practically no one addresses this challenge. Folks so many time fall into a "this is too hard" camp or "by god we are 'Mericans, and folks better do as we say or else".
In retrospect we should not have been in Iraq or Vietnam. But no one can define for me, why leaving AfPak to let the Pashtuns have at each other, whilst concurrently serving as a petri dish and launching pad for radical Islamists and de-stabilizing what has become a highly critical region of the world, is a viable strategy. Until someone does I am going to keep pounding the table about the need for the U.S. to engage aggressively.
http://jamesfallows.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/10/a_rorschach_test_on_afghanista.php
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