TW:...but perhaps ultimately more effective and less costly in blood and treasure
"Amazing what can happen when you have a foreign policy that includes diplomacy and force and sophistication."
--Andrew Sullivan's comment on the Coll article
From Steve Coll at New Yorker:
"The news that a joint C.I.A.-Pakistani raid in Karachi resulted last week in the capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is a big deal...Why would Pakistan move decisively against Afghan Taliban leadership now? The Times suggests that Pakistani generals under the lame-duck Army chief, General Ashraf Kiyani, are coming around to the view that they require a national-security doctrine that does not involve sheltering the Afghan Taliban...
I would guess at a more subtle motivation, one that might suggest a favorable pattern now emerging in the Obama Administration’s and Central Command’s approach to Pakistan’s role in the Afghan conflict. Over the last few months, by multiple means, the United States and its allies have been seeking to persuade Pakistan that it can best achieve its legitimate security goals in Afghanistan through political negotiations, rather than through the promotion of endless (and futile) Taliban guerrilla violence—and that the United States will respect and accommodate Pakistan’s agenda in such talks. Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban, especially in recent years, was always best understood as a military lever to promote political accommodations of Pakistan in Kabul. Baradar, however, has defiantly refused to participate in such political strategies...The more the Taliban’s leaders enjoying sanctuary in Karachi or Quetta refuse to lash themselves to Pakistani political strategy, the more vulnerable they become to a knock on the door in the middle of the night.
If, through a combination of pressure and enticement, Pakistan and the United States can draw sections of the Taliban into peaceful negotiations, while incarcerating those who refuse to participate, it will produce a sweeping change in the war. With enough momentum, such a strategy would also increase the incentives for Pakistan and Taliban elements to betray Al Qaeda’s top leaders. It’s been a while since there has been unadulterated good news out of Pakistan. Today there is."
Showing posts with label New Yorker. Show all posts
Showing posts with label New Yorker. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
Listen To This Guy On Afghanistan
TW: Kilcullen was an early voice for the type of politically oriented initiatives that have likely provided the most value in reducing the temperature of conflict in Iraq. When it became clear Petreaus was using guys like Kilcullen in Iraq I started having some hope that mess might improve. To be clear it is still a mess, a patently unnecessary mess and a mess into which the US should have never gotten involved. Nevertheless it is better now than it was and Kilcullen is one of the reasons why. If you have time read the 2006 New Yorker article focused on Kilcullen.
He now turns his attention to Afghanistan. Some of his key points include: not trying to replicate an Iraqi type surge in Afghanistan (different place and people) and not just dumping more combat troops into the fray without changing the strategies (e.g. banging your head harder against the wall will not knock the wall over).
From the New Yorker interview with Kilcullen:
"...It’s bad: violence is way up, Taliban influence has spread at the local level, and popular confidence in the government and the international community is waning fast. It’s still winnable, but only just, and to turn this thing around will take an extremely major effort starting with local-level governance, political strategy, giving the Afghan people a well-founded feeling of security, and dealing with the active sanctuary in Pakistan. A normal U.S. government transition takes six to nine months, by the time new political appointees are confirmed, briefed, and in position. But nine months out from now will be the height of the Afghan fighting season, and less than a month out from critical Presidential elections in Afghanistan. If we do this the “normal” way, it will be too late for the Obama Administration to grip it up.
The classical counterinsurgency theorist Bernard Fall wrote, in 1965, that a government which is losing to an insurgency isn’t being out-fought, it’s being out-governed. In our case, we are being both out-fought and out-governed for four basic reasons:
1) We have failed to secure the Afghan people
2) We have failed to deal with the Pakistani sanctuary
3) The Afghan government has not delivered legitimate, good governance to Afghans at the local level
4) Neither we nor the Afghans are organized, staffed, or resourced to do these three things
...There has been an emphasis on fighting the Taliban, which has led us into operations (both air and ground-based) that do a lot of damage but do not make people feel safer
...I doubt that an Anbar-style “awakening” is likely in Afghanistan."
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2008/11/kilcullen-on-af.html
The 2006 story:
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2
He now turns his attention to Afghanistan. Some of his key points include: not trying to replicate an Iraqi type surge in Afghanistan (different place and people) and not just dumping more combat troops into the fray without changing the strategies (e.g. banging your head harder against the wall will not knock the wall over).
From the New Yorker interview with Kilcullen:
"...It’s bad: violence is way up, Taliban influence has spread at the local level, and popular confidence in the government and the international community is waning fast. It’s still winnable, but only just, and to turn this thing around will take an extremely major effort starting with local-level governance, political strategy, giving the Afghan people a well-founded feeling of security, and dealing with the active sanctuary in Pakistan. A normal U.S. government transition takes six to nine months, by the time new political appointees are confirmed, briefed, and in position. But nine months out from now will be the height of the Afghan fighting season, and less than a month out from critical Presidential elections in Afghanistan. If we do this the “normal” way, it will be too late for the Obama Administration to grip it up.
The classical counterinsurgency theorist Bernard Fall wrote, in 1965, that a government which is losing to an insurgency isn’t being out-fought, it’s being out-governed. In our case, we are being both out-fought and out-governed for four basic reasons:
1) We have failed to secure the Afghan people
2) We have failed to deal with the Pakistani sanctuary
3) The Afghan government has not delivered legitimate, good governance to Afghans at the local level
4) Neither we nor the Afghans are organized, staffed, or resourced to do these three things
...There has been an emphasis on fighting the Taliban, which has led us into operations (both air and ground-based) that do a lot of damage but do not make people feel safer
...I doubt that an Anbar-style “awakening” is likely in Afghanistan."
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2008/11/kilcullen-on-af.html
The 2006 story:
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2
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